Former United States National Security Advisor John Bolton has sharply criticised President Donald Trump’s recent tariff threat against India, describing it as a “self‑inflicted wound” that has caused real damage to India–US relations.

In an interview with ANI, Bolton argued that the move underlined Trump’s lack of “strategic sense” about Washington’s long‑term interests, especially at a time of intensifying great‑power competition. He portrayed the tariff approach as tactically aggressive but strategically incoherent, undermining a key partnership in the Indo‑Pacific.

Bolton linked this latest tariff threat to what he characterised as Trump’s broader pattern of impulsive and disruptive foreign policy decisions. He cited, in particular, Trump’s repeated public talk of “taking control” of Greenland, which he said had sown “disarray” within NATO and risked causing lasting damage to the alliance.

According to Bolton, such distractions have diverted attention and political capital away from the central challenge posed by China’s rise and its hegemonic ambitions, especially in the maritime domain.

Focusing on Asia, Bolton stressed that the United States should be prioritising deeper strategic cooperation with India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and other regional partners to counter China’s increasingly assertive military posture.

Instead, he noted, Trump has become “obsessed” with tariffs and the politics of Russian oil sales. Bolton highlighted the inconsistency of penalising India for purchases of Russian crude while not imposing similar tariff measures on China, which imports significantly larger volumes of Russian oil, or on other major buyers such as Turkey.

Bolton warned that the new tariffs have already created “real trouble” in India–US ties by injecting mistrust into what both sides have publicly framed as a pivotal strategic partnership. He implied that this misalignment undercuts broader US objectives in the Indo‑Pacific, where India is seen in Washington as a key balancer to China, including in the South China Sea and in managing tensions along the Line of Actual Control. In strategic terms, Bolton suggested that alienating New Delhi over trade and energy questions is counter‑productive when viewed against the scale of the China challenge.

At the same time, Bolton identified a potential diplomatic off‑ramp in the personal equation between Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. He observed that Trump “believes he has a very good personal relationship” with Modi and expressed hope that a renewed direct dialogue between the two leaders could help defuse the crisis. In Bolton’s view, leader‑level engagement might allow both sides to re‑frame the tariff dispute, rebuild confidence, and restore momentum in the bilateral relationship.

The immediate trigger for Bolton’s remarks was Trump’s fresh warning, issued aboard Air Force One, that the US could further raise tariffs on India if New Delhi continued buying Russian oil. Trump publicly remarked that Modi “knew I was not happy” and framed it as “important to make me happy,” underscoring his personalised, transactional style of diplomacy.

He also emphasised that, because India trades with the US, Washington could “raise tariffs on them very quickly,” signalling a readiness to use trade leverage as a primary coercive tool.

The report notes that Indian exports to the US already face tariffs of up to 50 per cent, with around half of that level attributed to India’s continued purchase of Russian crude, which Washington argues indirectly sustains Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine.

This tariff structure has become a central point of contention, as India balances its energy security requirements and discounted Russian supplies against growing US pressure tied to the Ukraine conflict. The issue has thus become a test case of how far strategic partners can diverge on sanctions and energy policy without damaging the broader relationship.

Looking beyond the India–US bilateral context, Bolton set out his hierarchy of global security priorities for the White House in 2026. He identified China as the foremost strategic concern of the twenty‑first century, citing its sustained military build‑up and assertiveness.

He pointed to the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Line of Actual Control with India as key flashpoints where Chinese behaviour poses a “clear threat to peace and security”. His comments underscored the need for a coherent, alliance‑based response rather than disjointed, unilateral actions.

Bolton ranked Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine as the second major security challenge, arguing that Moscow’s aggression continues to destabilise Europe and absorb Western resources. He grouped Iran and North Korea together in third place, highlighting Tehran’s drive to develop nuclear weapons and Pyongyang’s efforts to expand and improve its nuclear and missile arsenal. In his assessment, these nuclear and near‑nuclear threats compound the complexity of the global security environment, stretching US and allied bandwidth across multiple theatres.

Against this backdrop, Bolton called for intensified strategic collaboration between the United States and India. He characterised the current international security landscape as “very dangerous” and argued that strong, stable partnerships are essential to maintaining peace and stability.

For Washington, this implies treating India not merely as a trade partner but as a central pillar in a broader coalition aimed at balancing China, deterring Russia, and managing the risks posed by Iran and North Korea. From Bolton’s perspective, tariff escalations that alienate New Delhi run directly counter to these higher strategic objectives.

Based On ANI Report