India’s participation in NASA’s Moon Base program carries significant risks that must be carefully assessed before any commitment is made.

The foremost concern is the potential compromise of India’s strategic autonomy in lunar exploration. ISRO has already established itself as a capable and independent actor with Chandrayaan missions, a planned sample-return mission in 2027, and a joint mission with Japan in 2028.

Joining a US-led initiative could limit India’s ability to pursue its own scientific and technological priorities without external influence.

Another risk lies in the growing domain of competition in lunar exploration. The Moon is increasingly seen as a strategic, technological, and commercial frontier.

By aligning too closely with the US-led coalition, India may find its policy space constrained, reducing flexibility to engage with other partners or pursue independent ventures.

The Artemis Accords, though voluntary and non-binding, represent a parallel governance system outside the United Nations framework. India has traditionally emphasised a rules-based, multilateral approach through the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).

Participation in the Moon Base program could weaken India’s position in defending UN-centred governance and dilute its long-standing commitment to multilateralism.

There is also the risk of undermining COPUOS itself. While the US reaffirms support for UN guidelines, it simultaneously promotes the Artemis Accords, which bypass the UN negotiating process. 

This dual approach risks fragmenting global space governance, and India’s involvement could inadvertently legitimise a coalition-based system that sidelines the UN.

Space-resource activities pose another challenge. The Artemis framework allows for resource utilisation principles that are not negotiated multilaterally. India’s participation could expose it to arrangements that prioritise coalition interests over equitable access, potentially disadvantaging its long-term commercial and scientific goals.

India must also consider the implications for its geopolitical positioning. While Indo-US cooperation in space is a strategic peak, overdependence on one partner risks limiting India’s ability to balance relations with other major spacefaring nations such as Russia, China, or Japan. Strategic autonomy requires maintaining flexibility in partnerships, not binding commitments that restrict options.

Furthermore, project-specific bilateral implementing agreements required for participation in the Moon Base program could lock India into obligations that extend beyond the non-binding nature of the Artemis Accords. This raises concerns about sovereignty in decision-making and the ability to adapt policies as circumstances evolve.

Finally, India must weigh the sustainability and security dimensions. The Moon Base program is framed as advancing science and exploration, but it also reflects geopolitical manoeuvring.

India’s involvement could expose it to risks of being drawn into strategic rivalries, particularly between the US and China, thereby complicating its independent vision of lunar exploration.

Agencies