Russia and India are attempting to move their decades-old defence relationship beyond the traditional buyer-and-seller model. The proposed modernisation of the BrahMos missile, the possible upgrade of India’s Su-30MKI fleet and Moscow’s offer to share Su-57 fighter-jet technology are emerging as important tests of this ambition.
The two countries are exploring a partnership centred on joint production, technology transfer, industrial localisation and the possible development of weapons for export markets. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently met in New Delhi ahead of the BRICS summit.
Their handshake and warm public interaction were described by Indian Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal as evidence of an “ever-strengthening relationship”.
However, the more important developments are taking place behind the diplomatic symbolism.
Officials and analysts believe that New Delhi and Moscow are considering a broader defence-industrial framework that could give Indian companies a greater role in designing, manufacturing and upgrading advanced military systems. This would represent an important change in the character of the relationship. For several decades, India was one of Russia’s largest defence customers.
Indian armed forces acquired Russian-origin tanks, fighter aircraft, submarines, helicopters, air-defence systems, missiles and other military equipment. The relationship also developed into licensed production and industrial cooperation. Yet India’s defence procurement policy has changed considerably in recent years.
New Delhi has increased purchases from the United States, France, Israel and other partners to obtain advanced technologies and reduce its dependence on a single supplier. The war in Ukraine has added further uncertainty. Western sanctions imposed on Russia since 2022 have restricted Moscow’s access to several advanced components, microelectronics, machine tools and other technologies.
These restrictions have created concerns about the availability of spares, supply-chain stability and the timely delivery of equipment to India. They have also encouraged both sides to reconsider the traditional arms-sale model. Instead of focusing only on the purchase of completed systems, India and Russia are now discussing joint production, technology transfer, domestic manufacturing and long-term industrial cooperation.
The approach is closely connected with India’s Make in India policy, introduced in 2014 to expand domestic manufacturing and reduce reliance on imported defence equipment. The BrahMos missile is the clearest example of what this model can achieve. BrahMos is a Russian-Indian joint venture that has developed and produced a supersonic cruise missile for land, naval and air-launched operations.
The missile can reportedly travel at around three times the speed of sound. It can be launched from land-based platforms, surface warships, submarines and aircraft. This multi-platform flexibility has helped BrahMos secure a distinctive position in the international defence market. The missile has also become one of the most visible examples of successful India-Russia defence cooperation.
Unlike a conventional imported weapon, BrahMos has involved joint development, Indian manufacturing, local integration and the gradual expansion of India’s industrial role. The system has been inducted by the Indian Army, Indian Navy and Indian Air Force. An export version has also been developed, with the Philippines becoming the first foreign customer for the land-based BrahMos coastal-defence system.
The missile’s export success has strengthened the argument that India and Russia can jointly develop equipment not only for their own armed forces but also for international customers. The next challenge is to determine whether the same model can be applied to more advanced systems. Russian officials have indicated that the next-generation BrahMos should offer improved performance, additional capabilities and greater competitiveness in the international market.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the two countries were already jointly producing BrahMos missiles and should now consider improving their characteristics. He suggested that the missile could receive additional features to make it more effective and attractive to potential customers.
Indian analysts believe that the next stage should involve moving from the joint production of an existing weapon to the joint development of a new generation of weapons. This would require deeper cooperation in propulsion, guidance systems, sensors, warhead technology, materials, software and manufacturing processes.
One proposal involves developing a lighter and smaller BrahMos variant for India’s TEJAS fighter aircraft. The existing missile is powerful but heavy, and its size places limitations on the number of aircraft that can carry it. A reduced-size version could potentially be integrated with lighter fighter aircraft while preserving a significant portion of the missile’s range and precision-strike capability.
Such a weapon could give the Indian Air Force a long-range anti-ship and land-attack capability without relying exclusively on larger heavy fighters. Another proposal concerns a submarine-launched BrahMos variant. A submarine-compatible version would provide India with an additional sea-based strike option.
It could potentially be deployed from future attack submarines or other suitable underwater platforms, subject to technical, weight and launch-system requirements. A submarine-launched missile would improve the survivability of India’s maritime strike capability because submarines can remain concealed for extended periods.
The most ambitious proposal is a hypersonic BrahMos variant. The proposed system is expected to target speeds of around Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound. A hypersonic missile would create major technical challenges in propulsion, thermal management, navigation, communications and terminal guidance. At hypersonic speeds, the missile’s outer surface experiences extreme heating. Its guidance system must also operate in a highly dynamic environment while maintaining accuracy against moving or defended targets.
Even if the final system does not immediately achieve every proposed performance figure, research and development in this area could strengthen the technological foundations of both countries. The development of an advanced BrahMos could also create opportunities for Indian aerospace, electronics, propulsion and precision-engineering companies. For Moscow, deeper BrahMos cooperation would help preserve its position in the Indian defence market while creating opportunities for future exports.
For New Delhi, it could support the development of a more self-reliant missile industry. The BrahMos project therefore has significance beyond the missile itself. It is being viewed as a possible foundation for a much broader India-Russia defence-industrial partnership. The other major area of cooperation is India’s Su-30MKI fleet. The Su-30MKI remains the backbone of the Indian Air Force’s combat-fighter inventory.
