Pakistan’s Defence Minister Labels PoK Protesters As 'Enemies Like India' Amid Deadly Crackdown

Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has triggered outrage by defending the killing of at least 32 protesters in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), equating them with “Enemies like India.”

His remarks come amid escalating unrest, widespread violence, and mounting international condemnation of Islamabad’s heavy-handed tactics.

The Defence Minister’s statement was made during ongoing protests in Rawalakot and Mirpur, where Pakistani forces have been accused of opening direct fire on civilians. Asif declared that demonstrators in Azad Kashmir should be treated as enemies, placing them in the same category as India.

His comments were captured in a viral video that has intensified scrutiny of Pakistan’s governance and its treatment of dissent in the disputed territory.

Reports confirm that over 90 people have been killed since 5 June during the unrest, with most victims linked to the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), an organisation banned by Islamabad for highlighting human rights abuses.

Among the dead was Usman Nazir, the younger brother of JAAC founding member Umar Nazir. Videos circulating on social media show Pakistani security personnel firing on civilians, loading bodies into vehicles, and leaving streets littered with corpses and abandoned motorbikes.

The crackdown coincided with the first phase of legislative assembly elections in PoK, where the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) secured nine of thirteen seats amid allegations of rigging. 

India has dismissed the elections as a “cosmetic exercise” designed to legitimise Pakistan’s illegal occupation, while pointing to the protests as evidence of widespread dissatisfaction with Islamabad’s policies.

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in New Delhi condemned the killings, describing them as brutal oppression and calling for accountability.

The JAAC has been at the forefront of demonstrations demanding the abolition of twelve reserved assembly seats for Kashmiri refugees, which protesters argue are manipulated to install Islamabad’s preferred leadership.

The organisation insists its campaign is peaceful, but Pakistani authorities accuse activists of carrying weapons and attempting to seize Muzaffarabad and Mirpur by force. Adviser Rana Sanaullah claimed protesters had presented 38 demands, but Asif categorically ruled out dialogue, branding them as enemies.

International reaction has been swift. The United Nations, European Union, United States, and several Western governments have expressed concern over the killings and suppression of democratic rights. Human rights organisations, including Amnesty International, have condemned the disproportionate use of force and called for an independent investigation.

The United Kashmir People’s National Party (UKPNP) has appealed to global institutions to intervene urgently to protect civilians and uphold international law.

The unrest highlights deep-rooted grievances in PoK, including economic exploitation, prolonged power cuts of up to 20 hours daily, inflated tariffs, and restricted food supplies. Protesters accuse Islamabad of extracting resources while denying fundamental rights.

The violence has further destabilised the region, with markets shut, internet services disrupted, and widespread fear among residents.

The controversy surrounding Khawaja Asif’s remarks is expected to fuel regional tensions, intensify India-Pakistan hostilities, and deepen international debate over civil liberties and governance in PoK. 

Calls for accountability and justice continue to grow louder as the death toll rises and Islamabad faces mounting pressure to halt its crackdown.

Agencies

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China’s Stealth Support Strengthens Russia’s War Machine

President Donald Trump’s war against Iran has weakened the United States militarily and strategically, leaving China in a stronger position globally. Beijing has simultaneously reinforced its influence while discreetly supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine and the West.

 American missile and weapon stock depletion, worsened by the Iran conflict, has created vulnerabilities that both China and Russia are exploiting in their respective calculations against Taiwan and Ukraine.

Dr Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute warned that this crisis in US military capability is immediate, not distant. China’s support for Russia has been subtle compared to North Korea’s overt actions, yet it remains decisive.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas described China as a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war.” Beijing’s proclaimed neutrality has been a fiction, as it has consistently echoed Moscow’s narrative and even mandated its teaching in schools and universities.

China’s selective criticism is telling. It condemned US strikes on Iran but has only warned Russia against nuclear use in Ukraine. Garry Kasparov noted that China aids Russia without suffering consequences.

Sanctions on some Chinese firms have had little political impact. Instead, China supplies electronics, semiconductors and machinery to Russia, while absorbing combat lessons from Moscow for its own designs on Taiwan.

Evidence of Chinese support dates back years. Reports from 2023 showed Chinese defence companies providing navigation equipment, drones, jamming technology and jet-fighter parts to Russia. Dual-use items were routed through Turkey and the UAE.

China’s share of Russian dual-use imports rose from 30% to 66% between 2021 and 2023, and by 2025, EU envoy David O’Sullivan estimated China supplied 80% of components used in Russian weapons. Bloomberg reported in April 2026 that over 90% of Russia’s sanctioned technology imports came via China.

At the UN in April 2026, China’s deputy representative Sun Lei deflected blame onto the US, accusing Washington of prolonging the conflict. Meanwhile, Chinese banks and corporations expanded into occupied Ukrainian territories, monopolising manufacturing and integrating equipment into infrastructure. In January 2026,

The Telegraph revealed China had provided Russia with $10.3 billion in technology, including specialised machines for hypersonic missile warheads. Beijing denied fuelling the war.

China abstained from a UN vote in December 2025 demanding Russia return deported Ukrainian children, claiming humanitarian issues should not be politicised. G7 ministers condemned China’s provision of dual-use components, but Beijing denied supplying lethal arms.

Ukraine’s intelligence service in October 2025 recorded evidence of China providing satellite data for Russian strikes. Two Chinese nationals were arrested for spying on Ukraine’s Neptune missile program. Zelenskyy declared at the UN that “without China, Putin’s Russia is nothing.”

Reuters reported Russian soldiers trained in China in late 2025, including chemical and radiological protection courses. Beijing denied this, but the cooperation underscored strategic alignment. Investigations by The Insider, Der Spiegel and Le Monde revealed plans for China to provide AI and industrial capacity for Russian drone swarms, in exchange for battlefield data.

They also uncovered joint efforts to undermine Starlink and discussions on integrated missile defence systems potentially operational by 2030.

China and Russia have held secretive military technology forums annually, aiming to erode US superiority. Yet China has also hacked Russian agencies to steal information. The overall picture is of China stealthily backing Russia while learning from Ukraine’s battlefield. Xi and Putin’s relationship, described as having “no limits,” has seen over 40 meetings.

