Several Dead After Major Fire At Alberta Military Base As Carney Coordinates Response With Authorities

A major fire at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Wainwright in Alberta has left several people dead and others injured, triggering a large-scale emergency response and prompting the Canadian government to coordinate closely with provincial and local authorities.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney expressed his condolences to the families of those affected, describing the incident as a serious tragedy involving military personnel stationed at the base.

In a statement, Carney said a major fire had followed a serious incident at CFB Wainwright and noted that federal officials were working closely with Alberta's government and local authorities to manage the situation.

The Prime Minister added that he remains in direct contact with Alberta Premier Danielle Smith, while federal ministers and senior officials are also engaged in the response effort.

Canada's Minister of National Defence, David McGuinty, confirmed that the incident resulted in multiple fatalities and injuries, although authorities have not yet publicly released casualty figures.

McGuinty stated that the Canadian Armed Forces, the Department of National Defence and several federal agencies, including public safety organisations, are working alongside provincial and municipal authorities to provide all necessary assistance.

The minister described the situation as active and highly sensitive, with investigators and emergency responders continuing to evaluate conditions on the ground.

Premier Danielle Smith characterised the blaze as a significant and tragic event that has affected numerous military personnel.

She said Alberta's government remains in close communication with Ottawa as developments unfold and thanked emergency workers, medical staff and support personnel involved in the response.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police are investigating the circumstances surrounding the incident and are working alongside military authorities to determine exactly what occurred.

According to an RCMP statement, initial reports indicated a fire in a training area, prompting the deployment of significant police resources to support emergency operations.

Police said their immediate involvement had begun winding down, although resources remain available if required, with further information expected to come from the Canadian Armed Forces.

Additional reports indicate that the fire spread rapidly amid strong winds, creating difficult conditions for emergency crews and requiring support from multiple responding agencies.

CFB Wainwright is regarded as one of Canada's most important military training facilities and serves as a key centre for preparing soldiers and conducting large-scale field exercises.

The installation is home to the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre and the 3rd Canadian Division Training Centre, making it a critical hub for military readiness and combat training activities.

On a typical day, the base supports around 690 military personnel and approximately 300 civilian employees. Originally developed as a major training location during the Korean War era in the 1950s, it remains one of Canada's busiest military establishments.

Authorities have indicated that further details regarding the cause of the incident, the extent of the damage and the number of casualties will be released as investigations continue.

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China-Laos Military Facility Draws Scrutiny As Aircraft And Military Vehicles Appear At Emerging Base

Light attack aircraft and military vehicles have been spotted at the newly announced China-Laos joint training facility in Ban Keun, Vientiane Province, according to satellite imagery reviewed by Reuters.

Images captured on 30 September by commercial satellite provider Vantor, one day after China’s defence ministry revealed the facility, show what security analysts identify as eight K-8 light attack aircraft and more than two dozen support vehicles positioned on a runway that remains under construction.

The imagery also highlights extensive building activity around the airfield, underscoring the rapid pace of development at a site that is attracting significant attention from regional military observers and security experts.

Several analysts believe the project could represent China’s first fully developed overseas military base in Southeast Asia, expanding Beijing’s military footprint beyond its facilities in the South China Sea, access to Cambodia’s Ream naval port, and its logistics base in Djibouti.

Rachel Vandenbrink, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said Ban Keun’s selection appears to be more a matter of strategic opportunity than a response to a specific operational requirement.

She noted that Laos offers geostrategic advantages due to its shared border with China and growing transport links, including the China-Laos railway, which enhances connectivity between the two countries.

Neither China’s defence ministry nor Lao diplomatic and foreign affairs officials immediately responded to requests for comment.

Security specialists Collin Koh and Alexander Neill, alongside Vantor analysts, assessed that the aircraft visible in the imagery are Hongdu JL-8 trainers, commonly known as K-8 aircraft.

The two-seat platform is widely employed for pilot training but also possesses light attack capabilities. Developed jointly by China and Pakistan, it has been exported to multiple countries and remains in service with both the Chinese and Lao air forces.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Laos currently operates four K-8 aircraft. Koh described the Lao fleet as having "questionable serviceability", making the presence of additional aircraft at Ban Keun particularly notable.

Diplomats and defence analysts are closely monitoring the site for signs of ammunition depots, fuel storage facilities, air-defence systems and surveillance infrastructure, all of which could indicate a broader military role beyond joint training activities.

Neill observed that while the runway currently appears relatively short and unremarkable, its design suggests the possibility of future expansion to accommodate larger aircraft.

He added that an extended runway could eventually support intelligence-gathering, signals intelligence and electronic-surveillance aircraft, potentially broadening China’s operational reach across mainland Southeast Asia.

The site also carries considerable historical significance. During the Vietnam War era, Ban Keun served as a covert American airfield known as Lima Site 44.

Records indicate that Air America, the airline secretly owned by the US Central Intelligence Agency, operated from the airstrip, transporting supplies and American-backed Hmong fighters throughout Laos.

Historical research shows that by 1968 the facility was already being used as a staging point for helicopter missions carrying Hmong troops into combat zones across the country.

The transformation of a former clandestine US wartime airfield into a modern China-backed military training facility highlights the evolving strategic competition in Southeast Asia and reinforces concerns about the region’s growing geopolitical importance.

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China Broadens Southeast Asia Military Footprint With New Laos Air Base And Expanded Regional Reach

China has significantly expanded its overseas military network, adding a new air facility in Laos to complement its existing access to a naval installation in Cambodia and its long-standing overseas base in Djibouti. The development marks a notable extension of Beijing’s military presence across Southeast Asia.

The newly operational China-Laos Joint Support and Training Centre and the China-Laos Friendship Aviation Academy were officially inaugurated at Ban Keun Airport in Laos on 29 September 2026. The opening ceremony was attended by Lao Defence Minister Khamlieng Outhakayson and followed high-level talks between Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing earlier this year, during which defence cooperation featured prominently.

