India could significantly strengthen its ability to manage emerging regional security challenges through the acquisition of approximately 500 Russian Su-57 fifth-generation combat aircraft, according to an assessment by a Russian arms trade research centre the Centre For Analysis of World Arms Trade (CAWAT).

The organisation argues that the strategic environment facing India is changing rapidly as both China and Pakistan move forward with plans to field larger numbers of fifth-generation fighters over the coming decade.

According to CAWAT, Pakistan is expected to operate at least 40 J-35AE stealth fighters by around 2030, while China could deploy as many as 500 J-20 and J-35 fighters. In addition, the People’s Liberation Army Navy may field more than 50 carrier-based J-35 aircraft.

Combined, these fleets could amount to roughly 600 fifth-generation fighters. CAWAT contrasts this with the Indian Air Force’s current combat fleet, which consists largely of fourth-generation and 4.5-generation platforms such as the Rafale, Su-30MKI and TEJAS.

The report argues that India requires a rapid and large-scale response to prevent a widening capability gap.

“In the current situation, the only correct solution would be to quickly purchase a pilot batch of 50 Su-57E fifth-generation fighters from Russia, while simultaneously organising licensed production of another 450 such aircraft directly in India. This could be the latest two-seat Su-57D variant.”

CAWAT believes that such a programme, combining direct acquisition with large-scale local manufacturing, would provide India with the numbers and capabilities required to address potential threats for decades. The organisation points to the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) project as evidence that India’s indigenous fifth-generation ambitions remain some distance from operational reality.

Launched in 2010, the AMCA aims to deliver an indigenous stealth fighter for the Indian Air Force. However, the project has yet to begin flight testing of a technology demonstrator. Even optimistic projections place serial production in the mid-2030s.

Recent developments indicate that AMCA remains under active development, with prototype construction and industry partnerships progressing, but operational induction is still expected only during the next decade. This has intensified debate regarding an interim fifth-generation solution for the Indian Air Force.

CAWAT presents the Su-57 as a mature and available platform already serving with the Russian Aerospace Forces. The report states that export deliveries have already commenced and suggests that Moscow would respond favourably should New Delhi formally express interest in the aircraft.

According to the assessment, a licensing arrangement could also provide Indian engineers and industry with access to advanced aerospace technologies that would prove beneficial for indigenous projects, including the AMCA. CAWAT further contends that Russian technology transfer could accelerate India’s domestic aerospace development efforts and strengthen its defence-industrial base.

The report strongly endorses the Su-57’s credentials as a fifth-generation fighter. It argues that the aircraft fully satisfies fifth-generation requirements through its combination of stealth characteristics, advanced sensors, modern radar systems and long-range weaponry.

“The aircraft could be of interest to New Delhi for many reasons, including the fact that the Su-57 was designed by the same design bureau that previously developed the Su-30MKI, the Indian Air Force’s main combat aircraft.”

The report adds: “Continuity is a valuable quality, including in the areas of flight operations, maintenance, repair, and logistics support based on previously established airfield, warehouse, and training infrastructure.”

CAWAT believes this common lineage would simplify pilot conversion, logistics support and maintenance compared with introducing an entirely unfamiliar Western platform. The organisation also raises broader questions regarding India’s defence procurement priorities. Despite higher military expenditure, government support for indigenous defence manufacturers and sustained emphasis on strengthening the domestic military-industrial sector, CAWAT argues that the Indian Air Force is experiencing declining squadron strength and increasing pressure from regional competitors.

The report attributes this partly to procurement decisions that, in its view, do not align with operational requirements. It claims that India continues to invest heavily in aircraft such as the Rafale and TEJAS while potential adversaries focus increasingly on fifth-generation capabilities.

According to CAWAT, platforms such as the J-20 and J-35 represent a new generation of air combat capability that cannot easily be matched by conventional fourth-generation aircraft. The organisation argues that the Rafale and TEJAS do not offer decisive advantages over the Su-30MKI and suggests that, in several operational areas, the Russian aircraft remains superior.