Economically, China dominates the partnership, with Russia accounting for only 4% of Chinese trade. Moscow repays Beijing’s support by backing its claims over Taiwan.

China’s denials of partiality ring hollow. Tong Zhao of Carnegie China explained that authoritarian elites believe themselves morally righteous and invest heavily in shaping global narratives. On Taiwan, Beijing sees military takeover as an internal matter, emboldened by perceived Western acceptance of US actions.

China spends heavily on influence campaigns abroad, including $100 million in the US in 2025, with $66.8 million funnelled to CGTN America. Tencent alone spent over $10 million lobbying. Trump accused China of spending $16 billion annually on intelligence and influence operations in the US.

Evelyn Yeh of the European Council on Foreign Relations warned that Russia-China alignment threatens the international order. Beijing is watching Ukraine to gauge Western resolve and calibrate ambitions for Taiwan.

Europe must act to counter this strategic exchange, which fuels Russia’s war machine and risks future aggression. Ultimately, China is funding and fuelling Russia’s war against Ukraine, and it is doing so with impunity.

ANI

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Iran To Receive Hundreds of Chinese Shoulder-Fired Missiles Amid Escalating War With US

Iran is set to receive between 300 and 400 Chinese-made QW-12 and FN-16 shoulder-fired air-defence missile systems within weeks, in a deal worth $60–70 million, Reuters reported.

The procurement underscores Tehran’s urgent effort to rebuild short-range defences amid its ongoing war with the United States and Israel, while raising questions about China’s role despite official denials.

Iran is expected to take delivery of hundreds of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) from China. The contract, signed with Zhongqing Baoshang International Investment, a Hong Kong-based intermediary, covers QW-12 and FN-16 missiles.

These infrared-guided systems are designed to target low-flying aircraft, helicopters, drones, and cruise missiles. Their portability allows rapid deployment by small teams, making them less vulnerable than fixed batteries.

The reported deal comes after months of intense fighting in which U.S. and Israeli strikes damaged Iranian missile, drone, and air-defence programs. Tehran responded with ballistic missile and drone barrages, but the conflict exposed gaps in its ability to defend strategic sites. Washington recently paused a two-week bombardment, though President Donald Trump warned strikes would resume if negotiations fail. He also expressed surprise at the reports, noting that Chinese President Xi Jinping had assured him Beijing would not support Iran militarily.

China’s Foreign Ministry dismissed the reports as “groundless,” while a defence ministry spokesperson claimed no knowledge of the matter. Pakistan, through its military public relations wing ISPR, denied involvement in facilitating transfers, despite sources indicating shipments would transit through Pakistan from Urumqi in western China. Tehran has also explored overland routes to discreetly move supplies and reduce risks of disruption.

Military experts highlight that MANPADS provide Iran with a flexible defensive layer. Unlike radar-guided systems, these weapons can be dispersed across multiple sites, including nuclear facilities, refineries, and command centres.

Analysts note that while the QW-12 is less advanced than newer QW-18 and QW-19 variants, the FN-16 offers stronger interception capabilities, with ranges up to 6 km and altitude ceilings of 4 km. The choice reflects Iran’s priority for immediate availability and numerical mass over cutting-edge seeker technology.

European and Middle Eastern security sources confirm Iran has been seeking QW-series systems for months. Western intelligence officials believe the acquisition could allow Iran to establish 50–100 firing positions depending on deployment structure, significantly expanding its short-range coverage. This procurement highlights Iran’s reliance on both domestic production and foreign suppliers despite sanctions.

The deal also signals deepening military ties between Tehran and Beijing. Reports suggest Iran has been negotiating separately for Chinese anti-ship cruise missiles, though it remains unclear if that agreement was finalised. The MANPADS purchase, however, represents one of Iran’s largest known efforts to strengthen its air defences since the war began.

The strategic implications are considerable. Portable systems could complicate U.S. and Israeli air operations, forcing them to adapt tactics against dispersed, mobile threats.

Yet the systems’ limited altitude and range mean they cannot replace Iran’s need for more advanced radar-guided batteries. Still, the acquisition marks a significant step in Tehran’s rearmament program and reflects its determination to sustain military resilience under pressure.

Agencies

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China’s J-35 For Pakistan Rekindles F-35 Debate For India Amid Reluctance

China’s J-35 stealth fighter program has revived debate in Washington about whether India should eventually be offered the F-35 Lightning-II, despite New Delhi’s reluctance to pursue such an acquisition, Times of India reported.

Pakistan’s move towards inducting the Chinese J-35 has prompted American strategic experts to argue that the United States may need to reconsider its position in order to strengthen India’s air power and counter Beijing’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific.

Analysts at leading American think tanks, including the Stimson Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and CSIS, believe that Pakistan’s potential J-35 fleet should not be seen solely in the context of India-Pakistan rivalry.

Instead, they view it as part of China’s broader strategic expansion in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific. The deployment of the J-35 in Pakistan would deepen defence cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad while extending the operational reach of Chinese fifth-generation air power into the region.

The J-35, which made its public debut at the 2024 Zhuhai Air Show, is designed for both the People’s Liberation Army and the export market. If Pakistan proceeds with acquisition, it would become the first foreign operator of the aircraft.

This would significantly extend the footprint of Chinese military aviation into South Asia, altering the regional balance of power. Experts note that India’s indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) remains several years away from service, leaving the Indian Air Force without an operational fifth-generation fighter.

The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning-II is widely regarded as the most advanced operational fifth-generation stealth fighter in the world. It combines stealth, advanced sensor fusion, electronic warfare capabilities and network-centric operations.

It has been combat-tested and is in service with the United States and more than 20 allied nations. By contrast, the J-35 is still in the early stages of induction, with its full operational capabilities yet to be tested in combat.

Despite the strategic arguments in favour of offering the F-35 to India, several obstacles remain. India has consistently informed US officials that it is not interested in acquiring the F-35, preferring instead to focus on partnerships involving technology transfer, joint development and domestic manufacturing under its ‘Make in India’ initiative.

Moreover, India’s continued reliance on Russian-origin systems such as the S-400 Triumf air defence system and Su-30MKI fighters poses a major challenge. US officials have warned that integrating the F-35 with Russian systems could compromise the aircraft’s classified stealth technologies and mission systems.

