Global Dealmaker, Ruin Within: Pakistan’s Jugular Vein (PoK) Rebellion, Pakistan’s Brutal Split

Pakistan under Field Marshal Asim Munir embodies a paradox that is both striking and dangerous. Abroad, it presents itself as a broker of global instability, mediating conflicts and offering corridors of connectivity. At home, however, it remains coercive, repressive, and deeply fragile, according to an analysis by The Print.

This duality has defined the state for decades, with the military’s ideology preferring perpetual risk over compromise. The consequences are stark. In 2025, Pakistan recorded 3,417 violence-linked fatalities, a 34 per cent increase from the previous year, marking its worst security record in a decade.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan accounted for more than 96 per cent of these deaths. Economically, the country grew by 3.7 per cent in FY2025-26, but remains trapped inside a $7-billion IMF program, with public debt hovering at 68.5 per cent of GDP. Diplomatic agility thus coexists uneasily with structural fragility.

The current crackdown in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir illustrates this contradiction most brutally. The Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee began in 2023 with demands for cheaper flour, electricity priced against locally generated hydropower, and an end to elite privileges.

Its agenda has since expanded to demand abolition or restructuring of the 12 assembly seats reserved for refugees living elsewhere in Pakistan. These seats, 12 of 45 directly elected and 12 of the 53-member House, are seen by protesters as a mechanism for Islamabad to engineer governments in Muzaffarabad. 

Islamabad, unwilling to relinquish this control, has branded the protesters “state-enemies.” Casualty figures remain contested due to communications blackouts. Reuters conservatively estimated around 30 deaths since June, while JAAC alleges dozens more dead and hundreds wounded.

The political gravity of this revolt is undeniable. Baloch and Pashtun dissent has long been dismissed by the Punjabi establishment as peripheral. But Kashmir is different. Pakistan has spent decades portraying it as its shah rag, or jugular vein. When the supposed vein itself rejects the centre’s control, the metaphor collapses into absurdity.

India has sharpened its response, particularly after Defence Minister Khwaja Asif accused Indian agencies of backing JAAC. New Delhi’s legal position remains rooted in the unanimous 1994 Parliament resolution demanding Pakistan vacate the occupied territories.

Gilgit-Baltistan, however, was largely absent from Indian discourse until Rajnath Singh’s 2022 declaration that India’s journey to resolve Kashmir would only be complete after “reaching Gilgit and Baltistan.” Even now, many Indians conflate Gilgit-Baltistan with so-called Azad Kashmir, overlooking their distinct institutions, populations, and grievances.

This distinction is critical because it is where China enters the picture. Gilgit-Baltistan forms the northern throat of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor. The Karakoram Highway enters Pakistan from Xinjiang through Khunjerab, traverses Punjab and Sindh, and ends at Gwadar in Balochistan. 

China has already seen its interests attacked from Gwadar to Dasu, where five engineers were killed in 2024. Instability now shadows the northern corridor as well. A 68-day traders’ protest halted Khunjerab traffic in 2025, and in 2026 electoral and dam-compensation protests blocked the highway again.

Financially, Beijing’s investments are complex. The CPEC portfolio is valued above $60 billion, mixing commitments, loans, and private power projects. Yet it is far from complete. One assessment counted only 38 of nearly 90 proposed projects finished, with 23 under construction and roughly a third untouched. Analysts such as Andrew Small have described China as Pakistan’s greatest economic hope and trusted military partner.

This logic explains why CPEC might still prevail. In 2025, the two sides launched CPEC 2.0, promising five corridors—growth, livelihood, innovation, green development, and regional connectivity—alongside realignment of the Karakoram Highway, new industrial zones, and the delayed ML-1 railway.

Despite chronic instability, China is unlikely to abandon this route or its access to the Arabian Sea. Persistent violence may instead push Beijing towards a more visible security posture: deeper intelligence coordination, hardened enclaves, private protection, and perhaps eventually an official outpost. Such a development would concern both India and the United States.

Yet fears of Pakistan’s “Balkanisation” remain improbable. China, Turkey, the US, Gulf financiers, and Pakistan’s army all have strong incentives to prevent state fracture, even if domestic reforms and strategic course corrections are indefinitely postponed.

For India, the reality is clear. Pakistan will remain flailing, punching above its weight internationally while cracking down internally. It will regenerate cross-border infiltration into India as a survival tactic. Pakistan is neither a miraculous winner of global instability nor an imminent ruin.

It is a state monetising disorder while being consumed by disorder; mediating wars overseas while militarising politics at home; offering corridors to others while closing roads to its own citizens. In today’s upended order, muddles can become leverage and puddles may reflect grand ambition.

But no performance can indefinitely reconcile mediation abroad with repression within. Eventually, the mountains return the echo.

Agencies

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India Objects To Chinese Projects On Illegally Occupied Jammu And Kashmir Territories

The Ministry of External Affairs on Friday accused China of infringing upon India’s sovereignty, stating that Beijing is illegally occupying Indian territories in Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh.

The MEA raised firm objections against Chinese projects being undertaken in these regions, describing them as violations of India’s territorial integrity.

At the weekly press briefing, MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal emphasised New Delhi’s consistent position on sovereignty. He reiterated that India has always raised concerns with Beijing, making clear that India does not violate China’s sovereignty in any manner and has remained consistent in its approach.

Jaiswal pointed to China’s ongoing illegal presence and unilateral infrastructure initiatives in Indian territory. He stressed that China has been in illegal occupation of Indian territories in Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh since 1963, despite India’s rights being officially acknowledged even by China. He added that there are Chinese projects on territories in Jammu and Kashmir that belong to India, and India firmly objects to them.

These strong remarks came a day after External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar held discussions with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila. The meeting highlighted both the contentious issues and the attempts at dialogue between the two sides.

According to a readout released by the Chinese foreign ministry, Wang Yi asserted that previous bilateral engagements between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Kazan and Tianjin had guided China-India relations onto the right track of improvement and development. He described China and India as partners rather than competitors, and as opportunities rather than threats to each other.

The Chinese statement noted that institutional mechanisms had gradually restarted, border regions had maintained peace and tranquillity, and bilateral trade had reached record levels. Wang emphasised that these achievements had not come easily and should be cherished.

He characterised both nations as key representatives of emerging markets and the Global South. Wang expressed that both sides should prioritise human well-being, demonstrate their responsibility as major powers, consolidate positive momentum in bilateral relations, strengthen coordination and cooperation in international and regional affairs, and contribute positively to promoting multipolarity and the democratisation of international relations.

The Chinese foreign ministry further stated that Beijing remains willing to collaborate with New Delhi to execute leader-level consensus, maintain regular high-level interactions, broaden trade, media, and cultural links, and handle sensitive friction points properly. It added that China seeks to explore a correct way for neighbouring major powers to coexist peacefully, based on mutual respect, mutual trust, common development, and common prosperity.

This exchange underscores the dual nature of India-China relations, where sovereignty disputes over Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh remain deeply contentious, even as both sides highlight cooperation in trade, diplomacy, and global governance.

India’s objections to Chinese projects in its territories reflect its firm stance on sovereignty, while China’s emphasis on partnership and multipolarity illustrates its attempt to balance disputes with broader strategic engagement.

