India's Indecision On Naval Submarine Acquisition Vs Pakistan's Swift Military Gains
India's journey to strengthen its naval submarine fleet has been marked by
persistent delays and indecision over several years.
Multiple ambitious projects, notably the $6 billion effort to build six
diesel-electric submarines, have encountered significant roadblocks. Issues
such as procedural delays during sea trials, contractor concerns, and
bureaucratic hurdles have stalled progress.
This indecision contrasts sharply with Pakistan’s expedited acquisition
strategy, highlighting an evident gap in defence procurement efficiency
between the two neighbours.
India’s submarine building plans have suffered not only from procedural
inefficiencies but also from challenges related to indigenisation and cost
concerns.
The Project 75(I), aimed at acquiring modern Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP)
submarines, has been mired for over a decade in debates over cost and content
localisation, leading to further deferment and uncertainty about timelines.
The Indian Navy currently operates a shrinking fleet, with many existing
submarines nearing the end of their service life, exacerbating strategic
vulnerabilities in underwater warfare capabilities.
In stark contrast, Pakistan has rapidly enhanced its undersea warfare capacity
through a fast-paced, clear-cut acquisition of the Hangor-class submarines
from China. Under a $5 billion deal, Pakistan plans to induct eight advanced
Chinese-designed diesel-electric AIP submarines over the next decade, with the
first already expected to enter service soon.
This procurement includes state-of-the-art weapons, combat management systems,
and sensors, elevating Pakistan’s strategic underwater deterrence
significantly. This quick decision-making reflects Pakistan’s priority in
maritime strengthening and serves as a strategic counterbalance within the
region.
China’s role as a defence supplier to Pakistan has been decisive in
accelerating Islamabad’s naval capabilities.
The Hangor-class submarines represent a tangible extension of China’s
strategic influence in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean regions, complementing
the development of port infrastructure like Gwadar in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s seamless integration of Chinese military technology, including
these submarines, contrasts with India’s complex and slower indigenous
submarine projects, underscoring the operational and strategic gap in naval
preparedness between the two countries.
India’s submarine acquisition delays primarily stem from stringent indigenous
content policies, procedural bottlenecks, and domestic vendor disagreements.
For instance, contractor disputes during critical sea trials have forced
repeated investigations and postponed project advancement.
Additionally, the cancellation or stalling of deals such as the one with
France’s Naval Group for additional Scorpene submarines further highlights
India’s procurement challenges. These issues have collectively contributed to
a naval capability gap, particularly when juxtaposed with Pakistan's rapid
fleet expansion through foreign acquisitions.
Yet, India retains a strategic and technological advantage with its current
fleet, which includes nuclear-powered submarines and the under-construction
Arihant and Arighat classes. However, the lack of new conventional submarine
inductions and the ageing fleet’s gradual retirement may erode this advantage
if not promptly addressed.
The Indian Navy is thus forced to recalibrate and expedite its submarine
programmes to avoid falling behind Pakistan, whose swift procurement policies
backed by China could undermine regional maritime security balances.
India’s indecision and bureaucratic complexities in acquiring modern naval
submarines starkly contrast with Pakistan’s swift and strategic acquisitions
from China. The Hangor-class submarine deal is emblematic of Pakistan’s rapid,
focused military procurement approach, which bolsters its naval capabilities
ahead of India
| Aspect | India's Project 75I | Pakistan's Hangor-Class |
|---|---|---|
| Project Inception | Mid-2010s with multiple delays | Early 2020s with aggressive, clear adoption |
| Contract Status (2025) | Ongoing technical evaluations, contract not signed | Contract signed, active production underway |
| Number of Submarines | 6 submarines planned | 8 submarines planned |
| Expected First Delivery | Around 2032, ~7 years post-contract | First submarine undergoing sea trials by 2025 |
| Full Fleet Operational | Mid-2030s | Late 2020s to early 2030s |
| Production Setup | Indo-German partnership (Mazagon Dock & TKMS) | Split production: China & Karachi Shipyard |
| Propulsion Technology | Advanced AIP with fuel cells planned | Stirling AIP system (less advanced but reliable) |
| Indigenous Content | High emphasis, complex procurement and vendor issues | Procurement mainly from China, faster delivery |
| Strategic Impact | Delays risk creating capability gaps | Rapid induction strengthens Pakistan's naval presence |
| Operational Sub Fleet | Existing older subs, aging fleet with fewer new inductions | Modern submarines added rapidly, improving naval power |
This above table summarises the stark contrast in submarine procurement timelines and program execution between India's Project 75I and Pakistan's Hangor-class submarines, highlighting India's slower yet indigenisation-focused approach against Pakistan's faster, China-backed procurement strategy.
IDN (With Agency Inputs)
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