Indian Navy’s Project 75(I) submarine acquisition has entered its decisive phase, with cost negotiations between the Ministry of Defence, Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Ltd (MDL) and Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) now substantially complete and the file expected to move to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for approval within the next quarter.

The program, valued in the range of ₹66,000–70,000 crore after successive rounds of price rationalisation, is poised to become one of the largest conventional submarine contracts globally and the single most expensive underwater capability project undertaken by India.

Conceived as the follow‑on to the original Project 75 Scorpene line, P‑75(I) is intended to deliver six next‑generation diesel‑electric submarines equipped with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP), advanced stealth shaping and coatings, modern combat management systems and heavyweight torpedoes for both anti‑surface and anti‑submarine warfare missions.

The emphasis on an AIP‑equipped design capable of remaining submerged for up to three weeks marks a qualitative leap over the existing Kalvari‑class, significantly improving survivability and lethality in contested waters of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

The industrial structure of the program reflects New Delhi’s effort to balance operational urgency with strategic autonomy under the Strategic Partnership model, in which an Indian shipbuilder partners a selected foreign Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for high‑end technology transfer and in‑country production.

MDL, having acquired substantial experience from the Scorpene line, has emerged as the Indian strategic partner, while TKMS is set to provide the design, AIP package and key technologies for what will effectively be a customised variant of its proven Type‑214/Type‑218 lineage.

Cost negotiations have been protracted and politically sensitive, driven by a steep escalation from the original Acceptance of Necessity figure of around ₹43,000 crore in 2018 to internal assessments that at one stage crossed ₹1.1 lakh crore once taxes and contingencies were loaded.

The Cost Negotiation Committee has since forced a substantial rollback, bringing the projected outlay into the ₹60,000–70,000 crore band and anchoring the official public estimate near ₹66,000 crore, a level the government considers high but strategically justifiable in light of regional naval dynamics.

With the CNC now understood to have closed its work, the focus inside South Block has shifted to financial vetting and inter‑ministerial scrutiny before the proposal is placed before the CCS. Senior officials indicate that the Defence Ministry aims to secure CCS clearance within the current financial year, enabling signature of the main contract by late FY 2025–26 and the release of an initial payment tranche soon thereafter.

This aligns with internal Navy planning that anticipates the first submarine entering service roughly seven years after contract signature, i.e. in the early 2030s, provided there are no slippages in design freeze and production ramp‑up.

Operationally, P‑75(I) is central to closing India’s widening undersea capability gap at a time when both China and Pakistan are adding modern platforms at a faster clip. The Chinese Navy’s expanding presence in the IOR, combined with Pakistan’s induction of Chinese‑origin AIP submarines, has sharpened the urgency of fielding a more survivable conventional fleet that can conduct sea‑denial operations, protect sea lanes and support deterrence in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal.

From an industrial and technological perspective, the program is expected to deepen India’s shipbuilding ecosystem through long‑term workshare for MDL and a host of tier‑II and tier‑III suppliers, while also embedding complex welding, modular construction and systems‑integration skills in the domestic base.

The technology transfer package, especially in relation to fuel‑cell AIP, quieting technologies and integrated platform management systems, is seen as a bridge to future indigenous designs and possible exports under an Indian design leadership model.

Despite the forward movement, residual risks remain. Any last‑minute hardening of positions on liability, intellectual property, indigenous content thresholds or through‑life support terms could stretch timelines beyond the currently anticipated three‑month window for CCS clearance.

Moreover, the Navy’s 30‑year submarine plan is already behind schedule, and further delay in P‑75(I) would compound pressure on legacy platforms that are nearing the end of their safe operational lives and require either life extensions or phased retirement.

Yet, political and strategic signalling suggests that the leadership views P‑75(I) as a flagship modernisation project, comparable in strategic weight to major fighter and air defence acquisitions, and is prepared to absorb the fiscal burden given the deteriorating undersea balance in the wider Indo‑Pacific.

If the CCS does accord approval within the projected three‑month span and the contract is concluded within the 2025–26 fiscal, the Navy would secure a predictable pipeline of advanced submarines stretching into the next decade, buying crucial time for parallel indigenous initiatives such as a follow‑on conventional line and nuclear attack submarine projects.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)