Another hurdle lies in the F-35’s unique operational ecosystem. The aircraft relies on the US-controlled Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN), which manages logistics, maintenance, software updates and mission data. Joining this ecosystem requires strict compliance with American security protocols, which may not align with India’s policy of strategic autonomy and diversified defence procurement. 

Analysts caution that while the F-35 could provide India with an immediate fifth-generation capability, a large-scale import could divert funding and industrial focus away from the AMCA, which remains central to India’s long-term goal of self-reliance in advanced fighter aircraft.

The debate illustrates the shifting dynamics of South Asian air power. Pakistan’s potential induction of the J-35 would not only alter the India-Pakistan balance but also extend China’s military aviation reach into South Asia.

For Washington, this raises the question of whether its historical hesitation about selling highly sophisticated warplanes to India can be sustained in the face of Beijing’s growing influence.

For New Delhi, however, the priority remains building indigenous capability through the AMCA program, even as external pressures mount.

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Trump Says Would Be 'Quite Disappointed' If China Arms

US President Donald Trump has expressed that he would be “quite disappointed” if China were to supply weapons to Iran, stressing that Chinese President Xi Jinping had personally assured him that Beijing would not engage in such transfers.

His remarks came during an Oval Office interaction in Washington, where he addressed reports suggesting Tehran could soon receive up to 400 Chinese-manufactured shoulder-fired missiles.

Trump told reporters that such a development would be surprising, reiterating that Xi had strongly conveyed his refusal to partake in such activities. He emphasised that Xi was aware of the disappointment it would cause him should China proceed with arms sales to Tehran.

The President’s comments followed earlier intelligence assessments indicating Beijing was preparing to deliver new air defence systems to Iran, at a time when Tehran is actively seeking to replenish its military stockpiles with foreign support.

The Oval Office remarks also built upon Trump’s warnings issued the previous week to both Beijing and Moscow against supplying arms to Iran.

Despite these warnings, Trump maintained that he accepted assurances from both Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin that neither nation was currently providing military support to Tehran.

On his Truth Social platform, Trump wrote that in his opinion both countries were abstaining from arms transfers, adding that any such move would be “very bad for them” and not in their best interests.

Washington’s scrutiny has intensified amid investigations into whether Russian and Chinese intelligence networks have been providing targeting data to Tehran following a series of strikes on American military installations.

Trump recalled his summit with Xi in Beijing in May, noting that the Chinese leader had given him an explicit commitment not to arm Tehran under any circumstances. He said that considering their relationship, he took Xi at his word.

The President also revealed that Putin had extended a similar commitment despite the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

He explained that the Russian leader understood U.S. arms policy, stating that Washington does not sell weapons to Ukraine but only to NATO countries, which pay full price. He added that he had no knowledge of how those weapons were distributed once purchased.

Affirming his reliance on the personal commitments conveyed by both foreign leaders, Trump reiterated to reporters that he trusted Xi and Putin. He concluded by saying that he did not believe either leader would want to risk disappointing him, underscoring his confidence in their assurances.

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Pakistan’s National Strategic Command Places Nuclear Control Under Asim Munir

Pakistan has formally shifted operational control of its nuclear arsenal to the newly created National Strategic Command (NSC), consolidating authority under Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, News18 reported.

This marks the country’s most sweeping military reorganisation in decades, side-lining civilian oversight and mirroring China’s PLA Rocket Force model.

Pakistan has initiated a structural overhaul of its defence framework through legislative amendments that established the National Strategic Command. The NSC now assumes operational oversight of strategic assets and the nuclear arsenal, centralising authority under a unified military hierarchy.

This effectively bypasses the traditional civilian-led National Command Authority, reducing prime ministerial oversight to an informational role rather than operational control.

The reorganisation is spearheaded by Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, who holds dual roles as Chief of Defence Forces and Chief of the Army Staff. Under this new framework, Lieutenant General Syed Aamer Raza, formerly Chief of the General Staff, has been elevated to four-star General and appointed as the inaugural Commander of the National Strategic Command. His appointment followed the abolition of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee under the 27th Amendment, consolidating power further under Munir’s leadership.

The operational blueprint of the NSC closely mirrors the force structure of China’s People’s Liberation Army, particularly the PLA Rocket Force. Supported by the Strategic Plans Division, the NSC consolidates management of nuclear stockpiles, delivery systems, and missile development under a single centralised command.

This restructuring aims to establish a joint operational command spanning the Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and Strategic Command, enhancing deterrence along Pakistan’s eastern border while deepening defence-industrial and technological integration with Beijing.

The internal impact of this consolidation has been significant. Promotion boards across senior officer cadres have remained frozen for over fifteen months amid systemic restructuring. Routine Formation Commanders’ Conferences have been suspended since 2024, reflecting the centralisation of decision-making within the senior leadership. Operational control has been streamlined under the Office of the Chief of Defence Forces, diminishing the traditional autonomy of senior regional Corps Commanders.

Lieutenant General Raza’s elevation surprised many observers, as several senior generals were overlooked. His loyalty to Munir during turbulent times appears to have been decisive. Raza, an armoured corps officer from the historic 6 Lancers regiment, has commanded formations such as the 37 Infantry Division and held senior roles in weapons and equipment management. His appointment strengthens Munir’s influence over Pakistan’s evolving nuclear command architecture.

The constitutional amendments underpinning this overhaul have insulated appointments to the NSC from judicial review, ensuring that decisions made by the Chief of Defence Forces cannot be challenged in court. This legal framework has entrenched Munir’s authority, making him Pakistan’s most powerful military leader in decades, with direct control over nuclear assets and strategic forces.

The restructuring represents a decisive shift in Pakistan’s civil-military balance, with nuclear command now firmly under military control. It signals a long-term strategic alignment with China’s military doctrines and operational models, while raising concerns about the erosion of civilian oversight in one of the world’s most sensitive security domains.

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India Faces Strategic Challenge As Turkey-Pakistan Defence Axis Gains Edge With Possible US F-35 Sale

US President Donald Trump has announced a dramatic reversal in policy by lifting sanctions on Turkey and signalling openness to restoring Ankara’s access to the advanced American F-35 fighter jets. Turkey had been denied these aircraft since 2019 after acquiring the Russian S-400 air defence system.

