India’s nuclear doctrine, summarised by “Credible Minimum Deterrence” and its steadfast “No First Use” (NFU) approach, emerged after the 1998 Pokhran-II tests as a model of responsibility and restraint, wrote Hindol Sengupta in the Sunday Guardian.

For over twenty years, this dual posture has underpinned the subcontinent’s stability. Yet, as 2025 unfolds, the doctrine faces a critical test. The credibility of “minimum” deterrence is fading, endangered on one side by China’s nuclear breakout and on the other by Pakistan’s tactical recalibration.

China’s Rapid Nuclear Surge

China’s nuclear arsenal has witnessed extraordinary growth, with SIPRI’s January 2025 estimates placing its warhead count at 600. India, in contrast, holds 180. Over a single year, Beijing expanded its inventory by 100 warheads, while India managed just eight. Forecasts predict Chinese holdings could top 1,000 by 2030, rivaling those of Cold War superpowers.

The quantitative leap is matched by qualitative advances. China’s maturing nuclear triad now includes:

Over 350 new missile silos for advanced solid-fuelled ICBMs like the DF-41, equipped with MIRVs that can target multiple locations across India.

At least six Jin-class (Type 094) SSBNs armed with JL-3 SLBMs, providing survivable, long-range second-strike capability.

New H-6N bombers capable of delivering air-launched ballistic missiles, completing Beijing’s strategic triad.

Alongside its physical expansion, China is believed to be shifting doctrine from NFU towards a “Launch on Warning” (LOW) posture. Massive silo construction and advanced early warning networks indicate increased readiness, where China may fire upon detection of an incoming attack rather than waiting for impact.

Erosion of Assured Retaliation

China’s advances challenge the logic behind India’s doctrine. The concept of “assured retaliation”—the guarantee that any nuclear strike would be met with a devastating response—is built on the adversary’s acceptance of mutual vulnerability. The disparity in arsenal size and technical sophistication now risks overwhelming India’s deterrent. Chinese warhead numbers, missile defences, and potential LOW posture could embolden Beijing to consider a first strike while intercepting or absorbing India’s “minimum” response.

Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Challenge

While India maintains a slight edge over Pakistan in warhead numbers (180 vs 170), the true challenge from Islamabad is doctrinal. Pakistan’s “Full Spectrum Deterrence” is explicitly designed to offset India’s conventional superiority, employing Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) such as the short-range Nasr missile. These battlefield weapons can be used against troop formations, lowering the nuclear threshold and creating enormous strategic dilemma for India.

Should Pakistani commanders deploy TNWs in response to an Indian conventional advance, India’s stated response is “massive retaliation.”

However, retaliating with a strategic strike against Pakistani cities would be viewed internationally as disproportionate and risks escalating to all-out nuclear war. If India refrains from retaliation, its deterrence collapses, effectively allowing Pakistan to use nuclear weapons as war-winning tools.

The ‘Credible Minimum’ Conundrum

India now faces a two-front squeeze—one from an increasingly powerful and survivable Chinese arsenal, the other from Pakistan’s willingness to employ nuclear weapons at the tactical level. The traditional doctrine of “Credible Minimum Deterrence” paired with “Massive Retaliation” appears insufficiently flexible to handle these divergent threats.

India’s scientific achievements are impressive. The “Mission Divyastra” MIRV test and functional nuclear triad, underpinned by SSBNs INS Arihant and Arighaat, have strengthened second-strike capabilities. However, limitations remain—the Arihant-class submarines currently field shorter-range K-15 missiles, curtailing operational reach. While the longer-ranged K-4 missile is in promising trials, urgent deployment is required. The MIRV breakthrough cannot counteract the pace and scale of China’s build-up alone.

Immediate Strategic Imperatives

India must rapidly rethink its nuclear doctrine. Key questions include:

What constitutes a credible “minimum” in the context of a 1,000-warhead China? Deterrence may now demand 200-250 warheads by 2030, with more mated warheads and survivable deployments ensuring a credible retaliatory capability.

How can the NFU pledge remain credible? India must contemplate more flexible retaliation options, introducing proportional or punitive responses that avoid the trap of “suicide-or-surrender” in the face of Pakistani TNWs.

Is modernisation fast enough? Programs like K-4, the future S-5 submarine, and broad MIRV deployment are not distant priorities but immediate national necessities.

India’s arsenal must grow both in size and sophistication, moving beyond the notion of mere “minimum” deterrence. Deployment mechanisms must be diversified—mobile and hidden launchers, operational SSBNs, and robust command control systems are vital. Infrastructure should be hardened, with redundancy introduced to frustrate adversary counter-force or decapitation attempts.

Towards Minimum Credible Flexibility

India may need to introduce a measure of ambiguity into its doctrine, making retaliatory options less predictable for adversaries. This could include revisiting the NFU pledge, obscuring warhead deployment, and clarifying escalation pathways. Survivability and assured retaliation must be maximised, leveraging MIRVs and penetration aids to defeat missile defences. Simultaneously, India should continue to advocate transparency and multilateral arms control, but not at the expense of credible capabilities.

Conclusion

India’s nuclear doctrine must evolve to address simultaneous, divergent threats. This demands a thorough reassessment—revising arsenal size, deployment readiness, and doctrinal flexibility. Without credible, survivable, and adaptable nuclear force, India’s strategic autonomy is at risk. The time for debate is now, before the “minimum” deterrent loses meaning in the face of aggressive adversaries.

Based On SG Report