Exercise Balikatan 2026 in the Philippines has become the largest iteration of the annual war games so far, with more than 17,000 troops taking part from 20 April to 8 May.

The exercise has drawn personnel from seven countries: the Philippines, the United States, Australia, Canada, France, Japan and New Zealand. Four of those partners — Canada, France, Japan and New Zealand — are contributing combat troops for the first time, underscoring how the exercise has widened in scope and political significance.

One of the most striking episodes took place on 4 May during a counter-landing live-fire drill near the La Paz sand dunes in north-west Luzon. In that scenario, US Army HIMARS launchers fired rockets towards approaching ship targets, while fighters, missile patrol boats and attack helicopters worked to reduce the number of enemy landing craft before they reached shore.

Any amphibious assault vehicles that managed to land were then met with artillery fire, mortars, small-arms fire and Stinger surface-to-air missiles.

By the end of the engagement, one unmanned surface vessel was left burning on the beach, while another disabled boat drifted away at sea. The defenders in that scenario were Canada, Japan, the Philippines and the United States, and the purpose of the drill was plainly to demonstrate how a joint force could block a hostile amphibious landing.

The Philippine military spokesperson for Balikatan 2026, Colonel Dennis Hernandez, described the event as proof of the country’s growing ability to defend its shores through a multi-layered joint and combined approach.

He said the exercise integrated land, sea and air assets to destroy threats decisively before they could reach the coastline. That formulation reflects the broader shift in Balikatan away from its earlier emphasis on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism towards large-scale combat operations and territorial defence.

Although the exercise organisers did not explicitly name an adversary, the strategic context made the likely focus clear. The drills were widely understood as rehearsal for a Chinese invasion scenario involving either the Philippines or Taiwan.

The targets used in the exercise reinforced that reading, as military commentators described them as ZBDs, a reference to Chinese amphibious assault vehicles. One of the unmanned targets at sea was said to visually resemble a PLA ZBD-05.

US Army AH-64E Apache attack helicopters were reported to have destroyed five ZBDs during the two-hour live-fire event near Laoag. The implication was that partner forces were practising a layered defence against an amphibious assault, combining air, sea and ground fires to stop hostile forces at or before the shoreline.

General Ronald Clark, Commander of US Army Pacific, did not name China directly, but he made clear that the exercise was about simulating the kinds of tasks allied forces might have to perform in combat. He stressed that Balikatan reflects the willingness of partners to train for the tasks they believe they may need to execute in a real crisis or conflict.

For the United States, dominance over the Luzon Strait helps prevent PLA Navy warships from breaking out of the South China Sea into the open Pacific. For China, by contrast, controlling the strait and similar waterways would open options for greater freedom of action, including the ability to attack or invade Taiwan’s east coast rather than facing only the west coast, which sits directly opposite mainland China across the Taiwan Strait. In that sense, any serious Chinese military move against Taiwan would almost certainly involve an attempt to secure access through the Luzon Strait.

Clark ended on a cautiously optimistic note, saying that the US military is in a much better and more focused position in the region than it was ten years ago when he last served at headquarters. That assessment reflects both the expansion of allied coordination and the sharper focus on Taiwan contingency planning, maritime denial and territorial defence across the First and Second Island Chains.

ANI