INS Chennai stealth destroyer firing a BrahMos missile during a routine validation exercise

Vietnam has officially signed a $629 million deal with India for BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, confirmed at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.

This acquisition significantly strengthens Vietnam’s coastal defence posture in the South China Sea, where Chinese militarisation of disputed islands has raised tensions.

Vietnam has become the latest Southeast Asian nation to procure the BrahMos missile system, joining the Philippines as confirmed operators, with Indonesia also nearing a similar agreement. The deal, valued at approximately ₹60 billion ($629 million), was signed earlier in March and publicly acknowledged by India’s Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh at the Shangri-La Dialogue.

From the scale of the contract, Vietnam is expected to receive six coastal batteries, complete with integrated logistics support, operator training, and technical instruction for maintenance personnel. This marks one of Vietnam’s largest defence acquisitions in recent years.

The BrahMos missile is a two-stage, solid-fuelled supersonic cruise missile capable of speeds between Mach 2.8 and Mach 3.0. It carries a warhead of up to 300 kilograms and has a strike range of 290–300 kilometres, with sea-skimming flight capability and steep-dive terminal attack modes.

It is a fire-and-forget weapon equipped with multiple target acquisition sensors to resist jamming. Developed jointly by India’s DRDO, the system is now largely indigenised in India, which retains rights to export it to trusted partners.

Vietnam’s acquisition focuses on land-based coastal batteries, though Hanoi has expressed long-term interest in air-launched variants.

The strategic significance of this deal lies in the contested South China Sea. Almost all Chinese-occupied islands and bases in the region fall within BrahMos range if launched from Vietnamese-held positions.

This mirrors the Philippines’ deployment of BrahMos batteries, which similarly cover Chinese-occupied islands claimed by Manila. Taiwan, though not a BrahMos operator, maintains equivalent systems to defend its isolated holdings.

The disparity remains stark: while ASEAN claimants have avoided heavy militarisation of their islands, satellite imagery shows Chinese-occupied features bristling with PLAN missile systems and air defences.

Vietnam’s decision is rooted in its difficult history with China. The 1979 border war and the 1988 Spratly Islands clash, in which 64 Vietnamese soldiers were killed by the PLA Navy, remain bitter memories. Since 2022, India and Vietnam have drawn closer in defence cooperation, united by shared concerns over Chinese assertiveness.

The BrahMos deal underscores Vietnam’s determination to modernise its maritime deterrence and diversify defence suppliers beyond Russia, while India consolidates its role as a credible security partner in the Indo-Pacific.

The regional picture is further complicated by Japan’s growing involvement. In May, Japan and the Philippines conducted a joint live-fire exercise off Luzon, with a Japanese coastal defence unit firing two Type 88 anti-ship missiles at a decommissioned Philippine corvette.

This test highlighted the emerging network of Indo-Pacific middle powers arming themselves independently to raise the costs of Chinese coercion, even as ASEAN struggles to forge a collective response.

Agencies