ANI

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Is Asim Munir Loses Grip Over Balochistan?

Pakistan’s grip over Balochistan has weakened dramatically, with human rights activist Mir Yar Baloch claiming that 85% of the province is outside state control and that a 5,00,000-strong rebel force is preparing to expel Pakistani troops by year-end. General Asim Munir’s military leadership is under severe strain, facing coordinated insurgent attacks, Chinese pressure over CPEC security, and mounting domestic criticism.

Mir Yar Baloch’s assertion that Pakistan has lost control of most of Balochistan underscores the scale of the crisis. He warned that a massive rebel force is ready to drive out Pakistani troops, signalling a potential escalation that could fundamentally alter the region’s political and security landscape.

The claim comes amid intensifying turmoil in Balochistan. In recent weeks, coordinated attacks by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have killed dozens of soldiers and police officers.

Militants stormed a police outpost at Mangi Dam in Ziarat, killing 27 police officers and 11 soldiers, and later abducted and executed 18 personnel. These attacks have been described as some of the deadliest in recent years, exposing deep vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s security apparatus.

General Asim Munir has responded with urgency. He reportedly issued a 72-hour ultimatum to his intelligence chiefs, demanding they “control Balochistan or pack up.” This ultimatum reflects the desperation within Rawalpindi, where the military is scrambling to reassert authority.

The Pakistan Army has since launched “Operation Shaban,” a sweeping offensive involving airstrikes and ground operations across the province. Official reports claim over 100 separatist fighters have been killed, though human rights groups accuse the military of targeting civilians and carrying out enforced disappearances.

The crisis is compounded by external pressure. China, heavily invested in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), has grown increasingly frustrated with attacks on its engineers and projects in Gwadar.

Beijing has reportedly threatened to halt funding and deploy its own security forces if Islamabad fails to secure the corridor. For Pakistan’s military elite, the prospect of foreign boots on the ground is a nightmare scenario, highlighting the geopolitical stakes of the conflict.

Domestically, criticism of Munir’s leadership is mounting. Politicians and activists argue that repeated failures have eroded the state’s writ, with some describing Pakistan as a “hard state” turning into a “failed state.” Former parliamentarian Bushra Gohar questioned why no accountability has followed the catastrophic lapses, while others accuse the military of meddling in politics instead of focusing on its constitutional role.

The unrest in Balochistan is not only a military challenge but also a political and social one. Rebels accuse Islamabad of exploiting the province’s vast natural resources—gas, gold, and minerals—while neglecting local development. This grievance has fuelled decades of insurgency, and the current escalation suggests that Pakistan’s strategy of force alone may be unsustainable.

If Mir Yar Baloch’s prediction of a rebel takeover materialises, Pakistan could face the most serious territorial crisis since its creation. The combination of insurgent strength, Chinese pressure, and domestic discontent places General Asim Munir in an unenviable position, with his grip over Balochistan appearing weaker than ever.

ANI

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Pakistan Army’s Historical Hatred for Kashmiris

by Nilesh Kunwar

Officers from the defence forces of several friendly foreign countries attend various military courses in Indian defence training establishments and the author had an opportunity to attend one such course in the late 80s. Some nations that have cordial relations with both India and Pakistan send their officers to both countries and so it’s not uncommon to find an officer who has attended a military course in Pakistan attending another one in India.

India and Pakistan have fought three wars and relations between them remain strained. It’s therefore evident that before their arrival, foreign officers attending courses in India or Pakistan are instructed to respect the sensitivities of the host nation and not say anything that could adversely impact cordial relations, and needless to say, the officers implicitly follow this directive.

So, when a foreign officer in my ‘syndicate’ (class) asked me whether I had served in Kashmir, I expected him to ask me something about anti-terrorist operations there and in anticipation, mentally framed an answer that to my mind would neither sound like a curt rebuff nor provide him any ‘classified’ information. However, I was taken aback when he asked me whether it was true that “Kashmiris could never be trusted?”

My instinctive response was, “who told you so?”

The officer said that he had heard the “Kashmiris just can’t be trusted” refrain so often during private discussions between Pakistan army officers during an army course that he had earlier attended in Pakistan that he felt that there must be some truth in it. I had extensively interacted with locals during my Kashmir tenure and never found any reason to doubt their integrity and nor did I come across anyone holding such a negative view.

I told the foreign officer so, reminding him that casting aspersions on the loyalty of an entire community was just an emotional assessment and not a credible evaluation. He must have found my answer reasonable as he didn’t pursue this issue any further. While this officer must have forgotten all about it, existence of this perverse belief within the Pakistan army kept haunting me and after superannuation, decided to investigate.

Likely Origins

Since there was no documented mention of this issue, I contacted my old friends who were following Pakistan and its army and this paid off. A very close friend who settled down in the US years ago sent me an interesting input. Through his colleague he was able to meet a veteran who had joined the Pakistan army in the early 50s and was now living with his son in New York. His account provided a convincing insight into the general view of the rank and file of Pakistan army on Kashmiris and the reason thereof.

He recounted that post Pakistan army’s unsuccessful attempt to annex J&K in 1947 by using tribals commanded by army regulars, everyone rightly wanted to know what went wrong especially since the invading force had nearly reached the outskirts of J&K’s capital, Srinagar.  Within army circles two reasons were ascribed for this debacle-one, politicians and two, Kashmiris.  While the army felt that the government had meekly accepted UNSC intervention, it blamed the people of Kashmir for having double crossed the Pakistan army led invading forces.

The belief that Kashmiris can’t be trusted gained further strength within the Pakistan army as veterans of Operation Gulmarg (code name for the Kashmir invasion) continued boasting and concealed their own failings by narrating incidents of how they were betrayed by locals. While not everyone (including the veteran who then had just five years service) agreed that all Kashmiris were quislings, this perception became an article of faith within the armed forces of Pakistan after the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict.  

For better understanding, there’s a need to digress and briefly mention Pakistan army’s war-plan.

Codenamed Operation Gibraltar, Rawalpindi’s strategy entailed annexation of J&K by using regulars to covertly infiltrate regulars disguised as Razakars (civilian volunteers) across the Line of Control (LoC) and start an insurrection by inciting the Muslim majority.  The plan further envisaged cutting off Kashmir Valley from India by destroying surface and wireless communication facilities, attacking military headquarters, logistic installations and even airfields.

In order to facilitate indoctrination of locals and foment an uprising, soldiers from the Pakistan occupied J&K’s “Azad Kashmir Regular Force” were selected for this operation. So, Pakistan army’s war plan ultimately boiled down to Kashmiris from PoJK motivating their brethren in J&K to rebel against the Indian authorities and facilitate annexation of Kashmir.

However, the people of Kashmir refused to cooperate with the infiltrators and instead reported them to the Indian army due to which Operation Gibraltar ended in a monumental failure, resurrecting and cementing the Pakistan army’s perverse “you just can’t trust Kashmiris” belief.

Present Day Context

The disparaging attitude of the Pakistan army towards locals in PoJK endures, leaving no room for doubt that it continues to believe that Kashmiris can’t be trusted, and this explains the heightened civilian surveillance and privacy intrusion by the military in this region. PoJK residents who ask for their basic rights are promptly dubbed “Indian agents” and this has created a sense of alienation that is increasing exponentially.