The announcement was made alongside President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at a NATO summit in Ankara on 8 July 2026. Turkey is reportedly seeking an initial delivery of six jets, and the US may also provide engines for Turkey’s indigenous KAAN fighter program.

However, Trump is expected to face strong opposition in Congress, where concerns remain about Turkey’s continued possession of the S-400 system and its deepening ties with Russia and China.

The announcement has provoked sharp reactions from Israel and Greece. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that supplying F-35s to Turkey would “destroy the balance of power in the Middle East” and has begun lobbying against the deal.

Greece has also expressed alarm, fearing that stealth fighters in Turkish hands could destabilise the Eastern Mediterranean. Athens has already ordered 20 F-35As, with deliveries expected from 2028, and has bolstered its air force with Rafale jets to counter Turkey’s growing military aviation capabilities. Both nations view the potential sale as a direct threat to their security interests.

The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning-II is widely regarded as the most versatile fifth-generation fighter jet in service. Its advanced sensor fusion, stealth features, and multirole adaptability allow it to dominate battlefields while remaining virtually invisible to enemy radars.

Over 1,340 F-35s have been delivered globally, with ten countries operating them and eleven more awaiting deliveries. Production surged last year to 191 aircraft, clearing backlogs caused by earlier upgrade delays.

The jet comes in three variants: the F-35A for conventional take-off, the F-35B for short take-off and vertical landing, and the F-35C for carrier operations. While the F-22 Raptor remains superior in air combat manoeuvrability, the F-35 excels in networking and multirole missions. China’s J-20 and J-35, and Russia’s Su-57, represent rival fifth-generation platforms, though analysts generally agree they fall short of the F-35’s stealth and avionics standards.

Turkey was originally expelled from the Joint Strike Fighter program in 2019 due to fears that operating the Russian S-400 alongside the F-35 could expose sensitive stealth data to Moscow. Congress reinforced this position, making any transfer contingent on Turkey relinquishing the S-400. 

Ankara has not complied, instead escalating tensions with Israel and Greece, entrenching its military presence in northern Cyprus, and deepening ties with China in sectors such as telecommunications. 

Washington’s concerns over Chinese 5G infrastructure had previously derailed the UAE’s pursuit of the F-35, raising questions about whether the same standards should apply to Turkey. Any final decision is expected to hinge on whether Turkey agrees to transfer its S-400 systems to a third country.

For India, the implications are serious. Turkey and Pakistan have forged a close defence partnership centred on joint development and technology-sharing. Pakistani engineers are actively involved in Turkey’s KAAN stealth fighter program, while Pakistan has integrated Turkish drones such as the Bayraktar-TB2 and Anka UAVs into its arsenal.

Agreements between Turkish Aerospace Industries and Pakistan’s NESCOM focus on joint production of MALE drones, while Turkish munitions like the Kemankes cruise missile have been procured to enhance Pakistan’s air force.

During Operation Sindoor, Turkey provided Pakistan with over 350 drones and deployed military advisors to coordinate strikes against Indian targets. Ankara also openly condemned India’s actions during the operation, further cementing its alignment with Islamabad.

The Turkey-Pakistan nexus significantly alters the regional balance, giving Pakistan access to advanced aerospace and drone technologies. Analysts warn that combining Turkish drone expertise with Chinese sensor suites could accelerate Pakistan’s C4ISR capabilities. This trilateral China-Pakistan-Turkey axis poses a growing challenge to India’s regional influence.

In response, New Delhi has deepened defence ties with Armenia, Cyprus, Greece, and Israel. Armenia became the first foreign buyer of India’s Akash SAM system in 2022, while Greece and Israel conduct joint exercises with India focusing on air combat and naval interoperability. India has also expanded its naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and backed the India-Middle East Economic Corridor, which bypasses Turkey.

Israel views the potential F-35 sale as a direct threat to its qualitative military edge in the Middle East. Netanyahu has highlighted Turkey’s ties to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that Ankara is no longer a reliable US ally.

Opposition to the sale has become a declared policy at the highest levels of Israeli politics. For Greece, the sale risks triggering an arms race in the Eastern Mediterranean, where disputes over territorial waters and airspace remain unresolved. Both nations are pressing Washington to reconsider, but Trump’s unpredictability leaves the final outcome uncertain.

India faces a new strategic headache. A stronger Turkey armed with F-35s would embolden its partnership with Pakistan, potentially undermining India’s deterrence posture. The convergence of Chinese hard power, Turkish drone capabilities, and Pakistani operational readiness represents a formidable challenge.

India must not only strengthen its own military capabilities but also reinforce partnerships in West Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean. The evolving dynamics highlight the need for India to prepare for a more assertive Turkey and to navigate the uncertainties of Trump’s foreign policy decisions.

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Sri Lanka Rejects Pakistan’s JF-17C Offer, Leaves Air Force Facing Immediate Capability Gap

Sri Lanka has officially declined Pakistan’s proposal to supply 6–10 JF-17C Block‑III fighters and also rejected an accompanying Pakistan Air Force training contingent, signalling a clear policy choice by Colombo away from that procurement route.

The offer included the latest JF‑17C Block‑III variant, a China–Pakistan co‑developed light multi-role fighter, which Pakistan has actively marketed to regional customers.

Alongside the aircraft proposal, Pakistan offered to deploy a PAF training team to assist with induction and operational familiarisation, but Colombo turned that offer down as well.

The dual rejection reflects a strategic shift by Sri Lanka towards exploring alternative modern fighter platforms rather than committing to the JF‑17 program.

Sri Lanka’s current combat fleet is dominated by ageing IAI Kfir multi-role fighters and Chengdu F‑7 interceptors, both of which are approaching obsolescence and face imminent retirement, creating an urgent capability shortfall.

The approaching withdrawal of Kfirs and F‑7s will leave gaps across air‑defence, interception and limited multi-role strike roles unless replacement aircraft are procured or interim solutions found.

