If India decides to switch to alternative engine suppliers for the TEJAS MK-2, the potential delays could be substantial, primarily due to the technical and certification challenges involved in integrating a new engine into an aircraft that has been specifically designed around a particular power-plant.

Key factors contributing to delays:

Structural Redesign And Integration: The TEJAS airframe, systems, and flight characteristics are optimised for the GE F404/F414 engine family. Integrating a different engine—whether French (Safran), Russian, or European (EuroJet EJ200)—would require significant structural modifications, re-engineering of engine mounts, changes to the intake and exhaust systems, and extensive ground and flight testing to ensure safety and performance standards.

Certification And Testing: A new engine would necessitate a full cycle of flight certification, which includes ground runs, flight tests, and re-certification by regulatory authorities. This process is lengthy and would need to be repeated for each major configuration change.

Estimated Delay: Defence industry experts and HAL officials have indicated that such a switch could delay the TEJAS MK-2 project by five to seven years. This estimate reflects the time required for redesign, integration, testing, and certification, not including potential delays in negotiating new contracts or establishing supply chains with the alternative engine supplier.

Precedent From MK-1A: The ongoing delays with the GE F404 engine supply for TEJAS MK-1A—caused by supply chain disruptions—have already resulted in a 9 to 12-month delay for that program, even without an engine change. Introducing a new engine would have a far greater impact.

Summary Table: Potential Delays From Engine Switch

Stage Estimated Additional Delay
Structural redesign 1-2 years
Integration & ground testing 1-2 years
Flight testing & certification 2-3 years
Total 5-7 years

Given these factors, switching to an alternative engine supplier for TEJAS MK-2 would likely result in a delay of at least five to seven years before the aircraft could enter operational service with the new power-plant. This is a critical consideration for India's air force modernization plans and operational preparedness.

Feasibility Factors

Local production of Safran engines for the TEJAS MK-2 in India is technically feasible and strategically aligned with India’s push for defence self-reliance, but it comes with important caveats regarding timelines, ecosystem maturity, and technology transfer.

Active Negotiations & Strategic Intent: India is actively exploring a strategic partnership with Safran to co-develop advanced engines for the TEJAS MK-2, especially as talks with GE over local F414 production have hit roadblocks on technology transfer. Safran has offered to develop an enhanced M88-4 engine, a variant of the Rafale’s engine, tailored for heavier single-engine fighters like the TEJAS MK-2.

Technology Transfer & Local Manufacturing: Safran’s proposal aligns with India’s goal for greater technology transfer and local manufacturing. The company already sources critical components from India and collaborates with HAL on other projects, indicating a foundation for deeper industrial cooperation.

Ecosystem Readiness: While India has made progress in aerospace manufacturing, its jet engine ecosystem is still developing and lacks the maturity of established players like the US or France. HAL’s experience with licensed Russian engine production and ongoing private sector involvement (e.g., TASL supplying composite structures) are positive indicators, but engine manufacturing remains a complex challenge.

Timeline Considerations: Developing and locally producing a new engine variant—even one based on the proven M88 platform—would require significant time for design, testing, and integration. Estimates suggest the first locally produced engine could roll out within three years of a finalized agreement, but full-scale production and operational integration would likely take longer.

Strategic Benefits: A Safran-HAL venture would reduce India’s dependence on a single supplier, provide leverage in ongoing negotiations, and help insulate the TEJAS MK-2 program from geopolitical disruptions. It would also support broader ambitions for indigenous engine development, including the revival of the Kaveri program.

Challenges

Development Delays: Shifting to a new engine supplier and co-developing a variant specifically for TEJAS MK-2 could introduce delays compared to continuing with the already operational GE F414.

Technology Absorption: India will need to rapidly scale up its technical expertise and manufacturing capabilities to absorb and sustain advanced engine technologies.

Certification and Testing: New engine integration would require extensive ground and flight testing, as well as regulatory certification, which could further extend timelines.

Conclusion

Local production of Safran engines for TEJAS MK-2 is feasible and strategically sound, provided India is prepared for the associated development and integration timelines. The partnership would deliver significant long-term benefits in technology transfer, supply chain security, and indigenous capability, but short-term delays and ecosystem challenges must be realistically managed.

IDN