An example is the way the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC) has been treated.

A grass root rights organisation demanding legitimate structural reforms, political rights, and critical economic relief for the people of PoJK, JKJAAC has been proscribed under the draconian anti-terrorism laws. There’s credible evidence indicating that this crude attempt to stifle genuine dissent is the brainchild of Field Marshal Asim Munir who perceives anyone not agreeing with the ‘establishment’ as an ‘Indian agent’.

It may be argued that blaming Pakistan’s self-appointed field marshal is being unfair since Rawalpindi has always relied on use of brute force to intimidate PoJK residents. But can Munir apologists deny the fact that under his charge the security forces have become yet more repressive and indiscriminate firing on peaceful protesters has become a routine affair.

Displaying commendable moral courage, JKJAAC leader Sardar Aman Khan exposed Rawalpindi’s duplicity by saying "It was the Pakistan Army itself that handed guns to Kashmiris. And today, they have the audacity to call us terrorists." He also cited the example of how people armed with swords and sophisticated weapons like AK 47s were seen freely moving around during an event organised by UNSC designated terrorist organisation Jaish-e-Mohammad last February in Rawalkot.

It’s no brainer that Pakistan has over-played the ‘victim’ card and Field Marshal Munir who’s heading Pakistan’s “hybrid regime” needs to seriously look inwards. He should realise that levelling unsubstantiated allegations of foreign (read ‘Indian’) involvement in the ongoing disturbances in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Sindh and now PoJK is a bit too far-fetched and very hard to digest. And if this is indeed the case, then why is the slogan “yeh jo dehshatgardi hai,uske peeche wardi hai” (the army is behind the ongoing terrorism) heard so often during protests across the country?

PoJK is today witnessing a humongous military-created human tragedy and stoic silence on this issue by the international community is tantamount to abetment.  Pakistan’s brutality against the innocent people of KP, Balochistan and PoJK in the clumsy garb of anti-terrorist operations can no longer be ignored.

The author is an Indian Army veteran and a founder-member of Society for Transitive Research, Integration and Veteran empowerment (STRIVE) and can be contacted at nileshkunwar.56@gmail.com

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Cornered By CPEC Failures, Pakistan’s Army Chief Deflects Deep Crisis By Blaming India For Balochistan Attacks

Pakistan’s military establishment is once again resorting to diversionary tactics as Field Marshal Asim Munir attempts to deflect attention from mounting crises at home, reported News18.

Following a deadly bombing targeting the Zaffar Express in Balochistan, Munir rushed to the western frontier and accused India of actively promoting and sponsoring terrorism inside Pakistan.

His remarks came during an Eid-ul-Azha visit with frontline troops in Zhob and Quetta, where he vowed to pursue “terror facilitators with full force” and insisted that external orchestration could not weaken the nation’s resolve.

Top intelligence sources, however, revealed that this aggressive rhetoric is a smokescreen designed to mask severe administrative panic. Pakistan’s armed forces are facing an unprecedented collapse in troop morale, compounded by Beijing’s growing dissatisfaction over stalled China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects and a devastating wave of insurgent strikes.

The military has recently branded alleged Indian involvement as “Fitna-al-Hindustan,” but analysts argue this is a textbook state response aimed at diverting public attention from chronic governance failures, unchecked radicalisation, and flawed security policies.

By conjuring up the spectre of Indian sponsorship for native Baloch and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) insurgencies, the high command is attempting to rally a disillusioned public around the flag.

The bombing of the Zaffar Express was a highly coordinated attack executed by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), targeting security personnel aboard the train. Rather than addressing glaring gaps in domestic counter-terrorism frameworks, Munir framed the insurgency as a foreign-funded proxy war. Intelligence analysts stress that this narrative is designed to obscure the military’s inability to protect Chinese state assets, which have repeatedly been targeted in recent months.

The real driver of Pakistan’s current panic lies in its strained relationship with China. Intelligence sources confirm that Beijing has raised intense concerns over recurring attacks on Chinese personnel and multi-billion-dollar CPEC projects.

The Chinese leadership is increasingly dissatisfied with Islamabad’s protection mechanisms, leading to significant project delays and stalled development in Gwadar. Munir’s sudden visits to Balochistan are seen as frantic attempts to project control and reassure Chinese auditors, who are threatening to freeze future capital inflows unless security guarantees are met.

This escalation comes at a time when Munir has consolidated his grip over the state apparatus. Sweeping constitutional changes have promoted him to Field Marshal and Chief of Defence Forces, extending his influence far beyond traditional military boundaries.

Yet this consolidation of power contrasts sharply with the ground reality. Intelligence sources report that morale among mid-level and frontline soldiers is at its lowest point in recent history. Troops on the western frontier feel trapped between relentless BLA ambushes and a hostile local population that resists Rawalpindi’s heavy-handed tactics.

While Munir continues to praise the “unwavering vigilance” of his forces in official statements, intelligence data indicates widespread fatigue within the military and Law Enforcement Agencies.

The spiralling cost of maintaining the security state has left the establishment struggling to sustain its narrative of strength. Munir’s aggressive posturing increasingly appears less a demonstration of sovereign authority and more a defensive counter-narrative from a leadership running out of answers.

Agencies

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Pakistan’s Strategic Tilt: Asim Munir Slows CPEC To Court US And Undermine China

Pakistan’s military leadership under Asim Munir is deliberately slowing down the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), signalling a strategic tilt away from Beijing and towards Washington, while Gulf states like the UAE are simultaneously obstructing Iran’s integration into the corridor to protect Dubai’s dominance, reported News18.

This marks a significant rupture in the “all-weather” China-Pakistan partnership.

Pakistan and China have long projected their relationship as a cornerstone of regional strategy, built around military cooperation and the ambitious CPEC program under Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative.

The corridor was designed to connect China’s Xinjiang province with Pakistan’s Gwadar Port through highways, railways, pipelines and energy projects. Over the past decade, it became the centrepiece of China-Pakistan ties, but it also left Islamabad heavily dependent on Chinese financing and technical support.

Reports now indicate that Army Chief Asim Munir is deliberately stalling the remaining projects, with only 38 out of roughly 90 projects completed. This slowdown is not accidental but part of a broader realignment with the United States and the Trump administration.

Munir’s strategy appears to prioritise Washington’s approval, especially as Pakistan positions itself as a diplomatic player in the ongoing US-Iran confrontation.

By attempting to mediate between Washington and Tehran, Islamabad is seeking to reduce reliance on China and regain strategic favour in Washington.

The United Arab Emirates has emerged as another disruptor in this equation. The Iran-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce has accused the UAE of actively sabotaging Tehran’s integration into CPEC, fearing that Gwadar port could rival Dubai’s dominance as a regional trade hub.

Iran’s planned rail connectivity between Chabahar, Zahedan and Mirjaveh would have linked it into the corridor, positioning Tehran as a strategic hub for trade between China, Central Asia and the Caucasus.

However, progress has been slow, with the rail link only 50–60% complete by 2026, partly due to Gulf obstruction. Munir’s deliberate stalling of CPEC projects has further hampered Iran’s ambitions.