Comparison of Options

Aircraft	Origin	Cost (Approx)	Strengths	Weaknesses
JF-17C Block-III	Pakistan/China	$25–30M per unit	AESA radar, BVR missiles, low cost	Concerns over reliability, logistics, political baggage
IAI Kfir (Current)	Israel	Legacy fleet	Proven combat record	Obsolete avionics, high maintenance
Chengdu F-7 (Current)	China	Legacy fleet	Cheap to operate	Outdated design, poor survivability
Saab Gripen-C/D	Sweden	$45–55M per unit	Advanced avionics, low operating cost	Higher upfront cost
KAI FA-50	South Korea	$30–35M per unit	Affordable, modern trainer/light fighter	Limited range and payload

Budget constraints in Colombo complicate any rapid modernisation; the defence budget is limited and competing fiscal priorities force a trade‑off between affordability and operational requirements.

High acquisition and life‑cycle costs for Western fighters remain a major barrier, pushing Sri Lanka to weigh cheaper alternatives, second‑hand markets, lease arrangements or creative financing to bridge the gap.

Defence analysts note Sri Lanka may now look towards Western light fighters such as the Saab Gripen or Korea’s FA‑50 as potential options, or consider second‑hand platforms from friendly nations to provide a stop‑gap capability.

Each of those alternatives has distinct advantages and drawbacks: Western types may offer superior avionics, weapons integration and political interoperability but come at a higher price and with complex support demands.

Second‑hand purchases or leases could reduce near‑term costs and shorten induction timelines, but they bring questions over remaining service life, upgrade potential, and long‑term sustainment logistics.

Sri Lanka’s rejection of the JF‑17 offer may also be read through a diplomatic lens; it could indicate a desire in Colombo to maintain or strengthen defence ties with India and Western partners while limiting deeper dependence on Islamabad or Beijing.

Regional geopolitics matter: New Delhi has in the past expressed reservations about South Asian states acquiring certain fighter types, and Sri Lanka’s decision will be observed closely by neighbours and external partners.

Operationally, the SLAF faces elevated risk in maintaining credible air defence posture over national airspace and maritime approaches in the Indian Ocean region if a replacement plan is not rapidly finalised.

Absent timely acquisition, capability shortfalls could affect peacetime air policing, maritime surveillance support, and the SLAF’s ability to contribute to regional cooperative security or crisis response.

Practical procurement pathways Sri Lanka may consider include direct purchase, lease, through‑the‑life support packages, foreign military financing or phased acquisition to spread costs over multiple budgets.

Another route could be to accept a smaller initial tranche of aircraft with guaranteed logistics support and training, paired with a roadmap for upgrades and local sustainment to lower long‑term costs.

Joint training agreements and basing arrangements with friendly air forces could mitigate short‑term training and operational familiarisation needs without full platform acquisition from a single supplier.

Colombo might also evaluate multi-role helicopters, UAVs, maritime patrol aircraft and enhanced ground‑based air‑defence systems as complementary measures to partially offset the loss of fixed‑wing fighter capability.

Logistics, spares supply chains and industrial support were likely factors in rejecting the JF‑17 offer; concerns about maintenance, parts availability and sovereign control over upgrades often weigh heavily in small‑air force procurements.

Pakistan has been actively marketing the JF‑17 to several countries, including Nigeria and Myanmar, but buyer hesitation has sometimes centred on performance perceptions, sustainment assurances and wider political alignment.

For Sri Lanka, a decision to purchase from Pakistan or the wider China–Pakistan axis would have implications for interoperability, long‑term support, and diplomatic signalling in the region.

Any future procurement will need to balance cost, capability, sustainment footprint, training pathways and diplomatic considerations to deliver a practicable and politically acceptable solution.

Given fiscal limits, Colombo may increasingly rely on pragmatic, incremental approaches—such as targeted capability purchases, foreign support for maintenance, and multinational training—to manage the transition.

If Sri Lanka opts for Western types, expect protracted negotiations over price, offsets, industrial participation, and training; if it seeks second‑hand jets, expect careful technical vetting and contingency planning for sustainment.

In the near term, the SLAF must prioritise force‑preservation measures: extending airframe service lives where safe, cannibalising parts for high‑priority assets, and intensifying cooperation with regional partners for surveillance and interception tasks.

Operational planners will need to model several replacement timelines and budget scenarios, including worst‑case gaps, to ensure minimal erosion of national air‑defence capability.

Political leaders in Colombo will face a delicate balancing act between securing capable platforms, protecting sovereign decision‑making, and managing relations with India, Pakistan, China and Western suppliers.

The JF‑17 rejection thus marks a turning point in Sri Lanka’s defence aviation strategy and sets the stage for a careful, cost‑conscious search for replacements that meet operational needs and geopolitical priorities.

Example Illustration: Taking a two‑phase approach — immediate leases or second‑hand buys for short‑term coverage, with a planned multi‑year procurement of a modern, supportable light fighter — could be a feasible path for Sri Lanka given budgetary constraints and strategic sensitivities.

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Australia Voices Concern Over China’s Missile Test During Modi‑Albanese Talks

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese raised concerns over China’s recent long‑range ballistic missile test from a submarine during his meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Melbourne. 

Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri confirmed that the issue was discussed and that a certain amount of concern was expressed about the development.

Misri explained that Prime Minister Modi emphasised India’s view of the Indo‑Pacific as a region where peace, security and stability must prevail. He noted that Australia and India share common interests and objectives in this regard and will continue to exchange perspectives while intensifying cooperation to ensure stability in the Indo‑Pacific.

China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy carried out a rare nuclear submarine‑launched ballistic missile test earlier in the week. The missile, fitted with a dummy warhead, was launched into the Pacific Ocean and landed in a designated maritime area.

Reports indicated that the missile flew across the exclusive economic zones of the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Kiribati and Tuvalu before landing near the boundary of either Kiribati or Tuvalu.

The test drew criticism from Australia and New Zealand, both warning that such actions could undermine regional peace and stability. Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong described the launch as destabilising, highlighting China’s rapid military expansion and the lack of transparency surrounding Beijing’s intentions. She stressed that China must explain the purpose behind the test.

During the media briefing, Misri also addressed questions about Australia and Fiji signing the Ocean of Peace Alliance. He clarified that specific countries were not discussed, but cooperation between India and Australia regarding Pacific Island nations did figure in the talks.

He pointed to the Forum for India‑Pacific Islands Cooperation framework, under which India undertakes several initiatives. He added that India remains in close coordination with Australia through other mechanisms, including the Quad, to advance cooperation with Pacific Island countries.

