The rapid proliferation of unmanned aerial systems is fundamentally altering the nature of warfare, and for India this represents both a qualitative and quantitative challenge of unprecedented scale, according to an extensive CLAWS brief.

China and Pakistan have invested heavily in expanding their drone arsenals across the spectrum of ISTAR platforms, unmanned combat aerial vehicles, swarm drones, first-person-view systems, and loitering munitions.

The possibility of collusive employment of these assets in a future multi-front tri-Service war cannot be discounted, and the operational doctrines of both adversaries increasingly emphasise autonomous strike technologies and persistent aerial surveillance. This creates a scenario where India must prepare for simultaneous drone threats across multiple theatres, stretching its air defence and command networks.

The study highlights that future drone warfare is likely to unfold in two distinct phases. The first will be characterised by persistent grey-zone activity, with adversaries employing drones for surveillance, probing, and harassment operations designed to wear down defences and create operational fatigue.

The second phase will involve large-scale swarm and drone attacks intended to overwhelm India’s air defence systems and disrupt command-and-control networks. Based on open-source assessments, India could face coordinated drone attacks of 1,500 to 2,000 or more platforms per day during a high-intensity conflict.

Such saturation strikes would not only challenge radar coverage and interception capacity but also threaten logistics, communications, and frontline troop deployments.

China’s advances in swarm drone technology, exemplified by systems like the Atlas swarm capable of launching nearly a hundred drones in minutes, reflect its doctrine of “intelligentised warfare” where AI-driven, networked, and autonomous operations dominate.

Pakistan, meanwhile, has demonstrated innovative mass drone tactics, including the use of harmless drones to trigger defensive fire before unleashing attack drones, as seen in Operation Sindoor. Both adversaries are likely to employ hardened drones with advanced navigation, electro-optical homing devices, and swarm collaboration algorithms, making them resistant to traditional countermeasures.

The collusive employment of such systems would multiply the threat manifold, forcing India to fight on multiple fronts against coordinated drone incursions.

India’s current anti-drone capabilities, while steadily improving, remain insufficient to counter the scale of the threat envisaged. The induction of indigenous systems such as IG Drones’ T-Shul Pulse reflects progress under the Make in India and Aatmanirbhar Bharat initiatives, enhancing preparedness against asymmetric threats including surveillance, disruption, and cross-border infiltration.

However, the proliferation of these systems across all critical points remains limited. Directed-energy weapons, microwave guns, and interceptor drones are under development, but require accelerated scaling and deployment.

The Indian Army has already begun transforming its force structure by raising specialised drone units under its “Decade of Transformation” vision, including Ashni platoons, Divyastra batteries, and Shaktibaan regiments, but the pace of integration must match the rapid evolution of adversary capabilities.

The study argues for an integrated Counter-UAS framework that combines advanced detection systems, kinetic and non-kinetic kill mechanisms, and a dedicated Battle Management Command and Control architecture.

Such a framework must be supported by accelerated indigenisation and capacity building to ensure sustainability in prolonged conflicts. Detection systems must evolve to identify low-RCS drones, swarm formations, and FPV systems operating at low altitudes.

Kinetic kill mechanisms, including interceptor drones and precision-guided munitions, must be complemented by non-kinetic options such as electronic warfare, jamming, and directed-energy weapons. The Battle Management Command and Control (BMC2) architecture must enable real-time coordination across the tri-Services, integrating sensors, shooters, and decision-makers into a unified network capable of responding to massed drone attacks.

The quantitative dimension of the threat underscores the urgency of capacity building. Facing 1,500 to 2,000 drones per day in a high-intensity conflict would require India to possess layered defences capable of sustained operations.

This includes not only frontline counter-drone systems but also strategic reserves, redundancy in command networks, and resilient logistics. The qualitative dimension, meanwhile, demands innovation in AI-enabled detection, autonomous interception, and adaptive electronic warfare.

India’s defence industry must accelerate the development of indigenous swarm algorithms for unified command, control, and autonomy of multi-drone operations, ensuring that its own drone forces can match adversary capabilities while providing credible deterrence.

In conclusion, the drone threat to India from its potential adversaries is both immediate and escalating. The combination of China’s advanced swarm systems and Pakistan’s asymmetric tactics presents a scenario where India could face unprecedented aerial saturation.

The study makes clear that only an integrated Counter-UAS framework, backed by rapid indigenisation and capacity building, can provide the resilience required to withstand such threats. India’s armed forces must therefore prioritise the proliferation of anti-drone systems, the acceleration of indigenous drone programmes, and the establishment of a robust BMC2 architecture to ensure that the nation is not outpaced in this critical domain of future warfare.

CLAWS Brief