Located roughly 50 kilometres north of Vientiane, the Ban Keun facility occupies a site with historical significance. During the Vietnam War, it was home to Lima Site 44, part of a network of airfields developed by the United States and the CIA. Construction of the modern facility appears to have commenced in late 2025 on land previously used for agriculture.

The base now features a 2,000-metre paved runway, taxiway, aircraft apron, air traffic control tower and five hangars. While most major infrastructure has been completed, additional development work remains under way.

China and Laos describe the installation as a jointly operated training facility intended to improve pilot training and aviation capabilities within the Lao military. Beijing has emphasised that the centre complies with domestic and international law, is based on mutual consultation and is not aimed at any third country.

Despite these assurances, regional analysts believe the base carries broader strategic significance. Vietnam is expected to view the development with particular concern given its historical tensions with China and the base’s location west of Vietnamese territory. The facility extends China’s potential operational reach deeper into mainland Southeast Asia.

Laos operates one of the region’s smallest air forces, consisting of a limited fleet of Russian- and Chinese-built aircraft and helicopters. Its inventory includes MA60 and MA600 transport aircraft, Z-9 helicopters, LE500 basic trainers and K-8W jet trainers. The country’s principal air facilities are located at Vientiane-Wattay International Airport and Xiengkhouang.

Analysts suggest the scale of the new training complex exceeds the immediate needs of the Lao Air Force. Beijing is widely expected to encourage greater reliance on Chinese military aircraft, technology and training systems, potentially replacing remaining Russian equipment and creating long-term strategic dependencies.

Chinese authorities have not disclosed the number of personnel, aircraft or support assets that will be stationed at Ban Keun. However, reports indicate that PLA Air Force JL-8 trainer aircraft could operate from the base alongside Laos’ existing K-8W fleet.

Questions also remain regarding the legal framework governing Chinese military access. Although Laos is expected to retain sovereignty over operations, observers note that Beijing’s growing economic influence could provide leverage in future negotiations concerning military usage.

Chinese military commentators have highlighted Ban Keun’s location along the China-Laos Railway corridor as a key logistical advantage. The rail connection enables efficient movement of personnel and equipment from southern China while also linking the facility closely to major regional transport routes.

The base’s proximity to Vientiane offers practical advantages for pilot training, administration and governmental oversight. Its location in relatively flat terrain is also considered more suitable for aviation operations than much of mountainous Laos.

Chinese analysts have identified three principal objectives for the installation. The first is strengthening the training and modernisation of the Lao Air Force, thereby expanding Chinese influence over future procurement and operational standards.

The second is enhancing military operations and exercises in Southeast Asia. Ban Keun could provide an additional operating location for Chinese aircraft participating in regional drills, including exercises with Thailand, while offering more realistic deployment scenarios.

The third objective relates to broader geopolitical influence. Numerous major cities across mainland Southeast Asia lie within operational range of the facility, potentially increasing China’s strategic presence throughout the Indochina Peninsula.

Some defence experts argue that the base’s greatest importance lies less in its immediate military utility and more in establishing a permanent Chinese military presence in Laos while strengthening institutional ties between the two armed forces.

The Laos installation differs from China’s overseas facility in Djibouti, which primarily supports anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden but also hosts Chinese naval infantry and armoured assets. The Djibouti base provides Beijing with a rapid-response capability across parts of Africa and the Middle East.

The Pentagon has previously assessed that Djibouti has contributed more to sustaining a permanent Chinese regional military presence than to the evacuation of citizens or protection of investments, despite those being among its publicly stated purposes.

Ban Keun is particularly significant because it represents the first overseas facility specifically focused on air force operations. The PLA is expected to maintain a continuous support presence while rotating personnel and aircraft through the base.

Some Chinese commentators suggest Beijing may have preferred Laos because Cambodia was reluctant to host a similar air facility. Phnom Penh has increasingly pursued a balancing strategy, maintaining security ties with China while also strengthening engagement with countries such as the United States and Japan.

China already enjoys extensive access to Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand. The jointly operated support and training centre there was inaugurated in April 2025 after substantial Chinese-funded expansion, including new berths and facilities.

Although Chinese warships regularly utilise Ream, Cambodia maintains that the base remains open to friendly foreign navies. That position was reinforced when the USS Cincinnati visited the facility in January 2026, marking the first United States naval visit since its redevelopment.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet has repeatedly insisted that no foreign country will be granted exclusive military rights at Ream, citing constitutional restrictions on foreign military bases.

At the same time, Cambodia has revived military exercises with the United States after a decade-long pause, reflecting its broader effort to maintain strategic flexibility between competing powers.

China and Cambodia continue to deepen military cooperation through annual Golden Dragon exercises and defence equipment transfers, including the supply of Type 056 corvettes to the Royal Cambodian Navy.

Together, the facilities at Ream and Ban Keun provide China with expanded access to both maritime and air domains in Southeast Asia. They also complement Beijing’s extensive military infrastructure across the South China Sea, including installations in the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

Chinese officials maintain that the Laos training centre will help establish a comprehensive aviation training system covering pilots, maintenance personnel and other aviation specialists. The facility is also expected to support simulators, joint exercises, technical assistance and long-term capability development.

Laotian personnel currently receive training in China, Russia and Vietnam. The new institution could reduce reliance on overseas programmes by allowing more instruction to take place domestically.

Chinese media further argue that the centre could support humanitarian operations, search-and-rescue missions, border security tasks and disaster-relief activities throughout the Mekong region.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon continues to assess that China is seeking a broader overseas logistics and basing network to support long-distance military operations. Potential locations reportedly examined by Beijing include Angola, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tanzania, the United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu.

Notably, Laos did not feature in previous publicly identified lists of potential Chinese military facilities, making the emergence of the Ban Keun base particularly unexpected.

Western defence assessments conclude that while China’s overseas military network remains modest compared with that of the United States, it is steadily expanding. The combination of naval access in Cambodia, an aviation foothold in Laos and established overseas facilities elsewhere demonstrates Beijing’s growing ability to project military influence beyond its borders and sustain a more persistent presence across strategically important regions.

