by Col (Dr) P K Vasudeva

The question of whether the Russia, India and China (TROIKA) — together with the broader Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) grouping — can effectively “blow out” or dismantle the global supremacy of the United States is complex. There are strong headwinds on both sides, and the answer is: possibly over time — but not imminently and not without serious obstacles.

BRICS + 6 new members Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia now represent a large share of the world’s population and a growing share of global GDP (especially under PPP) so the impact of any bloc they form is sizeable totalling 11.

India and China in particular have large domestic markets, rising consumption, and increasing global influence. The U.S. dollar’s dominance (reserve currency, global trade invoicing) is being questioned. BRICS nations have expressed interest in alternate payment systems, local-currency settlement and de-dollarisation.

BRICS has established mechanisms like the New Development Bank and a contingency reserve arrangement to provide some financial autonomy outside the U.S./Western-dominated institutions. TROIKA members (notably Russia, China and India) are actively pushing for trade and finance in non-USD terms.

Russia explicitly sees the multipolarity project as a way to reduce U.S. unipolar dominance. The very existence of an expanding bloc of emerging powers changes the “default” of global governance being led by the U.S. and its allies.

U.S. trade policies (tariffs, trade wars) have created friction and revealed to some the limits of unilateral power. The U.S.’s large debt, global military/strategic burdens, and internal polarisation give some possibility that challengers may gradually erode its dominance.

BRICS members are very heterogeneous: democracies vs authoritarian states; different strategic priorities (India vs China vs Russia) and different relationships with the West. For example, India tries to balance between the U.S. and China, and has ambivalent views on making BRICS explicitly anti-Western.

Decision-making in BRICS is consensus-based, which limits how fast and how radical unified action can be taken. Some members accept the U.S.’s global system rather than attempting to overturn it completely — which weakens the “bloc” effect. The U.S. dollar still dominates global reserves and trade invoicing. Changing that will take time, trust, and infrastructure.

Alternative currencies (including China’s yuan) are not yet globally trusted or deep enough to replace the dollar’s role. The existing global financial architecture (IMF, World Bank, SWIFT etc) heavily favours the U.S./Western side. Unless challengers build strong replacements, the structural advantages persist.

Being able to propose alternatives is one thing and having the economic, technological, military, institutional depth to challenge U.S. supremacy is another. The U.S. still leads in many critical technology sectors, military alliances, global cultural/institutional influence. If the U.S. can deploy its advantages (alliances, soft power, innovation) effectively, it will be hard to “blow out” overnight.

The U.S. has shown willingness to use tariffs, sanctions, trade restrictions etc. The challengers risk severe counter-measures. Fragmentation or confrontation could destabilise the global system and hurt all sides; many BRICS members may prefer incremental change rather than systemic risk.

In the medium to long term (say 10-20 years): it is plausible that a strengthened BRICS-plus axis — especially if India, China, Russia, and other Global South states cohere more — could shift the balance away from U.S. dominance toward a more truly multipolar world. But in the short term (next 3-5 years), the odds are low that U.S. supremacy will be “blown away.” It is more likely we see a gradual erosion of dominance rather than a sudden collapse.

The key factors that need to be watched are:

How far BRICS goes in building credible alternatives to the U.S./Western-dominated finance and trade systems (e.g., payments in Roubles/Rupees/Yuan, new currency, new institutions).

Whether India sticks with a balancing approach (between U.S. and China/Russia) or increasingly aligns with a more counter-U.S. bloc.

How the U.S. adapts — whether it reforms its system, renews alliances, invests in key technologies and remains competitive.

The internal coherence of the challengers: if China dominates too much, or India/Russia drift away, the bloc may fragment.

Regarding the specific issue of U.S. tariffs or “unjustified” trade policy: those create opportunities for challengers to rally together, but tariffs alone don’t dismantle supremacy. What undermines supremacy more is the underlying structural foundations (currency, institutions, technology, alliances) rather than episodic policy shocks.