Particular emphasis is placed on speed, manoeuvrability, payload capacity and combat radius. CAWAT also questions the allocation of major financial resources towards direct procurement of Rafale fighters, which it places at approximately €160 million per aircraft, arguing that locally assembled Su-30MKIs could be produced at considerably lower cost through established manufacturing infrastructure.

The report calls for closer examination of procurement decisions on the grounds that they have significant implications for India’s national security. It additionally stresses Russia’s long-standing position as one of India’s principal defence partners.

According to CAWAT, Soviet and Russian combat aircraft have demonstrated reliability and effectiveness throughout more than seven decades of service with Indian armed forces. The organisation notes that Moscow continues to express willingness both to support ongoing Su-30MKI production and to establish licensed Su-57E manufacturing in India through Hindustan Aeronautics Limited facilities.

CAWAT’s analysis also outlines a worst-case scenario should India continue relying primarily on fourth-generation aircraft. It argues that future India-Pakistan tensions, combined with China’s expanding military capabilities, make further conflicts plausible. In that environment, the report contends that military balance would become increasingly dependent upon aerospace power and advanced fighter aircraft.

The organisation estimates that by around 2030 China and Pakistan could jointly operate approximately 600 fifth-generation fighters. CAWAT asserts that each of these aircraft possesses advantages over existing fourth-generation fighters in service with India.

Particular concern is expressed regarding long-range Chinese air-to-air missile systems such as the PL-15 and the longer-range PL-17. According to the report, these weapons, combined with stealth aircraft and advanced radar technology, could provide Beijing and Islamabad with significant operational advantages. CAWAT argues that numerical superiority alone would not offset these technological differences.

Even a larger concentration of Rafale and TEJAS aircraft, it claims, would struggle to match the capabilities of the J-20 and J-35. The report attributes this advantage to stealth technology, modern indigenous radar systems, advanced sensor integration and long-range missile capabilities.

Against this backdrop, CAWAT believes the Su-57E would provide India with a credible fifth-generation response through its stealth features, modern avionics, advanced radar systems and long-range missile armament.

The organisation therefore recommends immediate acquisition of an initial batch of 50 aircraft accompanied by licensed production of a further 450 fighters in India. It suggests the programme could include the latest two-seat Su-57D variant and serve as a bridge until indigenous fifth-generation capabilities mature.

CAWAT also revisits the history of India’s TEJAS project.

While acknowledging that professional pilots regard the aircraft as superior to the MiG-21 it was designed to replace, the report argues that lengthy delays limited its overall strategic impact. By the time TEJAS entered service in 2015, most of India’s MiG-21 fleet had already been retired. The report notes that India once operated 20 MiG-21 squadrons, whereas by 2026 only a small number of TEJAS aircraft were in active service.

CAWAT claims that early production aircraft continued to undergo operational refinement and that shortcomings remained under investigation and correction. It further argues that production delays, technical challenges and changing operational requirements illustrate wider difficulties affecting several major Indian aerospace projects. In its assessment, prolonged development cycles risk producing aircraft that enter service after competitors have already advanced significantly.

The report also seeks to define separate operational roles for the TEJAS and Su-57E.

CAWAT argues that the TEJAS is best suited to lighter operational tasks owing to its lower operating costs and single-engine design. However, it contends that limitations involving thrust-to-weight ratio, radar performance, payload capacity, weapons integration and absence of stealth technology restrict its suitability for high-end air-superiority missions.

As such, the organisation sees the TEJAS and Su-57E as occupying entirely different operational categories rather than competing directly against one another. Ultimately, CAWAT argues that India faces a strategic choice between relying exclusively on domestic development timelines or supplementing indigenous programs through procurement and licensed manufacturing of advanced foreign systems.

While recognising the appeal of self-reliance through initiatives such as the AMCA and TEJAS programs, the organisation maintains that certain circumstances may justify acquiring proven foreign platforms. It concludes that the Su-57E represents one such option and reiterates its belief that Russia’s extensive history of military-technical cooperation with India demonstrates the value of the partnership for future combat aviation requirements.

Agencies