Russia’s renewed offer of the Su-57 stealth fighter to India has emerged as a pivotal development in the country’s defence modernisation debate.

At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum earlier this month, President Vladimir Putin proposed unrestricted joint production and technology transfer of the Su-57, directly addressing India’s widening stealth capability gap.

The Indian Air Force currently lacks fifth-generation fighters, while China continues to expand its J-20 fleet and Pakistan is reportedly preparing to induct the J-35, leaving India exposed to a shifting regional balance.

India had previously withdrawn from a similar co-development programme with Russia in 2018, citing cost overruns and disputes over technology transfer. Yet Hindustan Aeronautics Limited has now confirmed that it awaits Russia’s financial quotation before presenting the proposal to air force officials. 

Defence planners face a difficult choice: acquiring two to three squadrons of Su-57s could provide an immediate response to regional threats, but the multi‑billion‑dollar deal risks diverting resources from the indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft project, which is unlikely to be operational before 2035.

The Su-57 is described in the US Army’s ODIN database as a fifth-generation air-superiority and strike fighter, combining stealth features, internal weapons bays, advanced sensor fusion, and an active phased-array radar.

It is capable of supercruise at Mach 2, sustaining supersonic flight without afterburners, and has a combat range exceeding 1,500 kilometres. Extensive use of composite materials reduces weight and enhances stealth, while its aerodynamic design supports extreme manoeuvres at high angles of attack. 

Russia has also developed a two-seat variant, enabling long-range missions and potentially acting as a command platform for loyal wingman drones such as the Okhotnik.

The aircraft has already entered the export market, with Algeria receiving two units in November 2025 as part of a 12-aircraft order. In combat, Russia has employed the Su-57 in Ukraine, launching standoff strikes with Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from up to 400 kilometres behind the front lines.

This doctrine emphasises survivability through launch distance, altitude management, controlled corridors, electronic protection, and precision-guided weapons. Such tactics mirror the cautious approach seen during the May 2025 aerial skirmishes over Kashmir, when neither side crossed national borders, instead relying on drones and missiles to avoid escalation.

India’s vulnerabilities were exposed during those skirmishes. Reports suggest India lost two or three fighters, including a Rafale, a MiG-29, and possibly a Su-30. A Pakistani J-10C equipped with a Chinese PL-15 long-range missile was credited with downing one Rafale, highlighting the growing effectiveness of Chinese systems.

Pakistan’s integrated “ABC” kill chain—combining HQ-9P air defence, PL-15 missiles, and ZDK-03 AWACS—contrasts with India’s mixed ecosystem of Western, Russian, and domestic systems, which may suffer from integration challenges. Pakistan is also reportedly considering acquisitions of the J-35, KJ-500 AWACS, and HQ-19 air defence systems, further strengthening its Chinese-origin ecosystem.

China has meanwhile deployed J-20 stealth fighters at Shigatse Air Base in Tibet, less than 160 kilometres from India’s Sikkim border and the Siliguri Corridor. These deployments, combined with Pakistan’s upgrades, are eroding India’s traditional qualitative edge in the air domain.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies noted in February 2026 that India operates only 29 fighter and ground-attack squadrons, far below the target of 42 squadrons, underscoring the urgency of modernisation.

Yet Russia’s ability to deliver Su-57s in sufficient numbers remains uncertain. As of January 2026, Russia had only 32 units, including prototypes, far short of its goal of 76 by 2027–28. Production has been hampered by supply chain and funding constraints, with each aircraft priced at around US$100 million. Foreign buyers are seen as essential to subsidise costs.

Compounding these challenges, Ukrainian strikes in April 2026 destroyed two Su-57s on the ground, while a fire at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur plant disrupted production of critical composite materials, further slowing output.

India’s reliance on Russian arms is also undergoing structural change. SIPRI data shows Russia remained India’s top supplier from 2017 to 2025, but its share of imports has steadily declined, from 46% in 2017–21 to 40% in 2021–25.

India is deliberately diversifying suppliers, placing new orders with France, Israel, and the United States, while expanding domestic defence manufacturing. Russia’s export capacity is constrained by sanctions, international pressure, and the need to prioritise its own military requirements after the Ukraine war. Two-thirds of Russia’s shrinking arms exports are now concentrated in India, China, and Kazakhstan, reflecting limited global reach.

The Su-57 could provide India with a faster path to fifth-generation capability, bridging the gap until the AMCA matures.

However, doubts over Russia’s production capacity, India’s strategic shift toward diversification, and the risk of undermining indigenous development complicate the decision.

The proposal thus represents both an opportunity and a dilemma: a potential solution to India’s immediate stealth gap, but one that may come at the expense of long-term self-reliance.

Agencies