The slowdown in CPEC coincides with Pakistan’s broader geopolitical recalibration. Intelligence assessments suggest that while Islamabad continues to praise its partnership with Beijing publicly, its military establishment is quietly reducing dependence on China.

This shift comes at a sensitive moment for Pakistan’s fragile economy, which has struggled with debt and inflation. Aligning more closely with Washington could provide financial relief and political leverage, but it risks unsettling Beijing, which has invested heavily in Pakistan’s infrastructure and energy sectors.

Despite the slowdown, China has not withdrawn military or intelligence support to Pakistan. The two countries continue to collaborate on advanced defence platforms and coordinate at international forums.

However, the lack of new flagship CPEC projects since 2022 underscores the strain in their economic partnership. The “London Plan,” reportedly initiated in 2019, envisaged Pakistan’s military leadership moving the country away from China in exchange for increased American backing.

By 2022, this plan began to take effect, and CPEC’s progress has since stagnated.

The implications of this shift are profound. Pakistan risks alienating its most consistent strategic partner, China, while betting on renewed favour from Washington.

At the same time, Gulf states like the UAE are manoeuvring to protect their own economic interests, further complicating Pakistan’s regional calculus.

Iran, meanwhile, finds its ambitions curtailed both by Gulf obstruction and Pakistan’s deliberate stalling of integration projects.

Agencies

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South Asia Faces Tightrope As Trump–Xi Summit Redraws Strategic Margins

The forthcoming summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on 14–15 May 2026 is being framed as a bilateral de‑escalation exercise, but its implications stretch far beyond Washington and Beijing.

The two largest economies are attempting to stabilise a relationship strained by punitive tariffs, tightening restrictions on AI agents, and an increasingly precarious rare earth minerals arrangement. The fragile “October Truce” of 2025 temporarily halted tariff escalations, yet the underlying frictions remain

unresolved.

Overlaying this is the fallout from the US‑Israel war on Iran, which has constricted the Strait of Hormuz and sent shockwaves through energy‑dependent Asian economies, casting the longest shadow over the talks.

For South Asia, the outcome of the summit is critical. The region, home to nearly two billion people, has seen economic survival and national security become inseparable variables. Governments have adopted calibrated ambiguity, balancing Chinese capital inflows into infrastructure with Western partnerships for security cooperation and market access.

Most capitals seek a familiar equilibrium: sufficient US–China competition to preserve bargaining space and sustain “China Plus One” manufacturing shifts, but not so much escalation that it triggers a global slowdown or forces binary alignment.

India sits at the centre of this balancing act. New Delhi has anchored its external security posture in the Quad and expanded high‑tech defence cooperation with Washington, driven by concerns over Chinese assertiveness along the Line of Actual Control. Yet an unexpected US–China thaw, a transactional “Grand Bargain” between Trump and Xi, could complicate this trajectory.

Indian planners worry that reduced friction over Taiwan may embolden Beijing elsewhere, including in Arunachal Pradesh. At the same time, any easing of the Iran‑linked energy shock would provide relief to India’s inflation‑sensitive economy. For now, India is likely to continue tightening defence ties with the West while sustaining controlled, transactional economic engagement with China.

Pakistan presents a contrasting alignment. Deeply embedded in CPEC 2.0, Islamabad is shifting from basic infrastructure to higher‑end industrial cooperation, exemplified by its electric vehicle partnership with BYD and the management of 44 new Special Administrative Zones.

A more stable US–China relationship would provide the economic breathing room to sustain Chinese investment at this critical juncture. For Pakistan, Beijing remains both development lifeline and strategic anchor against India, narrowing the scope for meaningful re‑engagement with a protectionist Washington.

Smaller South Asian states are refining agile diplomacy. Bangladesh has leveraged shifting supply chains to secure a 2026 bilateral arrangement fixing US garment tariffs at 19 percent, while expanding defence cooperation with Beijing, including a January 2026 agreement with CETC to establish domestic drone manufacturing.

Afghanistan has emerged as a consequential node, with China securing long‑term mining contracts for poly‑metallic and critical minerals in Faryab province, integrating Kabul into its resource‑security architecture.

The buffer states face sensitive challenges. Bhutan continues delicate boundary negotiations with China under its “Three‑Step Roadmap” while advancing the Gelephu Mindfulness City, balancing Indian security concerns with experimental digital finance frameworks.

Sri Lanka and the Maldives, both under significant debt pressure, remain locked in cycles of refinancing and renegotiation. Male alone faces over $1 billion in obligations this year. Their survival strategies rest on securing Chinese debt flexibility, often through AIIB‑mediated rollovers, while preserving India‑first security arrangements.

The Bay of Bengal has transformed into a central theatre of contest. Once peripheral, it is now a dense maritime corridor of ports, surveillance infrastructure, and competing influence networks. China’s connectivity projects fuel Indian anxieties over encirclement, while the United States increasingly views the region as a counterweight arena. Any escalation in the Pacific or renewed disruption in the Strait of Hormuz would transmit immediate economic shockwaves through South Asia’s energy supply chains and shipping routes.

Technological fragmentation adds another layer of complexity. Beijing’s discussions on AI governance and semiconductor restrictions are likely to raise the cost of industrial upgrading for developing economies.

As automation reshapes garment production and other labour‑intensive sectors, the developmental divide will widen between countries investing early in digital infrastructure and those locked into low‑value manufacturing cycles. Pharmaceuticals, shipbuilding, and IT services are emerging as more durable pathways for those navigating this structural shift.

Expectations from the summit remain deliberately restrained. Limited announcements on agricultural purchases, Boeing aircraft, and energy trade are possible, alongside tentative steps toward Middle East de‑escalation. Few anticipate a strategic reset.

For South Asia, the decisive variable lies not in Beijing’s declarations but in domestic responses. States that strengthen institutional resilience, diversify partnerships, and adapt economic structures will be better positioned to absorb shocks.

In a region defined less by ideology than by adjustment, the Trump–Xi summit will not redraw the map but will quietly redraw the margins within which South Asia’s next decade must be negotiated. In a world of tightening constraints, that may prove consequential enough.

Agencies

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Chinese Firm Shuts Gwadar Plant As Iran-US Talks Falter And Washington Escalates Sanctions

A Chinese firm has shut down its Gwadar Free Zone plant, laying off all workers amid mounting losses, while Iran has submitted a fresh proposal via Pakistan to the US to end the West Asia conflict, even as Washington escalates sanctions under “Economic Fury.”

This dual development underscores both the fragility of foreign investment in Pakistan and the intensifying geopolitical-economic contest involving Iran, China, and the US.

The Hangeng Trade Company announced the closure of its Gwadar facility on International Labour Day, citing “non-commercial factors” and operational hurdles that made continued business impossible. 

Despite meeting international export standards, its shipments remained stuck, leading to sustained losses. The firm said it had engaged with Pakistani authorities for three months but no resolution emerged. Before shutting down, it cleared all dues, including three months’ salaries, penalties, electricity bills, and container demurrage charges.

The company emphasised that Pakistan and China remain close partners, noting Gwadar’s role as a flagship project under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). However, it stressed that a “clear and workable policy environment” is essential for businesses to survive.

It thanked the Government of Pakistan and the Ministry of Planning for supporting Pak-China cooperation but cautioned prospective investors to carefully evaluate uncertainties linked to Gwadar. 