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INS Kardip Countering Chinese Aggression: India’s Sentinel of Strength At The Malacca Gateway

INS Kardip on Kamorta Island is one of India’s most strategically vital forward operating bases, acting as a sentinel near the Malacca Strait while also serving as a lifeline for the Nicobarese tribal communities, Strat News Global reported.

Its location within a natural cyclone‑sheltered harbour makes it a cornerstone of the Andaman & Nicobar Command’s maritime security operations and humanitarian outreach.

A fast boat journey south of the Ten Degree Channel aboard ICGS Vijit sets the stage for reaching INS Kardip. Nestled on Kamorta Island, the base operates within one of the finest natural harbours in the world, offering protection against tropical cyclones and enabling sustained naval operations.

Its geographical position near the Andaman funnel of the Malacca Strait is critical, with nearly 90,000 ships transiting annually. This corridor carries almost 80 percent of China’s energy imports, a vulnerability often referred to as the ‘Malacca Dilemma.’

INS Kardip is part of India’s strategic spear in the Indian Ocean Region. The Andaman & Nicobar Command is often described as India’s unsinkable aircraft carrier, and Kardip plays a pivotal role in monitoring Chinese spy vessels and submarines that increasingly probe these waters. Its proximity to Southeast Asia and chokepoints like the Six Degree Channel enhances India’s maritime domain awareness and deterrence capabilities.

Operational readiness is demonstrated through high‑speed interception drills. Fast Interceptor Craft capable of exceeding 35 knots execute sharp manoeuvres, including 360‑degree turns, to neutralise piracy and poaching threats.

These constant exercises ensure the ANC remains sharp, safeguarding critical sea lanes and preventing illegal intrusions. Kardip’s sheltered harbour also allows submarines and warships to operate securely, reinforcing India’s ability to project power across the Indo‑Pacific.

Beyond its military role, INS Kardip is deeply integrated with the Nicobarese community. Medical camps are regularly conducted in villages such as Chotta Inaka and Munack, where local gratitude is expressed through music and choral singing.

The command runs a primary school and famously sponsored the education of a girl born aboard an interceptor craft during her mother’s emergency evacuation. Such outreach highlights Kardip’s dual role as protector and benefactor.

The base’s surroundings still bear scars of the 2004 Tsunami, with tree stumps standing as reminders of past devastation.

Yet Kardip continues to embody resilience, with its motto symbolising endurance: amidst the tempest, the lamp of Kardip burns bright. Its humanitarian efforts, combined with strategic vigilance, make it indispensable to both national defence and local welfare.

Additional context underscores Kardip’s importance. Situated over 1,500 kilometres from mainland ports like Visakhapatnam or Chennai, it is significantly closer to Southeast Asian capitals, enhancing India’s ability to respond rapidly to regional developments.

Its natural harbour, formed by Kamorta, Trinkat, and Nancowry islands, provides a fortress‑like environment for naval assets. This positioning ensures India can monitor bulk oil shipments from the Persian Gulf to East Asia, reinforcing its role in securing global energy flows.

INS Kardip thus stands as a sentinel of the sea and a guardian of the people. It embodies India’s strategic foresight in the Indo‑Pacific, balancing hard power with soft outreach, and ensuring that both maritime security and community welfare remain central to its mission.

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Two US Troops Killed, One Missing As Iran Strikes Jordan Base

Two US service members were killed and one remains missing after Iran launched missile and drone strikes on the Al Azraq base in Jordan, marking a deadly escalation in the ongoing confrontation. Kuwait bore the brunt of wider Iranian attacks, while US forces continued retaliatory strikes on Iranian infrastructure.

The US Central Command confirmed that two service members died on 17 July while defending against Iranian ballistic missile and drone attacks. One more is missing in action, and four personnel were evacuated to hospitals in Jordan but later discharged. The identities of the deceased will be withheld until their families are notified.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed responsibility for the strike, saying it targeted the Al Azraq base. Iranian state television reported that the attack destroyed at least two US fighter aircraft and three other aircraft. This follows an earlier attack on 9 July, when Iran fired ten ballistic missiles at the same base, eight of which were intercepted by Jordanian defences.

Responding to the deaths, President Donald Trump described the loss as “a very sad thing” and reiterated that the United States would “never” allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. His remarks underscored Washington’s determination to maintain military pressure on Tehran.

While Jordan suffered fatalities, Kuwait endured the heaviest bombardment as the conflict entered its seventh consecutive night. Iranian missile and drone attacks disrupted operations at Kuwait International Airport, damaged a desalination plant, and struck an oil facility.

The IRGC claimed it had targeted Camp Arifjan and destroyed a radar facility at Ali Al Salem Air Base. Kuwait Petroleum Corporation confirmed one of its oil facilities was hit, causing significant damage and injuries. Kuwaiti armed forces intercepted several missiles and drones, but firefighters and oil workers were injured while responding to the strikes.

US forces continued their counter-offensive, launching airstrikes on Iranian infrastructure in Hormozgan province. These strikes killed three people and injured eight, damaging two bridges and a road tunnel. Later raids targeted surveillance sites, logistics hubs, underground weapons storage facilities, and maritime capabilities. Iran’s Health Ministry reported that 50 people have been killed and more than 500 injured in US strikes over the past three weeks.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei warned that the United States would face “unforgettable lessons” from Iran and its allies. He accused Washington of repeatedly breaching commitments under a memorandum of understanding and dismissed President Trump’s signature as “utterly worthless and devoid of credibility.” His statement reflected Tehran’s growing defiance as ceasefire efforts collapsed.

The confrontation continues to centre on control of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital global shipping route through which about one-fifth of the world’s oil supply passes. Iran has accused the US of seeking dominance over the waterway, while Washington has condemned Tehran’s attempts to restrict commercial shipping and target vessels bypassing Iranian checkpoints.