India operates a large fleet of the aircraft, many of which were assembled or manufactured domestically by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited under licence. The aircraft has received several Indian modifications over the years, including the integration of indigenous avionics, electronic-warfare equipment, communication systems and weapons. Russia and India are now discussing a large-scale upgrade of the fleet.
The proposed Super Sukhoi modernisation is estimated to be worth around $11 billion. Using the approximate conversion of $1 = ₹85, the figure is equivalent to about ₹93,500 crore. The package could cover nearly 260 aircraft. The proposed upgrades are expected to include new active electronically scanned array radars, modern avionics, improved electronic-warfare systems, enhanced communications and upgraded weapons.
Russia has also offered its Izdeliye 177S engine as a possible option for the modernised aircraft. The engine proposal is intended to provide improved thrust, lower fuel consumption and a longer service life, although the final decision would depend on technical evaluations, cost negotiations and the terms of technology transfer.
The modernisation would allow India to extend the operational life of the Su-30MKI fleet. It could also improve the aircraft’s ability to detect, track and engage targets in contested airspace. The upgraded fighters could receive better long-range air-to-air missiles, precision-guided weapons and enhanced network-centric warfare capabilities.
However, the program would be complex.
Modernising a large fleet of aircraft involves extensive testing, structural inspections, software integration, certification and changes to maintenance infrastructure. The Indian Air Force would also have to balance the cost of the upgrade against the purchase of new fighter aircraft. The Super Sukhoi initiative is therefore not simply an equipment upgrade. It could become a major industrial project involving HAL, Indian defence laboratories, private-sector suppliers and Russian aerospace companies.
The third and most politically sensitive proposal concerns the Su-57. Russia has proposed supplying India with its fifth-generation stealth fighter and has also discussed joint production in India. Moscow’s offer is intended to go beyond the sale of completed aircraft. It reportedly includes technology transfer, greater local manufacturing and the possibility of allowing Indian industry to produce significant portions of the aircraft. Russian officials have repeatedly described the proposal as flexible and attractive to India.
The discussions are particularly important because India is developing its own fifth-generation fighter, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft, or AMCA. India’s AMCA project is intended to provide a domestically designed stealth fighter for the Indian Air Force. However, the development of a suitable high-performance aircraft engine remains one of the programme’s most difficult challenges.
India has considerable experience in aircraft design, assembly, avionics and systems integration, but it does not yet possess an operational indigenous fighter engine in the required thrust class.
This has created a major technological gap. Russia is attempting to position the Su-57 offer as a possible solution to India’s immediate need for a fifth-generation combat aircraft. The proposal could involve the direct acquisition of Su-57 aircraft, followed by phased local production. Reports have also suggested that Russia may be willing to share technology connected with the fighter’s engine. Some proposals have included local manufacturing of significant engine components, although the exact scope of any transfer would depend on a formal agreement. Moscow has reportedly indicated that discussions could cover other sensitive areas, including aircraft systems, radar technology, electronic warfare, low-observable features, software and air-launched weapons.
The extent of such access remains unclear.
Technology transfer involving a fifth-generation fighter is highly sensitive because it includes manufacturing knowledge accumulated over decades. It also involves proprietary information related to propulsion, radar-absorbent materials, flight-control software, sensors, electronic warfare and weapons integration. The Russian offer is therefore likely to be assessed not only on the aircraft’s operational performance but also on the depth and enforceability of the proposed technology transfer.
For India, local production would have several potential advantages. It could support the rapid creation of a domestic fifth-generation fighter manufacturing ecosystem. It could provide Indian engineers and manufacturers with experience in stealth shaping, low-observable materials, advanced avionics and integrated electronic warfare. It could also help expand the capabilities of HAL and Indian private-sector defence companies. A local production arrangement could reduce dependence on imported aircraft and simplify future maintenance, repair and overhaul activities. It might also provide a bridge capability while India continues work on the AMCA.
However, the Su-57 proposal also presents important risks. India would need to assess the aircraft’s operational maturity, availability, maintenance requirements and compatibility with its existing weapons and communications networks. The Indian Air Force would also have to examine whether acquiring a foreign fifth-generation fighter could affect the development schedule and funding of the AMCA. There is a possibility that a foreign aircraft could provide a short-term capability while also diverting financial and technical resources from India’s indigenous fighter project.
The issue of engines would be central to any agreement. India would need to determine whether Russia is offering genuine design and manufacturing access or only limited maintenance-level support. The distinction is critical. The ability to assemble an engine from imported modules is not the same as acquiring the capability to design, manufacture, test and improve the engine independently. India would also need guarantees concerning spare parts, repair facilities, software access, upgrades and long-term availability. The war in Ukraine has made these issues more important.
Sanctions and supply-chain disruptions have demonstrated how geopolitical developments can affect defence equipment availability. Any future agreement would need to contain arrangements for localised production and reliable access to critical components. It would also need to clarify how Indian-made aircraft and weapons could be exported to third countries.
For New Delhi, the priority will be to obtain genuine technological capability rather than merely purchase another foreign platform. For Moscow, the priority will be to demonstrate that it can provide dependable supplies, meaningful technology transfer and competitive systems despite the constraints created by sanctions.
BrahMos and the Su-57 have consequently become symbols of a much larger question.
They will help determine whether India and Russia can elevate their defence relationship from arms sales to a durable, technology-led partnership.
IDN (With Agency Inputs)