This closure comes just ahead of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s scheduled visit to China for a business-to-business forum, raising concerns about investor confidence and the viability of foreign-backed ventures in Pakistan’s strategic port city.

Gwadar itself has faced persistent challenges: low cargo volumes, infrastructure deficits, and local discontent. Security threats from Baloch insurgents have repeatedly targeted Chinese projects, adding to investor unease.

Reports also suggest bureaucratic delays, including disputes over export approvals, have compounded operational difficulties for foreign firms.

Meanwhile, Iran has submitted a new proposal through Pakistan to the US, seeking to advance negotiations to end the ongoing conflict. The proposal, handed over on 30 April, prioritises reopening the Strait of Hormuz and deferring nuclear talks to a later stage.

This marks a shift in Tehran’s approach, focusing on immediate de-escalation and maritime access before addressing nuclear issues. Analysts view this as an attempt to break the deadlock after failed talks in Islamabad and weeks of fragile ceasefire.

The US response has been sceptical. On 1 May, Washington announced sweeping sanctions targeting Iran’s financial and energy networks. Under the “Economic Fury” campaign, the Treasury designated three Iranian currency exchange houses and affiliated front companies accused of laundering billions of dollars.

These networks convert Iran’s oil revenues, largely settled in Chinese yuan, into usable currencies for Tehran’s military and proxies. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described Iran as “the head of the snake for global terrorism” and vowed relentless pressure.

The sanctions come amid a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which has disrupted nearly 20% of global oil and gas flows, driving prices above $100 per barrel. While Iran insists it does not seek war, it has maintained its blockade in response to US naval pressure.

The economic fallout is severe: Iran faces inflation exceeding 100%, collapsing purchasing power, and rising unemployment, while global markets remain jittery.

Pakistan’s role as mediator is under strain. The abrupt departure of Iran’s delegation from Islamabad on 25 April left its claims of brokering peace in tatters. With Gwadar’s investment climate deteriorating and Iran-US talks faltering, Islamabad’s ambitions to position itself as a regional stabiliser face mounting challenges.

ANI

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Afghanistan: From Landlocked, Luck-Locked To An Important South Asian Influencer

by Shaumik Samar Ghosh

The contentious Durand Line which separates Afghanistan and Pakistan runs 2,640-kilometre, with the western end touching Iran and the eastern end to China.

Named after British diplomat Mortimer Durand, the line was drawn with an intent to measure the limit of the countries’ respective scope of influence and make a fair demarcation to facilitate diplomatic relations and trade.

Back then, Britain deemed Afghanistan as an autonomous state, but had control over its foreign affairs and diplomatic relations.

Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have cultural histories shaped by a number of civilizations from the east and also the west. Afghan culture and ethos comprise of Pashtun, Uzbek, Hazara, Uzbek, and other ethnic groups; whereas Pakistani culture has the Punjabi, Sindhi, Baloch & Pashtun traditions, rooted in Islamic practices.

In spite of being an independent state Afghanistan could never break out of the shackles of subordination until 2021, while Pakistan continues to remain caught in a vortex of quasi military dictatorship, indecisive politics and internal imbroglios.

The Afghan Jihad against former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was a time when both Afghanistan and Pakistan had good relations, even though the former had a pro-USSR and anti-Pakistan government in Kabul.

Then came the US led attack on Afghanistan and the prolonged presence of foreign occupation forces which saw friends become foes, and seems that the same is happening even now. Another reason of Pakistan getting irked is Afghanistan’s new found alliances in South Asia, especially India.

For a landlocked country, Afghanistan has been unfortunate in limitless regards. After September 11, 2001, in attacks on New York City and Washington that left thousands dead, the terrorists were Al-Qaeda members, a militant Islamist network that was believed to have been supported by Afghanistan’s de facto rulers.

The Taliban could not trace and handover the leaders of al-Qaeda, especially Osama Bin Laden who was later traced in Pakistan. The United States then invaded Afghanistan to support the Northern Alliance in overthrowing the Taliban and to dislodge Al-Qaeda, but maybe it was looking for the right people in the wrong place. This could have been a mere pretext to capture Afghanistan. The Taliban was removed from power and a new government was set up.

Peace was still a distant dream as the new Afghan government struggled to bring stability to the country. Fighting continued between the NATO powers the Taliban, and civilian casualties were high. In February 2009, while Barack Obama was US president, it hiked the presence of troops in Afghanistan. 

In 2010 around 1,50,000 NATO troops were on the ground in Afghanistan, but the situation worsened as there were even higher casualties. This happened even in 1839, during the First Anglo-Afghan War, when British-led forces invaded Afghanistan and started a war with Afghan rulers, and two years later, the British were defeated.

The 1880 ‘Treaty of Gandamak’ did see Afghanistan giving control of various frontier areas to British ruled India, but it ended in a stalemate as a pro- British head could not be appointed in Kabul. After more than a decade Mortimer Durand was sent to Kabul to sign an agreement with the then supreme leader Amir Abdur Rahman Khan as an agreement of borders were mandatory for many reasons and the most important one was to keep the country afar from communist influence.

The political identity of Afghanistan has always been manipulated through indirect and clandestine formulations. This particular conflict of interest between the people of Afghanistan and foreign installed Afghan governments is the cause of mass resentment leading to armed resistance, a resistance that is always prepared for the worst.

Many who don’t want to live under clouds of mayhem and uncertainty are convinced by certain groups to move to Pakistan in the form of inflow of unarmed refugees, which also encourages drug and human trafficking. In recent times, the Afghan government has not accepted a number of border management proposals from Pakistan.

Bitten million times and shy a billion, Afghanistan continues to deal with serious distrust, blame games, a refugee crisis and cross border violations that is a result of centuries of tug of war. The international interest in Afghanistan stems from the fact that it is the inevitable ‘Boxing Ring of Asia” which is not just strategically, but also psychologically, culturally, geographically and politically the quintessential underdog who has been always carrying the bone with it.

With the world order headed towards multi-polarity, Afghanistan may face many more challenges because it was left behind when rest of the world was moving at a fast pace. For the country to grow it must to open to different philosophies, policies and sustainable trade models.

As it has seen with Pakistan that even though both practice the same religion—majorly the Sunni version or Deobandi form of Islam, it still won’t be enough to emerge as a robust independent power.

With rising trade tensions amongst major economies, not to forget the US- Iran War, South Asia remains at the centre of routing, sending and receiving problems, Afghanistan can play an important catalyst in the emerging new world order.

While China wants Afghanistan to join the former’s ambitious CPEC corridor program, it could be yet another cause of worry for Afghans as they may once more end up as proxy void of any equal say.

But it proved it can as many reports suggest that it is reducing its dependence on Pakistani corridors for access to other markets, and has been using more of the Chabahar port—a positive augmentation of its trade doctrine, backed by India.

At a diplomatic level, Afghanistan is evolving and experimenting with forging new relations. This becomes even more important for a country that does not have an Independence Day - as it was always a free nation on paper, but freedom eluded it for way too long.

