India faces a complex dilemma regarding its stance towards the Taliban, which currently governs Afghanistan. The group returned to power in August 2021, raising critical concerns across the region about the stability and orientation of Afghan policy.

Indian interests in Afghanistan have traditionally focused on development aid, infrastructure projects, and diplomatic engagement with prior governments. These efforts have often been underpinned by a desire to counter hostile influence from Pakistan and wider extremist forces.

The Taliban’s historical association with terrorism remains deeply troubling. Links to organisations such as al-Qaeda fuel apprehensions about Afghanistan’s potential resurgence as a safe haven for international militancy.

Indian policymakers fear that Taliban rule could rejuvenate anti-India extremist groups operating from Afghanistan or bolster insurgencies on Indian soil, especially when combined with Pakistan’s support networks in the region.

Since August 2021, New Delhi has pivoted to cautious diplomacy with the Taliban. India reopened its Kabul embassy in June 2022 and has maintained limited engagement aimed at safeguarding Indian nationals, investments, and strategic interests.

This outreach does not signify endorsement but reflects pragmatic recognition of realities on the ground. India remains wary of legitimising the Taliban regime yet sees constrained dialogue as vital for risk mitigation and intelligence gathering.

The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is severe and persistent. India has sent food, vaccines, and winter supplies as part of regional humanitarian efforts, signalling a willingness to separate basic aid from direct political cooperation.

Yet, such measures only partly address deeper anxieties over long-term security implications for both Afghanistan and India.

Concerns about the Taliban’s reliability as a partner persist. The group’s governance characteristics—including exclusion of women, repression of minorities, and ad hoc rule of law—undermine India’s preference for pluralism and stable institutions in its neighbour.

Sporadic statements promising non-interference or improved ties remain unconvincing until substantiated by concrete actions on cross-border terrorism and minority rights.

The geopolitical balance complicates choices further. China, Russia, and Iran have engaged the Taliban for varied strategic reasons, while Pakistan openly supports its government. India faces pressure to remain engaged in the region to maintain its influence and safeguard investments, challenging its historical reticence to collaborate with the Taliban.

Indian intelligence agencies remain vigilant for signs of militant regrouping in Afghanistan. Despite official assurances from Kabul, the potential for infiltration and radicalisation across the India–Afghanistan–Pakistan arc cannot be dismissed. The Taliban’s attitudes towards Kashmir and jihadist groups may fluctuate, and policy reversals could pose direct threats to Indian interests.

In sum, India cannot fully trust the Taliban based on observed policy patterns, historical baggage, and continuing ambiguities. Engagement remains tactical and heavily guarded, prioritising national security, intelligence, and humanitarian calculus over partnership or endorsement.

Any evolution in India–Taliban relations will rest strictly on verifiable actions regarding terrorism, regional stability, and governance rather than rhetoric alone.

Based On ANI Report