The situation highlights the risk of a wider escalation, with both sides intensifying strikes and regional states like Kuwait and Jordan suffering direct consequences. The collapse of the ceasefire has left the Gulf region exposed to sustained conflict, with fears mounting over the impact on global energy security and maritime trade.

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India’s BrahMos Missile Arc Redefines South China Sea Deterrence

India’s BrahMos missile exports are reshaping the South China Sea security environment by creating a distributed anti-access network across Southeast Asia.

With the Philippines already deploying, Vietnam signing a major deal, and Indonesia joining through a $600 million package, China now faces a layered deterrence arc that complicates its naval operations and strategic planning.

India’s BrahMos missile exports have become a central pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy. The Philippines was the first to acquire the system, signing a $375 million deal in 2022. Deliveries began in 2024, with batteries deployed across Luzon and the Luzon Strait, critical choke points for monitoring Chinese naval movements. Manila has since been offered extended-range variants, enhancing its ability to deter hostile fleets across wider maritime corridors.

Vietnam followed in May 2026, signing a deal worth approximately $700 million. This acquisition adds a powerful node to its layered coastal defence network, which already includes Russian Bastion-P systems, Kilo-class submarines, and Su-30 fighter jets. Integrating BrahMos strengthens Hanoi’s deterrence posture and raises the costs of coercion against its territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Indonesia became the third operator in July 2026, signing a defence package exceeding $600 million. This included BrahMos missiles, ASTRA MK-1 air-to-air missiles, and joint development of Sabang Port overlooking the Strait of Malacca.

The port’s location, near India’s Great Nicobar transhipment hub, underscores the strategic depth of the agreement. Indonesia’s entry completes a triangle of BrahMos operators, forming a missile arc across the South China Sea.

Together, these deals amount to over $1.7 billion in missile sales. They represent more than isolated procurements; they establish a layered maritime denial corridor stretching across critical sea lanes linking the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean. This distributed network forces adversaries to allocate greater resources to surveillance, missile defence, and force protection measures.

The BrahMos missile itself is a formidable weapon. Jointly developed by India’s DRDO and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyenia, it travels at Mach 2.8–3, nearly three times the speed of sound. Its extended-range variants exceed 400 kilometres, and its versatility allows launches from land, sea, air, and submarine platforms.

Its sea-skimming flight profile, high terminal energy, and resistance to electronic jamming make it extremely difficult to intercept. Defence analysts compare it to China’s YJ-12, but note BrahMos is among the fastest operational cruise missiles available globally.

For Southeast Asian states with limited naval forces, BrahMos offers a cost-effective deterrence strategy. Rather than building massive fleets, they can deploy concealed coastal batteries along islands and chokepoints. This Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) doctrine allows smaller states to impose operational risks on larger navies, compelling them to operate more cautiously in contested waters.

India’s export diplomacy is closely tied to its Act East policy. By supplying BrahMos, New Delhi strengthens regional partnerships without deploying its own forces. These agreements also include training, maintenance, logistics, and operational support, creating enduring military relationships. The missile’s success has boosted BrahMos Aerospace’s revenues, with FY26 figures crossing ₹5,200 crore, underscoring India’s rise as a global defence supplier.

China’s naval dominance is now challenged by dispersed missile networks rather than rival fleets. Beijing must reconsider its deployments, as aggressive maritime actions risk heavy operational costs. The timing of India’s deals has coincided with Chinese demonstrations of power, such as submarine-launched ballistic missile tests, highlighting the escalating strategic competition.

After decades India is taking exacting revenge on the missile, submarines, air defence systems and other key weapons proliferation to Pakistan by China. By arming China’s neighbours with BrahMos, India has effectively mirrored Beijing’s strategy of empowering Pakistan, but with far greater strategic consequences across the Indo‑Pacific.

The encirclement of the South China Sea with BrahMos batteries represents a turning point in regional security. It signals a decisive shift toward cost-effective deterrence strategies and consolidates India’s role as a trusted defence partner shaping the Indo-Pacific’s security architecture.

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Iran Claims Drone And Missile Strikes On US Military Sites In Bahrain And Kuwait After American Counter-Offensives

Iran has claimed responsibility for launching drone and missile strikes against US-linked military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait in direct retaliation for American strikes on its southern provinces. 

According to the state-affiliated Fars News Agency, Iranian army drones targeted the Sheikh Isa Air Base in Bahrain early on Wednesday morning, describing the attack as a response to what it called a hostile invasion by US forces.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) separately announced that it had carried out a large-scale joint missile and drone operation against 85 US military facilities.

The IRGC stated that its Navy and Aerospace Forces struck key sites including Salman Port, the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, and the Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait. This marks one of the most extensive retaliatory operations claimed by Iran in recent months.

In addition, an IRGC spokesperson asserted that Iranian air defences had successfully shot down an American MQ-9 drone over Bushehr Province. The spokesperson said the drone was destroyed by advanced air defence systems in the skies over Khormuj, following what Tehran described as aerial aggression by US forces.

These Iranian claims come in the immediate aftermath of US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirming that its forces executed a series of counter-offensives on 7 July. The American strikes reportedly hit more than 80 military positions inside Iran using precision-guided munitions.

US defence officials emphasised that the operation was aimed at dismantling Tehran’s maritime offensive capabilities, targeting command-and-control networks, air defence systems, coastal radar installations, anti-ship missile sites, and over 60 IRGC small boats.

CENTCOM explained that the strikes were triggered by Iranian attacks on three commercial tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The vessels identified were the Marshall Islands-flagged M/T Al Rekayyat, the Saudi Arabia-flagged M/T Wedyan, and the Liberian-flagged M/T Cyprus Prosperity. In a statement, CENTCOM described Iran’s actions as unwarranted, dangerous, and a clear violation of the ceasefire agreement.

Iranian state media reported multiple explosions in the port cities of Bandar Abbas and Sirik, as well as blasts on Qeshm Island. Fires were said to have broken out at the Sirik pier and the Shahid Haqqani Port in Bandar Abbas. However, Iran’s official news agency IRNA, citing the Governor of Hormozgan province, reported that no civilian casualties had been recorded from the American strikes.