Shaumik Samar Ghosh is a writer and keen political and geopolitical analyst

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Varuna Shakti – India’s Naval Power Projection In The Strait of Malacca

Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj known as the "Father of the Indian Navy," recognised as early as the 17th century that a formidable indigenous maritime force was essential to counter colonial threats (Portuguese, British, Dutch) along India's Konkan coast.

India’s modern-day Navy is carrying forward this legacy in the maritime domain & have understood strategic importance of the key global chokepoint – The Straight of Malacca.

One of the most important waterways in the world and a crucial global chokepoint, it facilitates quarter of global commerce between the Indian & Pacific oceans. Although this constricted route supports economies from East Asia to Europe, its bottlenecks increase the risk of piracy and geopolitical unrest. 

For centuries, the strait has served as a pivotal point for Southeast Asia's trade routes connecting the Far East and the Indian Ocean, promoting the development of ports as hubs of Cultural & religious beliefs.

Situated between the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra, the Strait of Malacca is a funnel-shaped passage linking Pacific Ocean with Indian ocean. The Chokepoint in the Phillips Channel near Singapore, the navigable width narrows to a dangerous 2.7 km. Over 94,000 vessels transit annually.

It carries 35% of the world’s maritime oil and 20% of its natural gas, supporting the economies of south east Asia. It's closure would cost China an estimated $63 million each week. China relies on this route for 80% of its oil imports.

To mitigate the risk of a blockade, Beijing has pursued the "String of Pearls"—investing in ports like Gwadar (Pakistan) and Kyaukpyu (Myanmar) to create land-based energy corridors that bypass Malacca. This will help it mitigate it’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’.

India has leveraged its geography to act as a regional balancer. ANC Command established in 2001, this tri-service command sits just 600 km from the Strait, allowing India to oversee routes critical to East Asian freight. ANC undertakes patrols, anti-smuggling operations, and humanitarian missions, thereby enhancing India's influence in the context of regional tensions.

INS Baaz (Great Nicobar): The southernmost air station for P-8I Poseidon patrols, providing oversight of the strait. INS Utkrosh and INS Kohassa: These bases support maritime reconnaissance operations with Do-228 aircraft and helicopters. INS Kardip and INS Jarawa: These serve as forward bases for corvettes, Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), and logistics operations near critical chokepoints.

Despite its importance, the Strait faces mounting pressures related to Security, Piracy, smuggling, and terrorism remain persistent threats requiring joint patrols by Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. Excavating for greater depths and establishing new pipelines or channels to bypass. Example: Thailand's Kra Canal.

Increasing trade resulting from China’s BRI amplifies dependence; alternative pathways such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) leading to efforts for diversification, primarily through Balochistan port of Gwadar. The Strait of Malacca is more than a waterway; it is a barometer for Indo-Pacific stability.

As trade volumes grow and geopolitical tensions rise, the management of this chokepoint with the help of the Indian Navy, will require a delicate balance of military vigilance and international cooperation to ensure the "freedom of navigation" that sustains the global economy, thus helping India achieve it’s goal of Viksit Bharat by 2047.

Adwet Prasad Tripathy & Avishkar Pamnani are experts in the field of Strategic Studies. They provide in-depth analysis on maritime security, energy corridors, and the evolving geopolitical landscape of South Asia, tracking the modernisation of conventional and asymmetric capabilities. This essay reflects authors opinions alone

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China Establishes New Strategic Administrative County In Xinjiang Near Afghan And PoK Borders

The Chinese government has established a new county, named Cenling, within its volatile Xinjiang province. This administrative move is situated near Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and the border with Afghanistan.

The decision appears to be a calculated effort to bolster security along the narrow Wakhan Corridor, with the primary objective of preventing the infiltration of Uyghur separatist militants into the region.

Cenling is positioned near the Karakoram mountain range, a location that underscores its immense strategic significance due to its proximity to sensitive international boundaries. This development marks the third new county created by Beijing in the predominantly Muslim Uyghur region of Xinjiang within a period of just over a year.

The establishment of such counties has previously drawn international friction. Last year, India formally lodged a protest against China regarding the creation of Hean and Hekang counties.

New Delhi maintains that portions of those jurisdictions fall within its union territory of Ladakh. Specifically, Hean encompasses a large part of the disputed Aksai Chin plateau, which China occupied during the 1962 war and remains a major flashpoint in the India-China border conflict.

While the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government announced Cenling’s creation on 26 March, the specific details regarding its exact boundaries and administrative divisions were not immediately clarified. It has been confirmed, however, that the county will be administered by the Kashgar prefecture.

Kashgar itself is a historic city on the ancient Silk Road and serves as a vital gateway between China and South and Central Asia. Furthermore, it acts as the starting point for the 60 billion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This massive infrastructure project passes through PoK and has consistently been opposed by the Indian government on sovereignty grounds.

Regional experts suggest that the birth of Cenling is a clear indicator of Beijing’s intensifying focus on border governance and national security. Lin Minwang, a professor at Fudan University, noted that the move signals China’s deeper recognition of the strategic weight of its borderlands and its desire to exert firmer control over these remote areas.

The new county is geographically linked to Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor, a 74-km strip of land that separates Tajikistan from PoK. Beijing has long harboured concerns that Uyghur militants from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) could utilise this corridor as an entry point into Xinjiang from Afghan territory.

According to Yun Sun, a senior fellow at the Stimson Centre, the creation of Cenling represents a push for a more robust grassroots government structure.

By establishing effective local governance and control, Beijing aims to strengthen stabilisation efforts in a frontier region that has historically been prone to ethnic unrest and the potential infiltration of foreign militants from Central Asia.

PTI

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Pakistan’s Strategic Inconsistencies Fuels China's Growing Frustrations Signal Cracks In Pak's All-Weather Alliance

China, frequently characterised as Pakistan's "all-weather friend", has started to exhibit noticeable discomfort regarding the current state of the bilateral relationship.

During a recent high-level visit to China, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, attempted to secure Beijing's support for Islamabad’s self-styled mediation initiatives.

However, Pakistani analysts suggest that Chinese officials responded with a measure of caution, advising Pakistan to first address the internal contradictions within its own regional policies, particularly concerning its conduct in Afghanistan.

Beijing’s primary anxieties stem from the belief that Pakistan's inconsistent approach could jeopardise China’s vital strategic interests in the region. These interests are multifaceted, encompassing security stability in Xinjiang, secure access to Afghanistan’s vast untapped mineral wealth, and the broader success of economic and connectivity projects under the Belt and Road Initiative. The Chinese leadership appears increasingly concerned that instability or contradictory manoeuvres by Islamabad could undermine these long-term goals.

Furthermore, China has expressed displeasure over Pakistan’s perceived efforts to weaken the Taliban. From Beijing's perspective, such actions threaten the fragile stability of Afghanistan—a nation where China has placed significant diplomatic and strategic stakes and has recently committed to massive infrastructure projects.

There is a palpable worry in Beijing that Pakistan might be covertly advancing a Washington-led agenda in Afghanistan to regain access to the Bagram military base, a move that would directly conflict with China’s regional dominance.

In an attempt to manage these escalating tensions, China took the proactive step of organising a meeting between representatives of the Taliban and Pakistan in Ürümqi. This mediation process is currently ongoing as Beijing seeks to harmonise the differing objectives of its neighbours. Simultaneously, there are undeniable indicators that China’s financial appetite for large-scale projects, such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), has begun to diminish significantly.