Prime Minister Modi is currently on a three‑day visit to Australia, with defence, nuclear and critical minerals agreements forming part of the landmark pacts signed during the trip. His outreach also includes diaspora engagement and discussions with Albanese on strengthening bilateral ties.

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Bangladesh To Buy Chinese J-10CE Jets Used In Operation Sindoor — New Security Calculus For India

Bangladesh is reportedly preparing to acquire 24 Chinese J-10CE fighter jets, a move that signals one of Dhaka’s most ambitious defence modernisation steps under its long-running Forces Goal 2030 program, according to a report by India Today.

The deal, expected to be signed during Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s visit to China and finalised by August, is valued at around $2.2 billion. Deliveries could begin in late 2026 or early 2027, with Beijing providing training, logistics, spares, and long-term sustainment support.

The J-10CE is the export variant of the Chengdu J-10C, a 4.5-generation multi-role fighter jet powered by the WS-10B turbofan engine. It can reach speeds of Mach 1.8 and is designed for air defence and maritime strike missions.

Its delta-wing and canard configuration, supported by digital fly-by-wire systems, gives it exceptional agility in dogfights and missile evasion. The aircraft can carry up to 5,600 kilograms of ordnance across 11 hardpoints, including bombs, precision-guided munitions, and advanced air-to-air missiles.

A key feature of the J-10CE is its advanced AESA radar, capable of tracking multiple targets while resisting jamming. It can also deploy the long-range PL-15 missile, enabling beyond-visual-range engagements.

For Bangladesh, which currently operates a modest fleet of around 40–44 aircraft, including ageing Chengdu F-7/J-7s and a handful of MiG-29s, the acquisition would represent a dramatic leap in capability.

Bangladesh’s pursuit of the J-10CE aligns with its need for versatile platforms that can perform multiple missions efficiently, given its limited defence budget. Each jet is expected to cost around $40 million, significantly cheaper than Western alternatives such as the Rafale or F-16, which can exceed $120 million per unit. This affordability makes the J-10CE an attractive option for Dhaka.

The deal also coincides with Bangladesh’s reported modernisation of a World War II-era airbase in Lalmonirhat, just 20 kilometres from the Indian border.

The base is being upgraded with hangars, repair facilities, and advanced radar systems. While Dhaka has denied claims that the base will host missile or drone systems targeting India, the timing of the modernisation alongside the fighter acquisition has raised eyebrows in New Delhi.

From India’s perspective, the induction of J-10CE fighters into the Bangladesh Air Force is unlikely to alter the immediate military balance. The Indian Air Force’s Eastern Air Command already maintains four squadrons in Assam and West Bengal, equipped with Su-30MKIs and Rafales, amounting to 60–70 modern combat aircraft. India’s superior numbers, advanced air defence systems, and robust command-and-control networks ensure a decisive edge.

However, the presence of J-10CE fighters on both sides of India’s borders — with Pakistan already operating 20 and ordering 16 more — could push New Delhi to accelerate its own fighter procurement plans. The deployment of advanced Chinese aircraft in both Pakistan and Bangladesh underscores Beijing’s growing military footprint around India.

Beyond the military balance, the acquisition deepens Bangladesh’s dependence on China. Operating the J-10CE requires continuous access to Chinese spare parts, technical expertise, software updates, and weapons systems. This reliance strengthens Beijing’s influence in Dhaka, adding a new layer to its strategic presence in India’s eastern neighbourhood.

Closer military ties between Bangladesh and China could also facilitate intelligence sharing and interoperability with Pakistan, which used the J-10CE during Operation Sindoor against Indian jets. This triangular dynamic may complicate India’s strategic calculus, even if the immediate threat remains manageable.

Bangladesh’s broader engagement with China extends beyond defence. Projects such as the Teesta River Barrage and infrastructure developments around Mongla highlight Dhaka’s multi-vector approach to cooperation with Beijing. The J-10CE deal, therefore, is not just about military modernisation but also about embedding China more deeply into Bangladesh’s economic and strategic landscape.

For India, the development reinforces the need to monitor China’s expanding influence in South Asia. While the balance of power remains in India’s favour, the growing presence of advanced Chinese platforms in neighbouring countries adds complexity to the regional security environment.

Agencies

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China’s Arms Ambitions Falter As Pakistan Remains Its Sole Anchor

China’s arms export ambitions remain constrained despite decades of investment, with Pakistan as its overwhelmingly dominant client. While Beijing ranks among the top five global arms sellers, its weapons remain largely untested in modern warfare, limiting credibility compared to Western rivals.

China has invested heavily in its defence industry, building advanced technology and offering low-cost systems with few political conditions. Yet its share of global arms exports has grown only modestly. The lack of combat testing is a major handicap. Unlike the United States, Russia, or France, China has not fought a major war in nearly fifty years, leaving its equipment unproven in contemporary battlefields.

The 2025 clash between India and Pakistan was the first real test of Chinese systems. Pakistan claimed its Chinese-made J-10C fighters shot down Indian aircraft supplied by France. India confirmed losing at least one aircraft, but the four-day conflict offered limited evidence of durability or quality. Even so, the episode thrust Chinese arms into the spotlight.

Attention has also turned to China’s support for Iran in its confrontation with the United States and Israel. While no direct deployment of Chinese weapons has been confirmed, Beijing has supplied dual-use technologies such as missile and drone components, and Iran may be using China’s satellite navigation system.

However, most of this support predates the current hostilities, with Beijing’s role largely economic rather than military.

Analysts argue that China’s reluctance to commit militarily to partners undermines its export ambitions. Countries buy not just equipment but long-term security relationships. Beijing’s hesitancy to back allies such as Iran and Venezuela when challenged by Washington has limited its appeal to new buyers.

Pakistan remains the cornerstone of China’s arms trade. Between 2021 and 2025, 80% of Pakistan’s imports came from China, up from 73% in the previous five years. This reflects Islamabad’s rivalry with India and its deteriorating ties with Washington, which once supplied nearly equal shares of Pakistan’s arsenal.

China has filled the vacuum, providing fighter jets, missiles, radars, and air defence systems. Last year, Beijing even admitted its personnel supported Pakistan during the confrontation with India. Following the clash, Islamabad raised its defence budget by 20%, boosting sales for AVIC Chengdu Aircraft, maker of the J-10C.