The Iranian Parliament Speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, issued a strong warning on X, accusing Washington of committing major violations of the Memorandum of Understanding signed in June. He declared that Tehran would not fold under military or economic pressure, stating defiantly that “the era of bullying and extortion is over. It leads nowhere.”

This latest cycle of strikes and counter-strikes underscores the collapse of the fragile ceasefire established under the MoU. The US bombardments mark the first direct American kinetic action against Iran since late June, when a brief pause in hostilities had been achieved. The situation now points to a severe breakdown in diplomatic commitments and a dangerous escalation in the Gulf region.

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Pakistan Plans to Deploy New Hangor-Class Submarines in the Bay of Bengal

Pakistan’s decision to deploy its new China-built Hangor-class submarine in the Bay of Bengal marks a striking development in South Asian naval dynamics, reported India Today.

The arrival of PNS Hangor in Karachi has revived memories of the 1971 war, when its predecessor sank India’s INS Khukri, though Pakistan ultimately suffered a crushing defeat and lost its eastern wing, leading to the creation of Bangladesh.

For over five decades, Pakistan’s naval presence remained confined to the Arabian Sea, but senior officers now openly speak of projecting power into the Bay of Bengal, a theatre where India has long enjoyed dominance.

The Hangor-class submarine, commissioned in China in April and escorted home via Sri Lanka, is the first of eight such vessels planned for induction. Commodore Omer Farooq described the submarine as a “game changer” that could allow Pakistan to maintain a presence in the Bay of Bengal.

This ambition is significant because the region hosts India’s Eastern Naval Command at Visakhapatnam, is close to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and serves as a vital hub for trade and energy flows between India and Bangladesh. The Bay of Bengal has also become a focal point of Indo-Pacific competition, with littoral states including Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka adding to its geopolitical weight.

Pakistan’s naval modernisation effort is centred on these Hangor-class submarines, which are equipped with Air-Independent Propulsion technology, enabling them to remain submerged for extended periods and making them harder to detect.

Analysts believe the class could eventually serve as a platform for Pakistan’s sea-based nuclear capability, though Islamabad has not confirmed this. The revival of the Hangor name underscores the symbolic value attached to its legacy, even as the strategic environment today is vastly different, with India operating nuclear-powered submarines, aircraft carriers, and long-range surveillance assets.

The timing of Pakistan’s ambition coincides with improving ties with Bangladesh. Since the ouster of Sheikh Hasina’s government in 2024, Islamabad has made significant inroads in Dhaka.

Direct flights between Karachi and Dhaka have resumed, cultural exchanges have flourished, and bilateral trade has surged. Military cooperation has deepened, with Bangladesh expressing interest in acquiring JF-17 fighter jets and participating in joint maritime exercises.

In November 2025, Pakistan Navy frigate PNS Saif docked in Chattogram, marking the first visit by a Pakistani warship to Bangladesh since 1971. Reports suggest Dhaka and Islamabad are negotiating a mutual defence agreement, though no formal hosting of Pakistani assets has been announced.

These developments raise the possibility of Pakistani naval assets operating more frequently in the eastern Indian Ocean. While Bangladesh under Tarique Rahman has also strengthened ties with India, the warming of Dhaka-Islamabad relations introduces new complexities.

Pakistan’s presence in the Bay of Bengal, even if limited, could be viewed as an irritant by India, which considers the region its strategic front yard. India’s expanding capabilities around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands further highlight the competitive environment.

Pakistan’s naval expansion reflects its desire to move beyond coastal defence and establish a wider operational footprint in the Indian Ocean. The induction of eight Hangor-class submarines represents its largest naval modernisation in decades.

Although Pakistan may not alter the balance of power in the Bay of Bengal, its ambitions signal a shift in regional dynamics, with implications for India, Bangladesh, and the broader Indo-Pacific.

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Government Approves ₹13,000-Crore Great Nicobar Airport, Shelves INS Baaz Expansion

The government has cleared the construction of a new ₹13,000-crore greenfield civil-military airport at Chingen near Galathea Bay on Great Nicobar Island, effectively shelving plans to expand the existing naval air station at INS Baaz in Campbell Bay.

The decision follows detailed studies which concluded that extending INS Baaz’s 4,500-foot runway to 10,000 feet was impractical due to terrain limitations, navigational challenges and infrastructure constraints.

Officials also noted that expansion could have posed greater risks to tribal settlements, forests and wildlife habitats compared to the proposed new site.

The new airport will serve both civilian and military aviation requirements, remaining under naval operational control while providing scope for future expansion. Strategically located near the western approaches of the Malacca Strait, the site offers India a vantage point over one of the busiest maritime chokepoints in the world.

A substantial share of global container traffic and energy shipments passes through these waters, making Great Nicobar a critical location for monitoring maritime activity and strengthening India’s surveillance and logistics footprint in the Indo-Pacific.

The airport is expected to be completed within five years and is one of four major infrastructure components under the ₹81,000-crore Great Nicobar Island Development Project. Alongside the airport, the project includes an International Container Transhipment Terminal at Galathea Bay, power infrastructure and township development.

The transhipment terminal is intended to reduce India’s dependence on foreign hubs such as Singapore and Colombo, positioning the country as a key player in global cargo movement. The government has consistently defended the project as a strategic investment to enhance India’s presence in the Indo-Pacific, improve connectivity and leverage the island’s proximity to vital shipping lanes.

Great Nicobar, India’s southernmost island, lies close to the Six Degree Channel leading into the Malacca Strait, through which a large portion of global maritime trade flows.

India already maintains a significant military presence in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, including INS Baaz commissioned in 2012, and the tri-services command established in 2001 to integrate the Army, Navy and Air Force. 

Strategic experts argue that strengthening infrastructure on the islands will enhance India’s ability to monitor maritime traffic, project power and counter China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean Region.

