India's Torturous Path To Fighter Jet Acquisition: Decades of Delays Amid Soaring Threats

India's pursuit of modern fighter aircraft has long been marked by delays, shifting priorities and persistent production hurdles, leaving the Indian Air Force (IAF) short of its operational needs.
A recent article highlights two potential milestones in this tortuous journey: a possible contract for up to 114 Dassault Rafale jets to fulfil the enduring Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) requirement, and progress on the indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) project.
India faces a pivotal set of decisions on its long-delayed, high-stakes combat aircraft programs, with stamina and sustainment at the heart of the challenge. The air force’s immediate requirement remains to bolster its numbers and capabilities in the face of evolving regional threats.
Delays that have stretched since the early 2010s have left the IAF with fewer fighters than its peacetime needs, and the service continues to rely on a mix of legacy platforms and more modern types in varying states of readiness. Amidst this backdrop, two major programmes stand at different ends of the procurement spectrum.
On one side, the MMRCA contest, which sought a large, modern multi-role fighter, appears to be moving towards a contract for up to 114 Rafale aircraft with Dassault. On the other side, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft, or AMCA, program is aiming to chart a path for India’s next generation of indigenous and cooperative combat air capability.
The Rafale decision, if confirmed in the public discourse, would mark a continuation and expansion of a platform that entered IAF service in 2020 after a protracted competitive process that began in 2012. The earlier attempt to secure 126 aircraft was halted by pricing concerns, and a smaller initial order of 36 aircraft was subsequently placed in 2016.
While the aircraft’s performance and the industrial and diplomatic dimensions of the deal are widely discussed, the broader strategic reality remains that this purchase would help address a gap in the IAF’s mid-term capability, even as it does not resolve the longer-term requirement for a next-generation, domestically integrated fighter.
The Rafale’s entry into service, with its multi-role versatility, has already begun to alter the balance in the IAF’s combat inventory, but questions persist about long-term sustainment, upgrade cycles, and the integration of new sensors and weapons as threat landscapes evolve.
Meanwhile, the AMCA program represents India’s ambition to define a largely indigenous path to a future combat aircraft, underpinned by private sector participation and a renewed emphasis on domestic design and system integration.
The period since the project’s inception has been characterised by cautious progress and competing visions among bidders and stakeholders. Reports around early February suggesting that HAL had not been selected for the next competitive stage reflect the uncertainties that often accompany major defence carve-outs.
The clarifications from HAL indicate that no official decision had been announced, underscoring the fluid nature of the procurement process in this arena.
The shortlisted contenders—TASL, L&T, and Bharat Forge—are all private sector players with varying degrees of aerospace pedigree and existing collaborations with global manufacturers. The implications of this selection process are significant: whoever leads the AMCA project will shape India’s ability to transfer knowledge, build supply chains, and nurture domestic capability for next-generation combat aviation.
The background challenge facing both programs is the IAF’s declining squadron strength. The Military Balance Plus and other assessments point to a force whose numbers have fallen below the historically targeted 42 fighter squadrons, heightened by regional tensions with China and Pakistan.
The May 2025 air-to-air exchanges with the Pakistan Air Force, coupled with observed advances in the PLAAF, underscore the need for a credible, quickly deployable, and survivable force. China’s growing numbers of high-end fighters, including the J-20 and newer designs, alongside progressively advanced stealth features, place considerable pressure on New Delhi to deliver capability that can deter and, if necessary, engage with sufficiency and resilience.
The IAF’s current balance comprises a mix of Rafale and Su-30MKI Flankers, with the latter forming the backbone of many Indian air combat sorties. The Rafale provides advanced sensor fusion, multi-role flexibility, and a relatively mature upgrade pathway. The Su-30MKI remains a potent workhorse but requires ongoing upgrade and maintenance to keep pace with emerging threats and the evolving electronic-warfare environment.
The HAL/ADA TEJAS, despite its long gestation and production backlog, represents an important step toward self-reliance and a platform on which future variants might be developed. The TEJAS program’s difficulties illustrate the persistent challenges that accompany domestically led combat-aircraft development, including delays, supply chain constraints, and the need to scale up production capacity to meet growing demand.
