The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has long been regarded as the cornerstone of India’s indigenous defence research apparatus,, wrote G Mohan Kumar Former Defence Secretary on ET News.

The Kaveri project, initiated in the 1980s, was intended to power the Light Combat Aircraft TEJAS and reduce dependence on foreign engine suppliers. However, nearly four decades later, the project remains incomplete.

The inability to achieve critical milestones—such as developing reliable turbine materials, achieving precise thermal efficiency, and mastering combustion stability—has highlighted DRDO’s limited access to frontier technologies.

This technological stagnation is not only about materials science limitations but also about an institutional framework that discourages collaboration and private-sector participation. Yet, its record in several crucial programs, particularly the Kaveri engine project, raises serious questions about institutional efficiency and the sustainability of its existing structure.

The failure to deliver an operational engine after decades of development underscores both technological and systemic deficiencies that have prevented meaningful outcomes.

India’s aspiration to design and manufacture a fully indigenous jet engine remains one of its most persistent technological challenges. Despite impressive progress in missile systems, space research, and nuclear technology, the effort to domestically develop a modern military turbofan engine continues to lag behind.

The experience of the failed Kaveri engine project, launched under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), laid bare the limitations within India’s materials research, engineering integration, and program management. The project, tasked with developing an engine in the 90–110 kN thrust class suitable for the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) TEJAS, stalled after achieving only around 60 kN.

At the core of the problem lies India’s inability to design and produce high-temperature turbine components and single-crystal alloys essential for modern engine performance. These “hot section” materials require ultra-precise metallurgical processes, and the Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory (DMRL) could not bridge these critical capability gaps.

Efforts to foster co-development with public research institutions and private industry remained insufficiently coordinated, leading to years of lost opportunity.

Against this backdrop, DRDO’s proposed collaboration with French aerospace giant Safran has reignited the debate on India’s self-reliance agenda.

The reported $2.5 billion partnership aims to co-develop a 110 kN class engine for future fighter aircraft, including the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA). Advocates say the project will include full technology transfer, with intellectual property rights remaining with DRDO.

However, scepticism persists. Critics question whether India can claim genuine self-reliance when such vital technology is imported at a heavy cost. After the failed attempt to secure engine know-how through offsets in the 2016 Rafale deal, the Safran partnership appears to many as a compromise rather than a leap forward.

The matter also highlights broader structural deficiencies within DRDO’s research framework. Its monopolistic control over high-end defence research has often led to slow progress, limited innovation, and a lack of accountability. While the government has recognised the need for sweeping institutional reform, tangible progress has been minimal due to bureaucratic inertia and internal resistance.

For India’s aerospace ambitions, the stakes are high. The success of the AMCA program and subsequent sixth-generation aircraft concepts depend on indigenous propulsion capabilities. Without mastering advanced gas turbine technology, India’s hard-won achievements in aircraft design risk remaining incomplete.

Experts now advocate a new approach — one that leverages the innovative capacity of the private sector. India’s private aerospace firms, already manufacturing precision components and sub-systems for global OEMs, possess the potential to shoulder critical aspects of jet engine design and production. A government-backed consortium model, bringing together HAL, DRDO, DMRL, and key private players, could bridge technological and managerial deficiencies.

Such an approach would not only advance defence self-reliance but also open a path for civilian spin-offs in commercial aviation, with the potential to create a globally competitive aerospace manufacturing ecosystem. Countries that have succeeded in developing indigenous aero-engines — the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia — did so by combining government direction with industrial innovation and decades-long investment in materials science.

India has no shortage of talent. Scores of Indian engineers work in leading global engine firms, contributing to both design and testing. Mobilising this diaspora, alongside domestic experts, could prove critical to fast-tracking progress. Yet, the task demands strong leadership, streamlined governance, and freedom from DRDO’s entrenched bureaucratic model.

With geopolitical volatility intensifying and strategic technology increasingly guarded by established powers, self-reliance in engine technology has become a matter of national security. India’s leadership must now define whether “Make in India” will truly translate into “Design in India”.

Deep institutional reform in DRDO — promised during Independence Day addresses — must become a policy priority. The time to act with mission-mode urgency has arrived. India’s dream of a home-grown high-thrust jet engine can no longer remain grounded in rhetoric. It requires vision, discipline, and the courage to transform.

If India seeks to achieve technological self-reliance in defence, reforming DRDO must move from being an advisory agenda item to a governance priority.

A transparent mechanism for independent review of research performance, time-bound project delivery, and integration of private-sector expertise is essential.

The Kaveri experience should serve as a cautionary tale—reminding policymakers that without genuine transformation, India’s defence research ecosystem will continue to underperform, regardless of funding or ambition.

IDN's Closing Perspective

Former Defence Secretary G. Mohan Kumar ought to have also outlined in this piece under his stewardship what had been achieved, or explained why the Kaveri turbofan engine project failed to reach fruition for the TEJAS program. According to IDN, during his tenure, efforts to bring the Kaveri engine to operational readiness were also unsuccessful, largely because he did not take proactive efforts to address the ongoing issue.

It is easy to sermonise now, but bureaucrats should refrain from digging up the past or pointing fingers, especially in processes they were part of and failed to resolve, despite having the sole responsibility to address those issues.

Based On ET News Report