India’s quest for the American F-35 Lightning-II stealth fighter now stands firmly on shaky ground, thanks to a blatant US pivot back to Pakistan. Though Washington dangled the offer before New Delhi, this latest geopolitical betrayal—coupled with fears over losing control to US strings—has wise Indian defence planners turning decisively to Russia’s Su-57E.

This move stands as a smart, sovereign bridge, holding the line until our proud indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) soars into service by the mid-2030s.

Attention now turns to Russia’s Su-57E as a pragmatic interim solution, bridging the gap until India’s homegrown Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) enters service in the mid-2030s.

The impetus for the F-35 discussions gained traction during President Donald Trump’s meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the White House in February 2025. Yet, this enthusiasm has waned sharply following subsequent American decisions.

In March 2025, despite an "America First" stance that curtailed much foreign aid, the Trump administration approved a $450 million sustainment package for Pakistan’s F-16 fleet.

New Delhi interprets this move not merely as counter-terrorism assistance, but as a strategic manoeuvre that jeopardises India’s security. Open-source intelligence reveals that such F-16 support often encompasses engine upgrades and technical enhancements, bolstering the Pakistan Air Force’s readiness against conventional adversaries, far beyond anti-terror operations.

This juxtaposition—offering cutting-edge F-35s to India while fortifying a rival’s ageing platforms—has deepened mistrust, particularly against the backdrop of enduring border frictions. Indian strategists perceive it as classic US hedging, eroding the confidence essential for procuring a platform as strategically sensitive as the F-35.

Compounding these geopolitical tensions are the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) reservations about the F-35’s technical architecture. A high-ranking Pentagon figure recently underscored that the jet functions as an integral component of a US-dominated network, enabling seamless integration with assets like the E-7 Wedgetail but at the expense of user autonomy.

Central to these concerns is the F-35’s reliance on systems such as ALIS or ODIN, which demand constant data interactions with American servers. For India, this introduces vulnerabilities: daily activation codes could enable remote throttling of the aircraft in a crisis, undermining operational reliability.

A 2024 Pentagon report, referenced in open sources, further highlighted maintenance woes, with average repair times stretching to 141 days—a crippling drawback for the IAF’s high-tempo demands. Above all, India’s defence doctrine insists on full sovereignty over nuclear-capable assets, a standard the F-35’s interconnected design fails to satisfy.

As the F-35 pathway fades, Russia’s Su-57E has risen as a compelling alternative. Momentum built during President Vladimir Putin’s Delhi visit in December 2025, where negotiations advanced towards an initial batch of 40 to 60 flyaway units, potentially expanding to 140 aircraft produced locally at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s (HAL) Nashik plant.

The Russian overture starkly contrasts with the US model by prioritising India’s insistence on technology transfer (ToT) and bespoke adaptations. Moscow pledges unfettered access to the Su-57E’s source code, empowering Indian engineers to seamlessly integrate indigenous munitions like the Astra beyond-visual-range missile.

Strategic independence forms the deal’s cornerstone, with commitments for full indigenisation, including manufacture of the potent AL-51F1 engine. This upgrade potential extends to revitalising the IAF’s existing Su-30MKI squadrons, enhancing fleet-wide capabilities without external dependencies.

Critically, the Su-57E addresses the IAF’s pressing squadron shortfall as MiG-21s retire en masse. It serves as a high-end interim asset, preserving air superiority against regional threats until the AMCA matures.

This pivot underscores India’s unwavering commitment to self-reliance, rather than a retreat from it. The AMCA project, approved in May 2025, targets a first flight by 2030 and operational deployment by the mid-2030s, promising a truly indigenous fifth-generation fighter.

Experts frame the Su-57E as a "practical bridge," safeguarding technological parity—particularly against China’s J-20—while insulating the IAF from a US defence ecosystem prone to policy volatility. It ensures firepower continuity without locking India into foreign-controlled logistics.

On the surface, US-India defence relations remain robust, as reaffirmed by the October 2025 Defence Framework agreement in Kuala Lumpur. Yet procurement realities reveal a reversion to India’s time-tested multi-vendor approach, diversifying risks amid great-power rivalries.

India’s calculus reflects a calculated hedge against potential US leverage, prioritising immediate operational needs. By embracing the Su-57E, New Delhi secures a capable stopgap that aligns with its doctrine of strategic autonomy.

This development signals broader implications for Indo-Pacific security dynamics. As Pakistan’s F-16s receive fresh life, India’s countermeasures via the Su-57E could reshape South Asian airpower balances, compelling adversaries to recalibrate.

Long-term, the AMCA’s fruition will anchor India’s fifth-generation ambitions, bolstered by lessons from Su-57E integration. Collaborative production at HAL not only builds capacity but also fosters expertise in stealth technologies and avionics.

Geopolitically, the episode highlights the fragility of arms deals in contested regions. India’s pivot exemplifies prudent diversification, blending Russian reliability with indigenous innovation to counterbalance American unpredictability.

This strategic realignment fortifies the IAF’s posture, ensuring resilience through the 2030s. It reaffirms New Delhi’s resolve to chart an independent course in defence modernisation, undeterred by external overtures.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)