Ultimately, these developments underscore a fundamental truth: a nation cannot successfully align itself with all global powers simultaneously without incurring serious diplomatic costs. Foreign policy is not a matter of managing daily narratives or pursuing short-term optics; its efficacy is measured over decades. 

Pakistan’s ambition to be viewed as a decisive global actor remains hampered by deep-seated structural constraints, including heavy economic dependence, geopolitical boundaries, and strategic inconsistencies. Unless these core issues are resolved, Islamabad’s claims of international influence will continue to emerge briefly before fading into irrelevance.

Agencies

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Former Pakistan Envoy Abdul Basit Warns of Nuclear Retaliation On Delhi, Mumbai Amid US Threat Fears

Abdul Basit, who served as Pakistan's High Commissioner in New Delhi from 2014 to 2017, has sparked alarm with his remarks on a hypothetical US attack on Pakistan.

Speaking on 21 March 2026, Basit declared that Pakistan would retaliate by targeting Delhi and Mumbai in India should America strike. He framed this as a 'worst-case scenario' where the US seeks to dismantle Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

The statement draws a parallel to Iran's strategy of striking Gulf states as proxies for the United States, which Tehran cannot reach directly due to geographical constraints. Basit noted that while Gulf nations host US military bases, India does not—yet positioned Pakistan's response as a deflection of existential threats. This analogy underscores Pakistan's doctrine of using second-strike capabilities against perceived enablers of its adversaries.

If America attacks Pakistan

We should bomb Delhi, Mumbai

😳

pic.twitter.com/QInRhjm4Ld

— Kreately.in (@KreatelyMedia) March 21, 2026

Tensions stem from the worsening Iran War, where Israel has advanced closer to Pakistan's borders, heightening Islamabad's security anxieties. Basit speculated on a scenario where the US, viewing Pakistan's nuclear programme as a threat, intervenates militarily. He stressed Pakistan's defensive prowess, insisting such an event remains 'among the impossibilities'.

Pakistan's nuclear doctrine, formalised in the 1990s, emphasises full-spectrum deterrence, including tactical weapons against India. Basit's comments revive fears of escalation, echoing the 2019 Balakot crisis when cross-border strikes nearly spiralled into nuclear confrontation. India's no-first-use policy contrasts sharply with Pakistan's ambiguity, amplifying risks in any proxy conflict.

India's strategic calculus has evolved with indigenous advancements like the Agni-V missile and S-400 systems, bolstering second-strike credibility. Mumbai and Delhi, as political and economic hubs, represent high-value targets that could devastate India's GDP and morale. Basit's naming of these cities signals deliberate signalling to both Washington and New Delhi.

The US-Pakistan alliance has frayed since the Afghan withdrawal in 2021, with Islamabad accusing Washington of duplicity over Taliban support. Recent US sanctions on Pakistan's missile programme under the Countering Proliferation Financing Act have deepened mistrust. Basit's rhetoric may serve as deterrence against perceived US encirclement via India.

India-US ties, fortified by the Quad and iCET initiatives, include intelligence-sharing on Pakistan's nukes. A 2025 joint statement reaffirmed commitment to regional stability, yet Pakistan perceives this as containment. Basit's warning positions India as a US proxy, mirroring Cold War proxy dynamics.

Geopolitically, the Iran War—now in its third year—involves Israel striking Iranian proxies, with Pakistan fearing spillover via Balochistan. China's CPEC investments in Gwadar heighten stakes, as US action could disrupt Beijing's corridor. Basit's statement aligns with Pakistan's overtures to Tehran amid shared anti-Israel sentiment.

Indian analysts dismiss Basit's remarks as bluster from a retired diplomat lacking official weight. However, they revive calls for enhanced missile defences like the indigenous PAD/AAD systems. Prime Minister Modi's government has accelerated hypersonic development, with DRDO's HSTDV tests in 2025 signalling readiness.

Public reaction in India has been swift, with social media erupting in condemnation and demands for retaliatory postures. Pakistani media amplifies Basit's views, framing them as bold realism. This exchange risks normalising nuclear brinkmanship in South Asia, where flashpoints like Kashmir persist.

Internationally, the UN has urged de-escalation, while the IAEA monitors Pakistan's safeguards compliance. US officials downplayed the scenario as 'unrealistic', reaffirming non-aggression pacts. Yet, simulations by RAND Corporation highlight how miscalculation could cascade into regional catastrophe.

Pakistan's full-spectrum deterrence includes Shaheen-III missiles with 2,750 km range, capable of striking deep into India. India's BrahMos and Nirbhay cruise missiles offer symmetric threats. Agni series of ballistic missiles can pulverise most Pakistani cities. Basit's hypothesis tests red lines, potentially deterring US policy shifts on Pakistan's nukes.

As the Iran War grinds on, South Asia's nuclear dyad faces unprecedented strain. Basit's words, though hypothetical, expose fault lines: Pakistan's siege mentality, India's rising assertiveness, and US balancing acts. Diplomatic backchannels remain vital to avert rhetoric from igniting reality.

Agencies

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India Halts Chabahar Funding Amid US Sanctions Shadow And Trump Tariff Threats

India has omitted any funding for the Chabahar port project in its 2026 Union Budget, a move coinciding with heightened US-Iran tensions and looming uncertainties over American sanctions. For years, New Delhi allocated ₹100 crore annually to this strategic initiative in Iran's Sistan-Balochistan province, but the latest fiscal plan signals a pause.

Chabahar, Iran's inaugural deep water port at the Gulf of Oman's entrance, provides Tehran with direct entry to global maritime trade lanes. Positioned west of the Iran-Pakistan border, it parallels Pakistan's Gwadar port—developed by China under the Belt and Road Initiative—positioning Chabahar as India's regional counterbalance.

The port holds economic promise for Iran, offering a sanctions workaround through alternative trade paths. For India, it unlocks vital access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, circumventing Pakistan's persistent refusal of overland routes.

India's engagement with Chabahar spans over two decades. Talks commenced in 2002 between Iran's then-National Security Advisor Hassan Rouhani and India's Brajesh Mishra. The momentum built in 2003 during President Mohammad Khatami's visit to India, where he and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee inked a cooperation roadmap spotlighting the port.

Post-Partition, Pakistan's emergence severed India's land connections to Iran and Central Asia. With India's economy largely insular for decades, the isolation posed little immediate issue. Dynamics shifted after the Taliban's 1996 takeover in Afghanistan, opposed by both India and Iran, who backed the Northern Alliance under Ahmed Shah Massoud.

Pakistan's blockade intensified New Delhi's quest for alternatives. Chabahar's relevance surged as China advanced Gwadar, framing the Indian project as both an economic lifeline and a strategic hedge against Beijing's regional sway.

In September 2025, the United States slapped broad sanctions on Iran yet extended India a six-month waiver for Chabahar, due to lapse on 26 April 2026. This followed earlier revocations and extensions under the Trump administration.

Last month, India's External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal affirmed ongoing dialogues with Washington on Chabahar matters. His remarks addressed reports of New Delhi reassessing amid threats of a 25 per cent US tariff on nations trading with Tehran.

