According to an April 22, 2024, article from the Asia Times, Pakistan’s reported push toward intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability is best understood as a layered problem of deterrence, signalling and strategic hedging, rather than a simple re‑orientation of its nuclear posture away from India, reported Asia Times.

For decades Islamabad has built a nuclear arsenal and missile inventory that is explicitly calibrated against Indian targets, with systems such as the Shaheen‑III (based on Chinese Lineage) giving it coverage of all of mainland India plus geographically outlying Indian bases such as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

In the 1990s, Pakistan engaged in a "technology swap" with North Korea, reportedly exchanging uranium enrichment centrifuge technology for the blueprints and components of the Nodong missile which emerged as the Ghauri (Hatf-V) missiles. However, most Ghauri tests have ended in failure.

While North Korea provided the "kickstart" for Pakistan's liquid-fuelled intermediate-range capabilities in the 90s, the Shaheen-III is the result of a separate, more advanced solid-fuel track that leans on Chinese aerospace standards rather than North Korean ones.

That India‑centric logic remains visible in Pakistan’s declared doctrine, its basing patterns, and the range bands of its tested systems.

Even if Pakistan were to develop ICBM‑class delivery systems, the primary driver is unlikely to be a credible strategic exchange with the United States, but rather a graduated shift in deterrence signalling and crisis management.

The US Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, has testified that Pakistan’s long‑range ballistic missile work “potentially could include ICBMs” capable of striking the US homeland, placing Islamabad alongside China, Russia, North Korea and Iran as states whose missile programmes may threaten the American mainland in the coming decade.

This assessment is framed within a broader intelligence community estimate that the global inventory of missiles aimed at the US could quadruple by 2035, with long‑range systems playing a central role.

From a technical standpoint, Pakistan’s current arsenal still centres on short‑ and medium‑range systems, with the Shaheen‑III representing the upper end at about 2,750 kilometres. This range is sufficient, when launched from suitable sites, to strike all of India and key Indian military nodes, including forward‑based or island‑based assets.

What has raised eyebrows in Western intelligence circles are hints of a longer‑range trajectory: satellite imagery of a new, larger horizontal motor test stand at Attock, sanctions on Pakistan’s National Defence Complex and associated Chinese dual‑use suppliers, and the procurement of equipment tied to large solid‑rocket motors. These indicators suggest that Pakistan is at least exploring the building blocks for more powerful boosters, even if an operational ICBM force remains speculative.

Pakistan’s nuclear posture has long been one of asymmetric deterrence against a materially stronger Indian conventional military, and its short‑range, tactical nuclear weapons have been framed as a way to impose costs on India for any deep conventional inroads. The introduction of ever‑longer ranges, however, alters the signalling calculus.

If Pakistan can credibly suggest that its missiles can reach beyond South Asia, it creates ambiguity about whether attacks on Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure or launch platforms would remain regionally contained, or whether they might cross a threshold that would invite strikes against more distant targets. 

This ambiguity is not primarily about matching India’s range, but about complicating the decision‑making of external powers, especially the United States.

A growing body of analysis argues that Pakistan’s nuclear signalling is less about deterring India directly and more about manipulating third‑party reactions. By amplifying the perception that any serious Pakistani setback could spiral into broader nuclear escalation, Islamabad seeks to incentivise outside actors—particularly Washington—to intervene early and restrain India.

This form of “third‑party coercion” uses uncertainty as a weapon: if the US cannot be sure whether Pakistani retaliation would stay localised or expand to longer‑range targets, it becomes more cautious about backing Indian military options. In that sense, the discussion of ICBM capability is as much a psychological and political tool as a technical one.

Underlying this logic is also a shift in Pakistan’s view of the United States. During the US war in Afghanistan, Washington was largely willing to overlook Pakistan’s nuclear‑related activities because Islamabad was a key partner in counterterrorism.

After the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the 2025 strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, strategic anxieties in Pakistan have deepened. The fact that a major power could launch pre‑emptive strikes against another state’s nuclear infrastructure has prompted Pakistan’s elite to ask whether their own facilities might be future targets if geopolitical winds turn.

Seen through this lens, longer‑range systems and the possibility of ICBM‑class capabilities may be interpreted as a hedge against an intrusive US security strategy, even if the primary pacing threat on Pakistani planning charts remains India.

China’s role further complicates the picture. Beijing has long supplied Pakistan with missile technology, dual‑use equipment and, in some analysts’ views, tacit approval for programs that skirt export controls. 

Heightening US–China competition may make Pakistan feel that close alignment with Beijing is both a necessity and a risk; the more dependent Islamabad becomes on Chinese support, the more it may wish to diversify its deterrent options and underwrite its own second‑striking credibility.

A turn toward longer‑range systems could thus be read as an attempt to reduce reliance on others’ reassurance and to build a more autonomous nuclear posture, even if the stated mission remains focused on India.

At the same time, serious analysts stress that the evidence for an actual Pakistan ICBM program remains thin and that the country faces severe economic and institutional constraints. Pakistan must balance nuclear modernisation with the costs of conventional‑force upgrades, population‑scale infrastructure projects and debt servicing, which limits how much it can plausibly invest in exotic, long‑range systems.

Many South‑Asian specialists argue that if a regional actor were to acquire ICBM capability in the medium term, India—driven by its global ambitions and larger fiscal base—would be the more likely candidate than Pakistan. Yet precisely because the notion of Pakistan having ICBMs is still uncertain, it generates disproportionate attention in Washington and elsewhere, feeding into both strategic planning and political discourse.

Putting this together, the most plausible interpretation is that Pakistan’s interest in longer‑range ballistic missiles represents a cautious, incremental expansion of its deterrence umbrella rather than a wholesale re‑orientation toward the United States.

It is less about fighting a global nuclear war with America and more about tightening the feedback loop between any US action—direct or indirect against Pakistan—and the risk of escalation that Washington prefers to avoid.

By blurring the boundary between a regional, India‑centric nuclear posture and a longer‑range capability, Pakistan may be trying to make its deterrent simultaneously more opaque, more flexible, and more effective in shaping the behaviour of both its primary adversary and the global superpower that often mediates their crises.

Asia Times