In a scenario analysis (2025–2035) on how the Russia-India-China troika + expanded BRICS bloc might reshape global order, and how India’s strategic and economic position could evolve under three plausible futures:

1. Best-Case (Multipolar renaissance)
2. Baseline (Competitive coexistence)
3. Worst-Case (Fragmented Blocs and instability)

Best-Case Scenario: Multipolar Renaissance (Global Power Rebalancing)

Global Picture

BRICS+ matures into a strong, coordinated economic and political bloc.
New financial architecture: a credible alternative to the dollar emerges — perhaps a BRICS settlement system or a basket-based currency for intra-bloc trade.
U.S. dominance erodes gradually, replaced by multipolar interdependence among regional power centres (U.S., China, India, EU, Russia, and a united Global South).
Trade diversification: tariff wars and sanctions lose influence as supply chains regionalize and south-south trade flourishes.
Global governance reform: G20, UN, IMF voting structures evolve to reflect the economic weight of non-Western powers.

India’s Position

India emerges as the “bridge power” — maintaining ties with the U.S. and the West while being a core member of an expanded, pragmatic BRICS.
Gains energy security via Russia and Middle East members, manufacturing advantages as Western firms seek “China-plus-one” diversification, and technological partnerships with both Western and Eastern blocs.
The rupee becomes partially internationalised in BRICS trade.
GDP growth stabilises around 7–8%, poverty declines sharply, and India becomes the third-largest economy (nominal) by 2035.
India’s soft power (education, digital infrastructure, democratic credibility) enhances its global influence.

Key conditions for this outcome

Stable China-India relations; border tensions managed diplomatically.
BRICS cooperation focuses on economics, not ideological confrontation.
The U.S. accepts a multipolar order instead of reacting with economic warfare.
India continues strong domestic reforms — infrastructure, education, energy, and industrial policy 25–30%

Baseline Scenario: Competitive Coexistence (Strategic Balancing)

Global Picture

The U.S. remains dominant but constrained — its hegemony transitions into leadership among equals.
BRICS + expands modestly, but internal divisions (India–China rivalry, Russia’s dependence on China, differing economic priorities) limit deep integration.
A dual-system world emerges: U.S.-led financial and tech ecosystems coexist with China-centred regional networks.
Tariff wars and sanctions continue sporadically but are offset by pragmatic trade deals.
Global growth slows slightly but remains stable; climate and AI governance become shared priorities.

India’s Position

India continues its balancing diplomacy — cooperating with BRICS on trade and infrastructure but aligning with the U.S. and allies (Quad, I2U2, G7+) on technology and defence.
The Make in India + China-plus-one trend strengthens manufacturing exports.
BRICS provides alternative financing for infrastructure, reducing reliance on Western loans, but the rupee remains largely domestic.
Growth averages 6–6.5%, steady but not transformative.
India remains a swing state in global power politics — respected but cautious

Key conditions for this outcome

U.S.–China competition remains controlled, not escalating into war.
BRICS continues as a forum for cooperation, not confrontation.
India maintains domestic political stability and reforms, though unevenly 50% (most likely).

Worst-Case Scenario: Fragmented Blocs And Global Instability

Global Picture

U.S. protectionism and tariffs escalate — Trump-style or nationalist administrations impose high barriers, triggering retaliation.
China–U.S. decoupling deepens, dividing the world into two economic camps.
BRICS fractures — India and China clash diplomatically or militarily (border or trade), and Russia becomes economically subservient to China.
Global financial fragmentation: sanctions, restricted tech flows, parallel SWIFT systems.
Energy and food insecurity rise amid supply chain chaos; climate cooperation collapses.
Emerging economies face currency instability and debt stress.

India’s Position

India is forced to choose sides — aligning more with the West for security, losing some autonomy in BRICS.
Economic growth slows to 4–5%, inflation and import costs rise.
Exports to BRICS partners stagnate; Western supply chains re-route but under strategic conditions.
Defence spending increases sharply, straining budgets.
India’s global influence narrows to the Indo-Pacific rather than global scale.

Key conditions for this outcome

Armed conflict or proxy wars between BRICS and Western blocs.
Unresolved border issues with China; worsening Russia-China dependence.
Escalating tariff regimes and sanctions leading to a new “Cold Trade War.” 20–25%

While it’s not impossible that BRICS-plus countries could jointly engage with the U.S. to deal with tariffs, the chances of a fully coordinated settlement across all of them are quite low — because of divergent national interests, the U.S.’s strong leverage and preference for bilateralism, and the lack of a unified trade negotiation vehicle among BRICS.

In practice, what we’re more likely to see is some coordination, some bilateral deals tied together, and select joint statements or pressure — rather than a sweeping collective agreement.

The writer is a researcher, author and commentator. He is former Professor ‘International Trade’. This piece is being published as it has been received – it has not been edited/fact-checked by IDN. This essay reflects author's opinions alone