Beyond Pakistan, China’s client base is thin. Of its top ten customers, only Saudi Arabia ranks among the world’s twenty largest importers, and Riyadh receives just 1% of Chinese exports.

Its deep partnership with Washington limits further expansion of ties with Beijing. Other buyers in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America remain small-scale and often face operational issues with Chinese systems, such as drone crashes and tank defects.

China’s potential should not be dismissed. It possesses one of the few comprehensive defence industries outside the United States, capable of producing end-to-end systems. Yet its exports lag behind its dominance in sectors like cars, ships, and batteries. Without combat validation, its weapons remain less attractive to mainstream buyers.

To improve credibility, China must expand joint military exercises and showcase its equipment at international defence exhibitions. More importantly, it must offer deeper strategic relationships, not just hardware. Until then, its arms trade will remain concentrated, with Pakistan as the anchor and modest gains elsewhere.

Agencies

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Bangladesh To Acquire J-10CE Fighter Jets From China Amid Strategic Partnership Expansion

Bangladesh is moving closer to a major defence acquisition from China, with reports indicating that Dhaka is likely to purchase J-10CE fighter jets. According to the Daily Waadaa, the plan involves acquiring 24 of these advanced multi-role aircraft during Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s visit to China, which began on Monday.

Officials have suggested that the agreement could be signed by August this year, marking a significant step in Bangladesh–China defence cooperation.

Each J-10CE aircraft is valued at approximately $40 million. A Chinese delegation visited Dhaka last week to accelerate negotiations, while Bangladeshi officials are expected to hold separate meetings with China’s foreign and defence ministers during the Prime Minister’s trip to finalise the details of the proposed acquisition. The defence discussions are part of a broader agenda aimed at elevating Bangladesh–China relations to new heights.

Bangladesh and China are set to sign 17 deals during the visit, including 15 memoranda of understanding, two agreements, one protocol, and one action plan. The Bangladesh Foreign Secretary described China as a very close friend, strategic partner, and crucial commercial ally, noting that the relationship has now advanced to a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership built on mutual trust, respect, and cooperation.

The Foreign Secretary also mentioned that discussions on the Teesta project will take place, though he did not elaborate further. He confirmed that the four major initiatives of Chinese President Xi Jinping will be warmly welcomed by Bangladesh. Military cooperation remains a central theme of the visit, alongside traditional bilateral relations and economic collaboration.

Prime Minister Rahman has also been invited by the President and CEO of the World Economic Forum to participate in the 17th Annual Meeting of the New Champions, known as “Summer Davos”, in Dalian, China. This summit brings together global leaders, policymakers, innovators, and experts to deliberate on the future of the global economy, emerging technologies, and sustainable development. The Prime Minister will arrive in Dalian on a special flight later in the evening.

High-level bilateral meetings are scheduled with the President and CEO of the WEF, as well as with leaders from Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Vietnam, and South Korea. Bilateral engagements with China will also be pursued during the summit. Prime Minister Rahman is expected to deliver a keynote speech at a plenary session titled “Climate Leadership in a Changing Global Landscape”, underscoring Bangladesh’s role in global climate discourse.

This visit reflects Dhaka’s intent to deepen ties with Beijing across defence, trade, infrastructure, and investment, while simultaneously positioning itself on the global stage through participation in major international forums.

ANI

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Pakistan Plans to Deploy New Hangor-Class Submarines in the Bay of Bengal

Pakistan’s decision to deploy its new China-built Hangor-class submarine in the Bay of Bengal marks a striking development in South Asian naval dynamics, reported India Today.

The arrival of PNS Hangor in Karachi has revived memories of the 1971 war, when its predecessor sank India’s INS Khukri, though Pakistan ultimately suffered a crushing defeat and lost its eastern wing, leading to the creation of Bangladesh.

For over five decades, Pakistan’s naval presence remained confined to the Arabian Sea, but senior officers now openly speak of projecting power into the Bay of Bengal, a theatre where India has long enjoyed dominance.

The Hangor-class submarine, commissioned in China in April and escorted home via Sri Lanka, is the first of eight such vessels planned for induction. Commodore Omer Farooq described the submarine as a “game changer” that could allow Pakistan to maintain a presence in the Bay of Bengal.

This ambition is significant because the region hosts India’s Eastern Naval Command at Visakhapatnam, is close to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and serves as a vital hub for trade and energy flows between India and Bangladesh. The Bay of Bengal has also become a focal point of Indo-Pacific competition, with littoral states including Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka adding to its geopolitical weight.

Pakistan’s naval modernisation effort is centred on these Hangor-class submarines, which are equipped with Air-Independent Propulsion technology, enabling them to remain submerged for extended periods and making them harder to detect.

Analysts believe the class could eventually serve as a platform for Pakistan’s sea-based nuclear capability, though Islamabad has not confirmed this. The revival of the Hangor name underscores the symbolic value attached to its legacy, even as the strategic environment today is vastly different, with India operating nuclear-powered submarines, aircraft carriers, and long-range surveillance assets.

The timing of Pakistan’s ambition coincides with improving ties with Bangladesh. Since the ouster of Sheikh Hasina’s government in 2024, Islamabad has made significant inroads in Dhaka.

Direct flights between Karachi and Dhaka have resumed, cultural exchanges have flourished, and bilateral trade has surged. Military cooperation has deepened, with Bangladesh expressing interest in acquiring JF-17 fighter jets and participating in joint maritime exercises.

In November 2025, Pakistan Navy frigate PNS Saif docked in Chattogram, marking the first visit by a Pakistani warship to Bangladesh since 1971. Reports suggest Dhaka and Islamabad are negotiating a mutual defence agreement, though no formal hosting of Pakistani assets has been announced.

These developments raise the possibility of Pakistani naval assets operating more frequently in the eastern Indian Ocean. While Bangladesh under Tarique Rahman has also strengthened ties with India, the warming of Dhaka-Islamabad relations introduces new complexities.

Pakistan’s presence in the Bay of Bengal, even if limited, could be viewed as an irritant by India, which considers the region its strategic front yard. India’s expanding capabilities around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands further highlight the competitive environment.

