
During Operation Sindoor in May 2025, the Chinese-supplied HQ-9P (Custom variant for Pakistan) air defence system deployed by Pakistan failed significantly to intercept Indian aircraft and missile strikes, including those launched by BrahMos, long-range precision-guided missiles, long range precision guided munitions (LR-PGMs) and SCALP cruise missiles. Indian forces were able to breach these air defence systems with relative ease, effectively neutralising key Pakistani military installations protected by the HQ-9.
Indian missile technology, particularly the BrahMos cruise missile and advanced drones, bypassed Chinese air defences deployed by Pakistan during Operation Sindoor through a combination of speed, precision, and sophisticated electronic warfare tactics.
Key points regarding the HQ-9 failure include:
The HQ-9 system was unable to detect or respond effectively to Indian missile attacks, resulting in complete strategic paralysis of Pakistan’s air defence during the operation.
Electronic Warfare and Jamming: The Indian Air Force (IAF) employed advanced electronic warfare techniques to jam and disrupt Pakistan’s Chinese-made air defence systems. This included targeting radar and communication networks, effectively blinding the air defences and allowing Indian missiles and drones to penetrate without detection.
Speed And Stealth of BrahMos Missiles: The BrahMos missile, known for its supersonic speed (Mach 2.8–3), is extremely difficult to intercept once launched. Its rapid speed and low-altitude flight profile make it challenging for existing air defence systems to track and engage in time.
Precision Targeting And Intelligence: Indian forces leveraged real-time intelligence, including satellite imagery and surveillance, to identify and strike high-value targets with surgical precision. This minimised the time available for Pakistani defences to react. ISRO’s advanced Earth observation satellites, such as the CARTOSAT and RISAT series, provided high-resolution optical and radar imagery. This enabled Indian forces to monitor enemy mobilisation, identify high-value targets (such as air defence radars, command centres, and ammunition depots), and track infrastructure changes in near real time.
Satellite data was integrated with intelligence inputs to select and verify targets with surgical accuracy. The use of both Indian (CARTOSAT, RISAT) and commercial (MAXAR, Sentinel) satellites allowed for layered imaging, which was critical for validating targets and minimising collateral damage.
Navigation And Guidance: India’s indigenous navigation system, NavIC, and other global positioning systems provided precise geolocation data. This supported the accurate guidance of cruise missiles, drones, and other munitions to their intended targets.
Use of Loitering Munitions: India deployed loitering munitions (suicide drones) that could hover over target areas, identify threats, and strike enemy radar and missile systems before traditional air defences could respond. These munitions were especially effective in neutralising air defence infrastructure.
Integration of Indigenous Systems: India’s layered, indigenous air defence and electronic warfare networks operated with high synergy, ensuring that while Indian strikes penetrated enemy defences, Indian assets remained protected from Pakistani retaliation.
Secure Communications: ISRO’s GSAT-7 and GSAT-7A satellites ensured secure, real-time communication between Indian military units, enabling seamless coordination during the operation.
Post-Strike Damage Assessment: Satellite imagery was used immediately after the strikes to confirm the extent of damage to Pakistani military installations. High-resolution before-and-after images, shared by agencies like Kawa Space and MAXAR, provided irrefutable evidence of successful strikes and helped assess mission effectiveness.
The failure extended beyond detection to interception, as the HQ-9 did not intercept a single incoming missile during the strikes, raising questions about the system’s reliability under combat conditions.
Some Chinese social media commentators attributed the failure to insufficient training and operational shortcomings on the Pakistani side, though the overall consensus points to systemic deficiencies in the Chinese hardware and integration.
The operation exposed broader vulnerabilities in Chinese-origin air defence and missile systems used by Pakistan, damaging China’s reputation as a reliable arms exporter.
Operation Sindoor exposed critical shortcomings and operational failures of the Chinese HQ-9 air defence system in real combat conditions, highlighting its inability to defend against advanced Indian aerial and missile strikes effectively. This has led to serious doubts about the efficacy of Chinese military technology in Pakistan’s defence infrastructure.
IDN