Noor Wali Mehsud, the emir of the TTP outfit

Pakistan’s attempt to redirect public outrage over escalating attacks by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) toward India underscores a deliberate effort to deflect attention from Islamabad’s long-standing complicity in fostering jihadist groups, reported Bill Roggio.of Foundation For Defence of Democracies.

The latest deadly ambush, which killed 11 Pakistani soldiers including a lieutenant colonel and a major in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, marks another escalation in the TTP’s insurgency against the state.

The Pakistani Army’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) reported that troops were conducting an “intelligence-based operation” in the Orakzai district, a known Taliban stronghold, when they came under heavy fire from militants.

The ISPR claimed that “nineteen Indian-sponsored Khwarij” were also neutralised during the exchange, accusing India of backing the attackers. This accusation forms part of a broader propaganda trend since 2024 in which Islamabad describes the TTP as an “Indian proxy” to externalise blame for domestic instability.

Orakzai has long served as a base of operations for Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, a fierce TTP faction historically associated with Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. The group’s former leader, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was notorious for his global jihadist ambitions and his role in harbouring Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri prior to his death in 2022. The current wave of TTP offensives traces its roots to the collapse of a ceasefire with the Pakistani government in November 2022, after which the militants vowed “revenge attacks across the country.”

The ceasefire, brokered by the Afghan Taliban in 2022, had offered Islamabad a temporary reprieve. However, as TTP factions rearmed and consolidated within Afghanistan under Taliban protection, the truce disintegrated. The Afghan Taliban’s mediation masked an underlying reality: both movements shared an ideological lineage and operational bond that transcended national borders. Since then, the TTP’s cross-border operations have intensified, exploiting safe havens across eastern Afghanistan.

The roots of Pakistan’s current predicament lie in its decades-long policy of nurturing militant groups to achieve strategic depth in Afghanistan. Since 1994, Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus—particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)—has been instrumental in the formation, training, and funding of the Afghan Taliban. This relationship grew out of Islamabad’s desire to maintain influence in Kabul and create a friendly regime to counter India’s regional weight.

Even after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Pakistan publicly allied with the United States while covertly sheltering Taliban leaders fleeing the U.S. invasion. This dual policy enabled Afghanistan to become a safe haven for global jihadist entities such as Al Qaeda and later, the TTP.

Inspired by the Afghan Taliban’s ideological narrative and battlefield victories, Pakistani jihadists in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) coalesced into the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in late 2006. The movement’s creation was bolstered by Al Qaeda and Pakistani-based jihadist outfits such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harakat-ul-Mujahidin, both with covert state backing. The TTP sought to overthrow the Pakistani government and impose an Islamic emirate mirroring the Taliban’s regime in Afghanistan.

Over the next decade, the TTP spearheaded a violent insurgency across north-western Pakistan, with bombings, suicide attacks, and territorial seizures bringing the state to the brink of collapse. In 2009, the group’s advance into Buner district, just 60 miles from Islamabad, showcased the magnitude of Pakistan’s internal threat. Military operations launched subsequently devastated the tribal belt, claiming over 100,000 lives including civilians, soldiers, and insurgents.

Military offensives gradually dismantled the TTP’s territorial control but failed to eradicate its networks. By 2018, surviving Taliban commanders and fighters had relocated into Afghanistan, establishing a formidable cross-border base under the protection of the Afghan Taliban.

The United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team in its 2024 report confirmed that TTP fighters “continue to operate at significant scale in Afghanistan” and maintain “close bonds” with the ruling Taliban government in Kabul.

The TTP now operates from Afghan sanctuaries, exploiting porous borders and Taliban immunity to launch renewed attacks on Pakistani security forces. The TTP’s emir has publicly declared his organisation “a branch of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” reaffirming the operational unity between the two Taliban movements.

Despite clear evidence of its own role in the Taliban’s ascendancy, Pakistan persists in blaming India for TTP-linked violence under the narrative of “Indian Proxy Khwarij.” This rhetoric serves dual domestic purposes—avoiding accountability before its populace and reinforcing anti-India sentiments central to its national security doctrine.

Yet, Islamabad’s consistent support of extremist networks for geopolitical purposes has backfired. The very forces it once cultivated to serve as strategic assets in Afghanistan and Kashmir have evolved into existential threats to Pakistan’s internal stability. The increasingly coordinated TTP-ISKP-Al Qaeda nexus continues to undermine Pakistan’s frontier security, even as the state seeks to deflect blame abroad.

Based On FDD Report