Pakistan’s naval expansion reflects its desire to move beyond coastal defence and establish a wider operational footprint in the Indian Ocean. The induction of eight Hangor-class submarines represents its largest naval modernisation in decades.

Although Pakistan may not alter the balance of power in the Bay of Bengal, its ambitions signal a shift in regional dynamics, with implications for India, Bangladesh, and the broader Indo-Pacific.

Agencies

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Pakistan’s Fighter Jet Momentum Highlights Urgent Need For India To Accelerate TEJAS And AMCA Programs

Pakistan has accelerated its fighter jet modernisation with the JF‑17 Thunder fleet nearing 200 aircraft, while India’s TEJAS MK1A continues to face delays and the AMCA program risks slipping behind regional rivals.

Unless India speeds up production and integration, Pakistan’s pace—backed by Chinese collaboration—could erode India’s technological edge.

Pakistan’s JF‑17 Thunder program has achieved significant momentum. The Pakistan Aeronautical Complex at Kamra is producing between sixteen and twenty‑five aircraft annually, ensuring steady induction into the Pakistan Air Force.

The fleet now numbers around two hundred aircraft, replacing older legacy fighters and forming the backbone of Pakistan’s modernisation drive. The Block-III variant incorporates advanced features such as AESA radar, electronic warfare systems, sensor fusion, and long‑range beyond‑visual‑range missiles. 

This makes the JF‑17 a credible multirole platform, especially when combined with China’s support and the prospect of future access to the FC‑31 stealth fighter.

India’s TEJAS MK1A program, by contrast, is struggling with persistent delays. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited has faced supply chain bottlenecks, particularly with engine deliveries from GE Aerospace. Out of ninety‑nine engines ordered, only six have been delivered, forcing HAL to invoke contractual penalties.

The ₹48,000 crore contract for eighty‑three MK-1A aircraft was originally scheduled for deliveries beginning in 2024–25, but timelines have slipped by more than two years. Airframes are ready, yet full integration and operational clearance remain pending. This has raised concerns about the Indian Air Force’s ability to maintain squadron strength in the near term.

The Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft project is India’s long‑term answer to fifth‑generation airpower. Designed as a twin‑engine stealth fighter with internal weapons bays, advanced sensors, and AI‑enabled systems, the AMCA is expected to enter service by 2034–35. However, the program faces structural challenges.

Unlike China’s vertically integrated approach to the J‑20, India is attempting to build AMCA across multiple bureaucracies, with design authority under the Aeronautical Development Agency, R&D under DRDO, and production shifted to private industry for the first time.

The MK-1 variant will rely on foreign engines, while the MK-2 aims for a co‑developed indigenous solution. This fragmented process risks slowing progress at a time when Pakistan is aligning itself with Chinese fifth‑generation pathways.

The export market further highlights the divergence. Pakistan’s JF‑17 has secured multiple contracts abroad due to affordability, delivery speed, and sanction resilience.

India’s TEJAS, despite its technical promise, has struggled to convert interest into firm orders because of production delays and credibility concerns. For many air forces seeking immediate capability, the JF‑17 offers a deployable solution, while the TEJAS still asks for patience.

India’s challenge is therefore twofold. First, it must accelerate TEJAS MK-1A deliveries to stabilise squadron strength and reassure export customers. Second, it must ensure the AMCA program avoids the pitfalls of bureaucratic fragmentation and lowest‑bidder procurement logic.

Without decisive acceleration, India risks ceding both regional and global ground to Pakistan’s faster, alliance‑driven approach.

Agencies

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LR-LACM Validates Tomahawk‑Comparable Capabilities Achieves Textbook Success During Trials, Puts Chinese, Pak Cities Within Strike Range

India has achieved a textbook success in its cruise missile program with the first successful test firing of the Long Range Land Attack Cruise Missile (LRLACM) from the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur in Odisha on 15 June.

This missile, often described as the Indian equivalent of the US Tomahawk, marks a decisive step forward after the setbacks faced during the Nirbhay experiment. The trial demonstrated flawless performance, hitting a target at a distance of 1000 kilometres with all previous issues resolved.

Officials confirmed that the missile is a successor to the failed Nirbhay but incorporates extended range and advanced precision guidance. It is designed to be launched from multiple platforms, enhancing operational flexibility for the armed forces. The missile will undergo two more developmental trials followed by two user trials over the next two years before formal induction into service.

The LRLACM has a speed of up to 0.8 Mach and is capable of flying at land‑skimming altitudes, making it extremely difficult for enemy radars to detect. It carries a 500‑kilogram warhead, providing destructive capability against high‑value targets. The weapon is seen as a critical addition to India’s arsenal, offering stand‑off strike capability at ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometres.

Pakistan has fielded its Babur cruise missile since 2010, with a range of 900 kilometres. The Babur was reportedly reverse‑engineered from an unexploded US Tomahawk missile recovered after a 1998 strike against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Pakistan received technical support from China in its development, effectively gaining access to Tomahawk technology. China itself possesses a wide range of conventional and nuclear cruise missiles, underscoring the competitive environment in the region.

The Indian missile’s success comes at a time when stand‑off weapons are increasingly shaping modern warfare. Long‑range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and rockets are becoming central to the Army’s rocket regiments, ensuring preparedness against the People’s Liberation Army’s missile capabilities in worst‑case scenarios.

The LRLACM therefore represents not only a technological achievement but also a strategic necessity for India’s defence posture.

India’s LRLACM, with its extended range, could cover large parts of Pakistan including Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Faisalabad and Karachi. Karachi is particularly significant as Pakistan’s largest economic hub and home to key naval facilities.

When deployed along the northern or eastern sectors near the Line of Actual Control, the missile could also reach strategic Chinese locations such as Lhasa, Chengdu, Urumqi and Kunming. These cities host important military and economic infrastructure, underscoring the missile’s potential to alter regional strategic balances.

This test also reflects India’s broader push towards self‑reliance in defence technology under the Aatmanirbhar Bharat initiative. By overcoming the limitations of the Nirbhay and producing a missile with extended range and precision, DRDO has demonstrated the maturity of indigenous systems and the ability to deliver operationally relevant capabilities. The success strengthens deterrence and enhances India’s credibility as a missile power in Asia.

Agencies

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