A key feature of the present moment is the interplay between imports and indigenous development. The Rafale deal demonstrates that India continues to rely on capable foreign platforms to address immediate capability gaps, while AMCA embodies a strategic pivot toward home-grown development and deeper private-sector participation.
The involvement of TASL, L&T, and Bharat Forge signals an openness to leveraging private enterprise in high-technology aerospace projects, though it also raises questions about leadership, governance, and the orchestration of multi-party collaboration. Any prospective consortium would need to align design authority, propulsion integration, avionics architecture, and risk-sharing strategies to avoid the delays that have plagued earlier attempts.
In the propulsion and radar domains, India’s choices will significantly influence performance and endurance. The TEJAS MK-1A’s trajectory, including the 2021–2025 upgrade process and the decision to equip subsequent aircraft with the Uttam radar, illustrates the ongoing push to improve detection, targeting, and situational awareness within existing platforms.
The F404-based powerplant in the MK-1A family has proven reliable, but future high-performance designs in AMCA will demand advanced propulsion options and seamless integration with next-generation sensors and weapons, including potential long-range air-to-air missiles and advanced air-to-ground capabilities.
For AMCA to succeed, the supply chain must deliver not only airframes but increasingly sophisticated subsystems, including stealth features, sensors, and avionics that can be updated in tandem with evolving adversary technologies.
Strategically, timing remains the singular constraint. The IAF needs tangible, deployable capability now, and it also requires a long-term blueprint that ensures technological sovereignty and sustainable production.
The Rafale purchase fulfils a portion of the immediate requirement while potentially setting the stage for downstream upgrades and lifecycle support. AMCA, if successfully matured, would grant India a indigenous strategic asset with broader spill over effects for indigenisation, export potential, and national resilience.
However, the road to a credible AMCA fleet is fraught with risk, including technology maturation timelines, private-sector readiness, and the need for a coherent and enforceable industrial plan that aligns government, military, and industry objectives.
From a policy perspective, sustaining momentum is essential. Clear, timely communication from government and defence ministries would help set expectations and reduce market uncertainty for industry players.
A transparent evaluation framework, with published criteria and milestones, can foster confidence among bidders and potential partners while maintaining competitive integrity.
A robust test and evaluation regime will be critical to validate performance claims and ensure that any chosen platform, whether Rafale or AMCA-derived, meets the IAF’s operational requirements across a range of mission profiles, including air superiority, precision ground attack, and electronic warfare. The procurement strategy should also consider lifecycle costs, maintenance, and sustainment logistics, including spares, depot-level support, and training pipelines for pilots and technicians.
The broader regional security environment continues to evolve rapidly. Advances in Chinese air capabilities, coupled with the PLAAF’s emphasis on stealth, sensor fusion, and long-range engagement, demand that India not only modernise its air arm but also develop a robust industrial base capable of sustaining complex platforms over decades.
Pakistan’s air force remains a persistent factor in the regional security calculus, underscoring the need to maintain a credible deterrent and the ability to project air power when required. In this context, the success or failure of India’s AMCA program could have ramifications beyond military readiness, affecting strategic signalling, alliance-building, and regional relationships with partners and potential export customers.
India stands at a crossroads with two parallel tracks, each bearing distinct risks and rewards. The Rafale acquisition offers an established, timely augment to the IAF’s current and near-term capabilities, helping to bridge capability gaps while providing a platform with known performance and an established industrial footprint.
The AMCA program represents a leap toward strategic autonomy, potentially delivering a next-generation platform grounded in domestic capability and private-sector leadership. The ultimate outcome will be shaped by political will, market dynamics, technological progress, and the ability to craft a cohesive industrial and military strategy that can deliver both immediate relief and long-term resilience.
The challenge is to manage both urgency and ambition without compromising on quality, safety, or the sustainable growth of India’s defence industrial base.
Based On The International Institute for Strategic Studies Analysis
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