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'Not About Defence,’ Says Rahul Gandhi On Great Nicobar Plan

Rahul Gandhi has intensified his criticism of the Great Nicobar Project, releasing a video of his visit to the island that shows him diving into the sea, travelling through dense forests, and interacting with tribals and locals.

In the 16‑minute video of his April trip, he accused the Modi government of misleading the public by claiming the project was about defence and a transhipment port, calling this narrative a “lie.”

He argued instead that the project was designed to benefit a major businessman, specifically naming Adani, who he alleged would use the development to build hotels and casinos on one of India’s most irreplaceable ecosystems.

Rahul Gandhi launched an online petition titled “we choose green over greed,” urging Indians to support environmental protection over corporate interests.

He appealed particularly to young Indians, asking them to reflect on whether they wanted to inherit an India where rainforests were bulldozed for casinos, coral reefs erased from maps, tribal communities displaced from their ancestral lands, and the air poisoned, or an India where natural heritage was safeguarded, tribal communities remained secure, and progress worked in harmony with nature.

He claimed that more than 1.5 crore trees, ancient coral reefs, and irreplaceable rainforests were being destroyed to profit a single businessman.

He further argued that if the government was genuinely concerned about defence on the island, it should abandon the project and instead expand INS Baaz, the naval air station located on Great Nicobar. 

According to him, the Navy had been requesting its expansion for five years, and this would serve India’s defence needs without causing ecological devastation.

Rahul Gandhi’s intervention comes at a time when the project has already triggered widespread concerns about environmental destruction and tribal displacement. His video and petition are part of a broader campaign to mobilise public opinion against the initiative, framing it as a clash between ecological preservation and corporate greed.

By naming Adani and linking the project to casinos and hotels, he has sought to sharpen the political debate, portraying the government’s defence rationale as a cover for private profit.

The controversy surrounding the Great Nicobar Project highlights the tension between strategic imperatives and environmental sustainability.

While the government insists the project is vital for India’s maritime security and economic development, opposition voices like Rahul Gandhi continue to raise alarms about its ecological and social costs.

His call to expand INS Baaz instead of pursuing large‑scale commercial development underscores his position that defence needs can be met without sacrificing India’s fragile island ecosystems.

Agencies

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Vice Admiral Vineet McCarty Assumes Command of Andaman & Nicobar Command

Vice Admiral Vineet McCarty, AVSM, formally assumed charge as the 20th Commander‑in‑Chief of the Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC) at Sri Vijaya Puram on 1 June 2026.

His appointment marks a significant moment for India’s only Tri‑Service Operational Command, which plays a pivotal role in safeguarding national interests in the Indian Ocean Region and reinforcing India’s strategic posture in the Indo‑Pacific.

Commissioned into the Indian Navy on 1 July 1989, Vice Admiral McCarty is a specialist in Gunnery and Missiles. Over the course of 36 years of distinguished service, he has held a wide spectrum of operational, staff, training, and tri‑service appointments.

His academic credentials include being an alumnus of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, and the National Defence College, New Delhi, institutions that have shaped generations of India’s senior military leadership.

His sea tenures have been extensive and impactful. He was part of the commissioning crew of INS Delhi, where he completed all specialist appointments onboard the frontline destroyer. He has commanded several warships including INS Ajay, INS Khanjar, and the stealth frigate INS Shivalik, demonstrating his operational acumen across different classes of naval platforms. These commands underscored his expertise in frontline operations and his ability to lead complex missions at sea.

Vice Admiral McCarty has also held key staff and training roles. He served as Training Commander at the Indian Naval Academy, Command Plans Officer at Headquarters Eastern Naval Command, and Commodore Naval Plans at Naval Headquarters. His promotion to Flag Rank in 2020 saw him take on critical responsibilities such as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Staff Requirements) and Controller of Personnel Services.

In 2023, he commanded the Western Fleet as Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet (FOCWF), a role that placed him at the helm of India’s most powerful operational fleet. He later became the tenth Commandant of the Indian Naval Academy in 2024, shaping the future leadership of the Navy.

His tri‑service experience is equally notable. Prior to his current appointment, he served at Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) as Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Policy, Plans and Force Development) and Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Doctrine, Organisation and Training) during 2025‑26.

These roles placed him at the centre of India’s evolving joint warfare doctrine and force development initiatives, reinforcing his credentials as a leader capable of integrating the Army, Navy, and Air Force into cohesive operational structures.

Vice Admiral McCarty’s overseas assignments further broadened his strategic outlook. He served as Directing Staff at the Naval and Maritime Academy in Sri Lanka, and later as Defence Advisor to Singapore and the Philippines concurrently from 2011 to 2015.

These postings enhanced India’s defence diplomacy and maritime cooperation with key partners in the Indo‑Pacific, strengthening regional security ties and expanding India’s influence in critical maritime corridors.

On assuming charge of the ANC, Vice Admiral McCarty emphasised the strategic importance of the Command in safeguarding India’s maritime interests and ensuring stability in the Indian Ocean Region. 

He reaffirmed his commitment to enhancing operational preparedness, strengthening jointness and synergy among the Services, and reinforcing ANC’s role as a vital pillar of national security. His vision aligns with India’s broader strategic objectives of maintaining a robust presence in the Indo‑Pacific, deterring threats, and ensuring freedom of navigation across critical sea lanes.

The Andaman & Nicobar Command, established in 2001, remains India’s only Tri‑Service Operational Command, integrating the Army, Navy, and Air Force under a unified structure. Its geographical location provides India with a strategic vantage point to monitor and secure the eastern approaches of the Indian Ocean, including the Malacca Strait, one of the world’s busiest maritime chokepoints.

Under Vice Admiral McCarty’s leadership, the Command is expected to further consolidate its role in power projection, maritime domain awareness, and joint operations, ensuring India’s readiness to meet evolving challenges in the region.

Vice Admiral McCarty’s assumption of command represents continuity and renewal in India’s maritime strategy. His blend of operational experience, tri‑service integration, and international exposure positions him to strengthen ANC’s role as a cornerstone of India’s defence architecture in the Indo‑Pacific.