The Trump administration had withdrawn the 2018 waiver before granting India a temporary reprieve. Escalating US-Iran frictions prompted fresh tariff announcements targeting third-party dealings with Iran.

This budget silence underscores India's delicate balancing act: nurturing Chabahar for connectivity while navigating US pressures. The port remains pivotal for bypassing Pakistan and countering Gwadar, yet sanctions risks loom large.

Without renewed funding, operational phases—like equipment upgrades and terminal expansions—face delays. India had previously committed $500 million via a credit line, with operations commencing in 2018 under India Ports Global Limited.

Strategic stakes extend beyond trade. Chabahar facilitates aid to Afghanistan, evading Pakistani routes, and bolsters India's presence in the International North-South Transport Corridor linking to Russia and Europe.

Iran views the port as a sanctions shield, enhancing its export capabilities. India, meanwhile, eyes it for energy imports and mineral access from Central Asia.

US policy under Trump prioritises 'maximum pressure' on Iran, complicating allies' projects. India's waiver plea hinges on Chabahar's non-oil trade focus and Afghan humanitarian role.

Should the waiver expire without extension, India risks penalties, prompting diversified funding or private partnerships. Tehran has urged faster progress, citing Indian hesitancy.

Regionally, Pakistan champions Gwadar, deepening China-Pakistan ties. Chabahar's stall could tilt balances, amplifying Beijing's influence.

India's budget choice reflects fiscal prudence amid domestic priorities like infrastructure and defence. Yet, it invites scrutiny over strategic retreats in a contested neighbourhood.

Diplomatic overtures continue. Jaiswal's update on the US Treasury's 28 October 2025 guidance reaffirms India's push for a viable arrangement.

Long-term, Chabahar embodies India's multi-alignment: engaging Iran for access while reassuring the US. Resolution by April will shape its trajectory.

Based On NDTV Report

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MEA Reaffirms Stance On Shaksgam Valley, Brands China's CPEC Moves 'Illegal And Invalid'

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has firmly reiterated India's longstanding position on the Shaksgam Valley, dismissing China's activities under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as illegal and invalid.

This statement emerged during a weekly press briefing on 16 January 2026, where spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal referred journalists to prior clarifications, underscoring New Delhi's unwavering stance.

Just days earlier, on 9 January, Jaiswal had explicitly rejected the 1963 China-Pakistan boundary agreement as illegitimate. He emphasised that Shaksgam Valley constitutes Indian territory, never recognised by India as having been legitimately transferred by Pakistan, which holds it under forcible occupation.

India has consistently protested CPEC projects traversing this region, viewing them as encroachments on sovereign soil. Jaiswal reaffirmed that the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir, including Ladakh, remain integral and inalienable parts of India, with New Delhi reserving the right to safeguard its interests through necessary measures.

Shaksgam Valley, also termed the Trans-Karakoram Tract, spans over 5,000 square kilometres in the harsh, inhospitable terrain of the Hunza-Gilgit region. Situated north of the Siachen Glacier, it borders China's Xinjiang to the north and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to the south and west, rendering it a linchpin in India's northern security architecture.

Its strategic value cannot be overstated. Proximity to Siachen—the world's highest battlefield—allows India to monitor Pakistani movements closely, while the nearby Karakoram Pass offers oversight of Chinese activities. Any developments here ripple across both the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China and the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan.

Historically, Pakistan controlled the area until 1963, when it ceded Shaksgam—along with the Yarkand River region—to China via a boundary agreement. India has always contested this, arguing that Pakistan lacked any legal authority to alienate territory belonging to Jammu and Kashmir, then under illegal occupation.

China, in response, has brushed aside India's objections. On Monday preceding the MEA briefing, spokesperson Mao Ning asserted that the territory belongs unequivocally to China, justifying infrastructure builds as sovereign rights. She cited the 1960s boundary pact with Pakistan as a legitimate demarcation between two sovereign states.

This position lays bare a glaring contradiction in Beijing's rhetoric. China routinely frames the Kashmir dispute as a bilateral India-Pakistan matter, yet pursues aggressive development in Pakistan-occupied segments of Kashmir, including Shaksgam, through CPEC.

Geostrategic analysts highlight China's "salami-slicing" tactics—incremental encroachments that cumulatively erode status quo without triggering outright conflict. By mid-2024, China had reportedly paved a road over the 4,805-metre Aghil Pass into lower Shaksgam, positioning construction crews and possible patrols within 50 kilometres of India-held Indira Col on Siachen.

Such advances heighten vulnerabilities along India's northern frontiers. Enhanced Chinese connectivity could facilitate rapid troop deployments, threatening Siachen's flanks and complicating logistics for Indian forces already contending with extreme altitudes.

CPEC itself, a flagship Belt and Road Initiative project, snakes through Gilgit-Baltistan—another Pakistan-administered area India claims as its own. Shaksgam infrastructure bolsters this corridor, linking Xinjiang to Pakistan's Gwadar port and amplifying Sino-Pak strategic depth against India.

India's non-recognition of the 1963 agreement aligns with its broader territorial assertions. New Delhi views the entire princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, acceded in 1947, as indivisible, rejecting all unilateral alterations by Pakistan or China.

Past diplomatic notes underscore this resolve. India has lodged protests with Beijing over Shaksgam alterations, from road-building to potential military outposts, demanding cessation to preserve pre-1963 realities.

China's rebuttals remain formulaic, often pivoting to calls for bilateral talks while advancing faits accomplis on the ground. Mao Ning's recent remarks exemplify this, prioritising "legitimate" development over India's sovereignty claims.

The timing of MEA's reiteration is telling, coinciding with escalated CPEC activity amid thawing India-China border tensions post-Galwan. It signals New Delhi's intent to deter further salami slices, particularly as winter thaws could usher renewed patrolling seasons.

For India's defence posture, Shaksgam implications extend to high-altitude warfare capabilities. Proximity demands bolstered surveillance via UAVs, satellites, and possibly indigenous hypersonic assets to counter dual threats from China and Pakistan.

Indigenous production ramps up in response—think DRDO's Pinaka rockets, Akash missiles, and Project Kusha for long-range interception—tailored to secure Siachen and Karakoram vantage points against CPEC-enabled incursions.

Geopolitically, this impasse strains the trilateral dynamic. Pakistan's cession locked in anti-India alignment with China, while India's protests isolate CPEC's legitimacy on global forums, from the UN to Quad dialogues.

Experts warn of a tipping point. Continued Chinese consolidation risks altering Siachen's tactical equilibrium, potentially forcing India into pre-emptive postures or multilateral escalations.

India's reserved rights to "necessary measures" evoke quiet deterrence—diplomatic, military, or otherwise. Historical precedents, like Operation Meghdoot securing Siachen in 1984, illustrate resolve to hold high ground.

As CPEC evolves into a militarised artery, New Delhi must calibrate responses: ramping border infrastructure via BRO projects, enhancing QUAD interoperability, and leveraging economic statecraft against Belt and Road overreach.

Shaksgam embodies unresolved post-colonial cartography, where India's claims clash with Sino-Pak revisionism. MEA's firm line reaffirms that New Delhi will not cede ground—literally or figuratively—in this high-stakes Himalayan chessboard.

Based On ANI Report

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