The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) faces a critical convergence of technical, operational, and institutional challenges over the past twelve months, demanding strategic intervention. Twin failures of the PSLV launch vehicle in May 2025 and January 2026, alongside reduced launch capacity and governance bottlenecks, expose systemic vulnerabilities threatening India's space ambitions. Remedial action necessitates fundamental restructuring, private sector empowerment, and legislative clarity.

India's reliable PSLV suffered unprecedented back-to-back third-stage failures. On 18 May 2025, PSLV-C61 lost the RISAT-1B satellite due to a combustion chamber pressure drop eight minutes post-liftoff from Sriharikota, as confirmed by ISRO Chairman V. Narayanan. The 12 January 2026 PSLV-C62 mission repeated this pattern, losing 16 satellites including DRDO's Anvesha surveillance satellite and AayulSAT refuelling experiment.

Historically, the PSLV completed 60 missions with over 96% success before May 2025. These failures suggest systemic issues in solid propellant manufacturing, flex nozzle degradation, or design limits under heavier modern payloads. The undisclosed August 2025 Failure Analysis Committee report and seven pre-launch reviews for C62 highlight gaps in quality control beyond inspections.

Meanwhile, GSLV MK-III or LVM-3 maintains a perfect record across seven missions, underscoring PSLV-specific third-stage problems. ISRO's 2025 launch tally fell to five against projections of eight or more, causing delays in SpaDeX, Gaganyaan G1 (now March 2026), NavIC replenishments, NISAR, and the first HAL-L&T PSLV.

This contraction stems from saturated integration facilities and workforce shortages, with ISRO overextended as designer, integrator, and operator. Private providers still depend on ISRO infrastructure despite liberalisation.

Institutionally, 2020 reforms separating ISRO (research), IN-SPACe (regulation), and NSIL (commercialisation) remain incomplete without national space legislation. Ambiguities foster overlap, risk aversion, and an ageing, hierarchical workforce unsuited to high-cadence operations.

Reinstating S Somanath: S Somanath's 2022-2025 tenure delivered Chandrayaan-3, Aditya-L1, SSLV readiness, and policy reforms, earning acclaim. Successor V Narayanan, a propulsion expert from LPSC, assumed office days before PSLV-C62's failure; roots likely predate both. Reinstating Somanath risks disruption; support Narayanan with resources instead.

Private sector progress is notable: start-ups raised ₹150 million in FY2025, totalling over ₹617 million. Skyroot's Vikram-1 and Agnikul's engines advance, with HAL-L&T building PSLVs independently for Q1 2026 launch. Yet IP restrictions, infrastructure monopoly, and regulatory gaps constrain full potential.

Start-ups drive innovation via agile models, supported by IN-SPACe funds and Gaganyaan contracts. Enacting the Space Activities Bill would clarify liability and boost confidence.

Remedies include forensic PSLV third-stage probes, manufacturing transfers to industry, statutory powers for IN-SPACe, IP reforms for private R&D, workforce expansion, and quarterly launch commitments. These build on 2023 policy for a competitive ecosystem.

Financially, the sector eyes ₹44 billion by 2033; strategically, it bolsters observation, navigation, and defence. With technical fixes, reforms, and private dynamism, India can sustain Gaganyaan, lunar missions, and Bharatiya Antariksh Station ambitions.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)