PIB

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Retired Military Officials Defend Great Nicobar Project, Reject Rahul Gandhi’s Allegations As Baseless

Retired Indian armed forces officials have strongly defended the Great Nicobar Project, countering allegations made by Leader of Opposition Rahul Gandhi regarding land grabbing, ecological damage, and corruption.

They emphasised that the project is vital for India’s maritime security and economic development, particularly in monitoring the Strait of Malacca and countering China’s expanding presence in the region.

Major General P Vivekanandan (Retd) underscored the need to safeguard India’s maritime interests and economic zones. He pointed out that China has attempted to restrict India’s maritime mobility through its “String of Pearls” strategy, establishing ports around India.

He argued that the development of Great Nicobar Island, stalled since 2008, must be expedited to ensure freedom of movement and protect India’s economic interests.

He acknowledged concerns about the intercontinental trans-shipment container terminal but stressed that co-opting industrial players like Adani does not equate to selling the region to them. He added that administrators are addressing ecological and habitat concerns by working with local communities to find sustainable solutions.

Air Vice Marshal PK Srivastava (Retd) highlighted the strategic importance of the Strait of Malacca, drawing parallels with Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz during its conflict with the United States. 

He stated that the Great Nicobar Project would enhance India’s commercial activity, military dominance, and surveillance capabilities in the region.

Former Director General of Border Roads Organisation (DG BRO) Rajeev Chaudhary reinforced the project’s legitimacy, citing clearance from the National Green Tribunal (NGT) and government afforestation efforts.

He noted that 7.11 lakh trees across 49.86 square kilometres of forest are expected to be felled, with compensatory afforestation planned in Haryana over 97.30 square kilometres.

He dismissed Rahul Gandhi’s claims as unfounded, stressing that the project is essential for strengthening India’s strategic and economic hub in Great Nicobar.

He argued that India cannot afford to remain passive while China develops assets in Gwadar and Hambantota, and emphasised that the island’s proximity to Myanmar offers opportunities to strengthen bilateral ties.

Chaudhary described the government’s plan as “fool proof,” assuring that flora, fauna, and marine life would be preserved.

He explained that Leatherback sea turtles would be relocated to nearby islands, corals and coastal biodiversity would be protected, and afforestation would be carried out in Haryana and Madhya Pradesh due to space constraints on Great Nicobar.

He further stated that the government’s plan ensures zero displacement of tribal populations, with relocation only considered in later phases and strictly with consent.

Rahul Gandhi, however, reiterated his concerns, alleging that tribal rights and environmental safeguards were being undermined. He claimed that settlers and tribal communities were not receiving proper compensation and accused the administration of corruption and authoritarian behaviour.

He described the project as ecological theft, alleging that trees worth lakhs of crores were being destroyed and land was being handed over to industrialists.

The government maintains that the Great Nicobar Project is designed to transform the island into a strategic maritime and economic hub, leveraging its proximity to the East-West shipping route and reducing dependence on foreign transhipment ports.

The project will unfold in three phases over 22 years and is aligned with the Shompen Policy of 2015 and the Jarawa Policy of 2004, which mandate prioritising the welfare of Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTGs) and ensuring structured consultation processes.

The debate underscores the tension between strategic imperatives and environmental concerns, with retired military officials firmly backing the project as essential for India’s security and economic resilience, while opposition voices continue to raise alarms over ecological and tribal rights.

ANI

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China Launches Disinformation Campaign To Undermine India’s Great Nicobar Port Project

Reports indicate that China has launched a disinformation campaign targeting India’s Great Nicobar Port project, portraying it as environmentally destructive and politically controversial.

Analysts suggest this is part of Beijing’s broader strategy to undermine India’s strategic foothold near the Strait of Malacca, a critical chokepoint for Chinese trade and energy supplies.

The Great Nicobar Island Development Project, approved by the Union Cabinet in 2021 and devised by NITI Aayog, is valued at approximately ₹81,000 crore (around $10 billion). It is designed to transform Great Nicobar into a major commercial and strategic hub.

The centrepiece is a transhipment port at Galathea Bay, built on a naturally deep harbour of 18 to 20 metres. The port is expected to handle 4 million TEUs by 2028 and expand to 16 million TEUs by 2058, rivalling Singapore’s capacity and positioning India as a key maritime player in the Indo-Pacific.

The project also includes an international greenfield airport with a 3,300-metre runway capable of accommodating wide-body aircraft, a 450 MW solar and gas-based power plant, and the expansion of the Andaman and Nicobar tri-service command into a frontline strategic arm.

These dual-use facilities will serve both civilian and military purposes, enhancing India’s ability to project power and secure its maritime interests.

China’s opposition stems from the project’s location. Great Nicobar sits at the mouth of the Six Degree Channel, one of the main routes into and out of the Strait of Malacca. More than 80% of China’s oil imports, valued at about $312 billion annually, and two-thirds of its overall trade pass through this narrow waterway.

The Chinese leadership has long recognised this vulnerability, famously described by former President Hu Jintao in 2003 as the “Malacca Dilemma.” With over 15 million barrels of oil consumed daily, and only 3.7 million transported via overland pipelines, China’s dependence on the strait remains acute.

India’s control of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, stretching over 700 kilometres, effectively places it at the gateway to this chokepoint. Great Nicobar, equidistant from Singapore, Port Klang, and Colombo, is geographically positioned as a natural aircraft carrier. For India, the project is a strategic trump card, offering leverage in any future confrontation with China and reinforcing its role as a rising power in the Indo-Pacific.

Reports suggest that China has sought to derail the project by amplifying environmental concerns and encouraging opposition within India’s political class. Campaigns highlighting ecological risks and questioning the project’s viability have been circulated, aiming to slow down or halt its progress. 

However, India has cleared major legal hurdles, with the National Green Tribunal refusing to interfere with environmental clearances earlier this year, allowing the project to advance.

