India's underwater strike capability remains a critical vulnerability in its naval arsenal, with the much-anticipated indigenous nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) unlikely to enter service before 2036. This delay exacerbates a strategic gap, leaving the Indian Navy reliant on ageing assets and leased platforms amid escalating threats in the Indian Ocean Region, according to a TOI report.

The Indian Navy currently operates a modest fleet of submarines, comprising diesel-electric boats and a single nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).

The INS Arihant, commissioned in 2016, serves primarily as a strategic deterrent with limited strike capabilities due to its slower speed and shorter range compared to dedicated attack submarines.

Nuclear-powered attack submarines, or SSNs, offer unparalleled advantages: unlimited endurance, high submerged speeds exceeding 30 knots, and the ability to launch precision strikes with cruise missiles while remaining stealthy for weeks.

For India, these platforms are essential to counter China's expanding underwater fleet, which includes over 12 SSNs and advanced Type 093B Shang-class boats.

The cornerstone of India's SSN ambitions is Project 75-Alpha (P-75A), a collaboration with Russia under a 2019 inter-governmental agreement valued at over $3 billion. This project aims to construct six SSNs at Visakhapatnam's Shipbuilding Centre, leveraging leased Akula-class technology and Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL) expertise.

However, progress has stalled due to supply chain disruptions, technological transfer hurdles, and funding constraints. Recent parliamentary reports indicate that the first SSN keel-laying may slip to 2028, with sea trials not before 2032 and full operational capability around 2036—pushing back earlier timelines by at least four years.

Compounding this, India's conventional submarine fleet is dwindling. Of the 16 diesel-electric boats planned under Project 75I, selection remains undecided after a decade of evaluations involving global contenders like Germany's Type 212 and Spain's S-80. The Navy's current 11-boat fleet averages over 20 years in age, with half undergoing extended refits.

China's naval surge heightens the urgency. Beijing's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) now fields six Type 095 SSNs under construction, alongside Jin-class SSBNs patrolling the Bay of Bengal. These assets enable long-range strikes against Indian carriers and island territories, outpacing New Delhi's capabilities.

Pakistan, too, bolsters its underwater posture with Chinese-supplied Yuan-class (Hangor) submarines, equipped with AIP systems for extended submerged operations. Eight boats are slated for delivery by 2028, potentially armed with Babur-3 nuclear cruise missiles, threatening India's southern coasts.

India's leased SSNs provide interim relief. INS Chakra, the second Akula-class boat from Russia, arrived in 2012 but will decommission by 2025. Negotiations for a third lease falter amid Russia's Ukraine commitments and Western sanctions limiting spares.

Indigenous efforts under the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project have yielded SSBNs like INS Arighat (expected 2024) and INS S4* (2025), but SSNs lag. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) are developing a 190 MW pressurised water reactor (PWR) for SSNs, miniaturised from Arihant's 83 MW unit—yet integration trials persist.

Budgetary pressures strain timelines. The Navy's submarine modernisation requires ₹1.2 lakh crore over the next decade, per the 15-Year Naval Plan. Capital outlay for FY2026 hovers at ₹25,000 crore, insufficient against inflation and import dependencies for high-strength steel and sensors.

Technological bottlenecks abound. Achieving quiet propulsion rivals global leaders like the US Virginia-class or Russia's Yasen-M, demanding advanced pump-jet propulsors and anechoic coatings—areas where India's private sector, including Larsen & Toubro, shows promise but lacks scale.

Geopolitically, the Indo-Pacific's contested waters demand SSN deterrence. India's Quad partnerships with the US, Japan, and Australia emphasise interoperable underwater ops, yet capability gaps undermine credibility. Joint exercises like Malabar highlight New Delhi's reliance on allies' P-8I Poseidon aircraft for sub-hunting.

Alternative pathways include partnering with France for Scorpene-derived SSNs or accelerating Project P-75I with electric batteries over AIP. The government eyes private yards like Mazagon and Garden Reach for modular construction to compress timelines.

Yet, without urgent reforms—streamlined procurement, boosted R&D funding, and steel indigenisation—the 2036 horizon looms large. A 2030 SSN debut remains aspirational, per Navy Chief Admiral R. Hari Kumar's recent statements.

This capability void risks India's maritime dominance, inviting adventurism from adversaries. Bridging it demands political will to match China's aggressive shipbuilding, ensuring the seas from Malacca to the Arabian Gulf remain secure for trade and sovereignty.

TOI