The disinformation campaign reflects Beijing’s anxiety over India’s growing maritime capabilities and its ability to challenge Chinese dominance in the region. By attempting to sow discord and delay construction, China hopes to protect its vulnerable trade lifeline.

Yet, India’s determination to proceed underscores its recognition of the strategic importance of Great Nicobar, not just as an economic hub but as a cornerstone of its security architecture in the Indian Ocean.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)

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A400M Vs Kawasaki C-2: Airlift Solutions For India’s AAP And Zorawar Tank

For India’s Medium Transport Aircraft program, the central requirement is the ability to lift 25–26 tons directly to advanced landing grounds.

This ensures that platforms such as the Advanced Armoured Platform (AAP) and the Zorawar Light Tank can be transported without intermediate staging, a capability that directly enhances rapid deployment in contested or high-altitude theatres. Two aircraft stand out as candidates: the Airbus A400M Atlas and the Kawasaki C-2, both of which meet and exceed the payload threshold.

The Airbus A400M Atlas is a proven European design with a certified payload of 37 tons, with upgrades pushing this figure to 40 tons. Its cargo bay offers a generous 340 cubic metres of space with a 4m x 4m cross-section, sufficient for light tanks and armoured platforms.

The aircraft can carry a single outsized load of up to 32 tons, comfortably covering the AAP and Zorawar. Its operational range is 3,300 km at maximum payload, extending to 6,400 km with lighter loads. A key advantage lies in its ability to land on short, soft, and unpaved strips, distributing weight through a 12-wheel landing gear system.

This makes the A400M particularly suited to Himalayan terrain, where prepared runways are scarce. With a cruise speed of Mach 0.72 and a ceiling of 11,300 metres, the A400M balances tactical ruggedness with strategic reach. For the Indian Air Force, this translates into reliable delivery of heavy equipment directly to forward bases, even under austere conditions, while also offering versatility as a tanker or UAV mothership.

The Kawasaki C-2, developed by Japan, offers a slightly different emphasis. With a payload capacity of 37.6 tons, it matches the A400M in lifting ability. Its ferry range of 10,000 km and operational range of 4,700 km with a 20-ton payload provide superior reach, enabling long-haul missions without refuelling. The C-2 cruises at Mach 0.8, faster than the A400M, and operates at a ceiling of 12,200 metres.

Its cargo hold is designed to accommodate outsized loads, including helicopters and multiple pallets, while its low-pressure tyres allow operations from short or unprepared strips. For India, the C-2 offers strategic benefits in terms of speed and range, allowing rapid reinforcement across theatres from Ladakh to the Andaman Islands.

It also provides flexibility for humanitarian missions, disaster relief, and long-distance deployments, complementing India’s growing expeditionary ambitions.

Both aircraft are compatible with India’s emerging platforms. The AAP, weighing around 24 tons, and the Zorawar Light Tank, at 25 tons, fall well within the payload limits of both the A400M and C-2. This ensures that India can deploy these systems directly to forward bases, bypassing logistical bottlenecks.

Feature	Airbus A400M	Kawasaki C-2
Payload	37–40 t	37.6 t
Range (Max Payload)	3,300 km	~4,700 km
Ferry Range	~8,700 km	10,000 km
Cruise Speed	Mach 0.72	Mach 0.8
Runway Capability	Short, Unpaved Strips	Short/Unprepared Strips
Ceiling	11,300 m	12,200 m
Strength	Tactical Flexibility, Proven In Combat	Higher Speed, Longer Range

The A400M’s strength lies in tactical flexibility and proven combat deployment, while the C-2’s advantage is in strategic reach and speed. For the Indian Air Force, the choice will depend on whether rugged tactical deployment or long-range strategic lift is prioritised.

Either option would significantly enhance India’s ability to project power, sustain operations in high-altitude regions, and respond rapidly to crises.

IDN (With Agency Inputs)

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Andaman And Nicobar Command Showcases Multi-Domain Synergy In Exercise Dweep Shakti 2026

The Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) has successfully executed Exercise Dweep Shakti 2026, a comprehensive joint military drill held from 29 March in Sri Vijaya Puram.

This large-scale operation brought together assets from the Indian Army, Indian Navy, Indian Air Force, and Indian Coast Guard, alongside contingents from formations across the nation.

The primary objective was to refine multi-domain joint warfighting capabilities and standard operating procedures (SOPs). Participants focused on boosting interoperability and operational synergy, essential for coordinated responses in complex scenarios.

Elements from ANC's Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard components played central roles, augmented by Special Forces and reinforcement units from all three services. This diverse integration underscored the command's ability to mobilise tri-service resources effectively.

Operations spanned land, sea, and air domains, validating joint capabilities in a realistic, dynamic setting. Troops executed a broad spectrum of multi-domain manoeuvres, simulating high-stakes engagements across the archipelago.

Strategic deployment of Army, Navy, and Air Force assets occurred across key islands, with seamless activation of operational and support mechanisms. Close coordination with the local civil administration of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands ensured logistical efficiency and real-world applicability.

The exercise highlighted ANC's robust operational preparedness, demonstrating the Indian Armed Forces' prowess in protecting maritime interests. It affirmed the command's role in securing these strategically vital islands amid evolving regional threats.

Professionalism shone through in the execution of intricate joint operations within a fluid environment. The synergy among ANC components and external formations exemplified disciplined coordination under pressure.

Vice Admiral Ajay Kochhar, PVSM, AVSM, NM, Commander-in-Chief of ANC (CINCAN), observed the proceedings first hand. He praised the troops for their exemplary conduct and the flawless execution of all phases.

Such initiatives bolster India's defence posture significantly. They reinforce the nation's unwavering commitment to regional peace and security, particularly in the Indo-Pacific theatre where the Andaman and Nicobar Islands hold pivotal geostrategic importance.

Exercise Dweep Shakti 2026 thus serves as a benchmark for future tri-service collaborations, enhancing India's deterrence capabilities against potential adversaries.

Agencies

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